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INTRODUCTIONA laska is a land of extremes.' More than twice the size of Tex-
as, the state is marked by extraordinary variations in topogra-
phy and climate. This variability extends also to the region's econo-
my. More than half of Alaska's population lives in the urban, com-
mercial centers of Anchorage and Fairbanks. Another quarter of the
population is scattered among some 200 rural villages in all comers
of the "Great Land."2 Life in these villages is quite different from
life in Alaska's urban centers.3 Transportation is difficult, expen-
sive, and often slow. Industry is almost nonexistent. Natural re-
sources are extracted, but are exported from the region for process-
1. See CLAUSE-M. NASKE & HERMAN E. SLOTNICK, ALASKA, A HISTORY OF
THE 49TH STATE 5-9 (2d ed. 1987) (describing geography, population, and cli-
mate).
2. See id. In 1980, 26.8 percent of the population lived in places with less
than 1,000 people. Id. at 302.
3. See FEDERAL FIELD COMMITrEE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN ALAS-
KA, ALAsKA NATIVES AND THE LAND 39-81 (report to Senate Committee on In-
terior and Insular Affairs, Oct. 1, 1968) (describing life in rural Native villages
prior to Congress' enactment of Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971)
[hereinafter FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT]. The contrast between urban and village
life did not disappear when Congress settled Native land claims and set aside
certain federal lands so that village and state authorities could select the remain-
der for development. See THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JouRNEY 42-47 (1985)
(report of Alaska Native Review Commission).
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ing.4 Because there are few year-round jobs and little commerce,
the cash economy is minimal.5 Villagers live largely, as they have
for centuries, off the land.6 The name used to describe this rural
economy is "subsistence."7
The subsistence economy dominates every aspect of village life.'
4. Alaska's principal resource revenues are from oil which is exported to
other states for refining. See NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 1, at 266-69, 272
(describing operation of trans-Alaska pipeline and dependence of state govern-
ment on oil revenues). See also FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 55
(describing villagers' migration to obtain seasonal wage employment in remote
fish canneries).
5. See Robert Wolfe, Myths-What Have You Heard?, ALASKA FISH &
GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 16, 18 (describing "mixed subsistence-cash econo-
mies" that characterize Alaska's rural areas).
6. See id.; JAMES H. BARKER, ALWAYS GETTING READY:
UPTERRLAINARLUTA, YUP'IK ESKIMO SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHWEST ALASKA 20
(1993); see also FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 13, 50-54.
7. BERGER, supra note 3, at 51-59; Martha Lee, Northern Voic-
es--Subsistence Hinges on Labor, Trade, Land's Resources, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 10, 1994, at C3; see Steve Behnke, Editorial, ALASKA FISH & GAME,
Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 1. In addition to a complex economic system involving coop-
erative effort, sharing of the harvest, and trade, "subsistence" also denotes activi-
ties that have great social, cultural, and religious significance for many villagers.
See David S. Case, Subsistence and Self-Determination: Can Alaska Natives
Have a More "Effective Voice"?, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 1009, 1009-10 (1989);
Marilyn J. Twitchell, Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell: Federal
Subsistence Protection Ends at Alaska's Border, 18 ENVTL. L. 635, 635-36, 638-
40 (1988); infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
8. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 48-59; see also FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 50-54 (while degree of dependence various by region, most vil-
lage Alaskans survive, in some measure, by hunting, fishing, and gathering); see
generally BARKER, supra note 6, passim (documenting subsistence lifestyle of
contemporary southwest Alaskan Eskimos). The Alaskan subsistence economy is
estimated to produce over 40,000,000 pounds of food per year. Jim Magdanz,
River Trip-A Personal Exploration of Contemporary Subsistence Life, 21 ALAS-
KA FISH & GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 41, 43. Three quarters of all Native fami-
lies in smaller villages derive at least 50 percent of their food from subsistence.
H.R. REP. No. 1045, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 181-82 (1978). The Division
of Subsistence of the Alaska State Department of Fish and Game has published
over 150 technical papers analyzing subsistence activities in Alaskan villages. See
Behnke, supra note 7, at 1; cf Robert G. Bosworth, Describing Subsistence,
ALASKA FISH & GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 31, 31-33 (discussing methods used
by sociologists to gather subsistence data). These papers are available from the
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Village residents follow the cycles of nature by hunting, fishing,
and gathering wild plants as the seasons dictate. Many of the villag-
ers are Alaska Natives whose ancestors followed these cycles.9
From their ancestors, they received the wealth of knowledge that
makes it possible for them to survive by subsistence. Although air
strips, schools, and electrification, as well as modem tools such as
outboards and snowmobiles, have touched village life,"0 daily tasks
are still accomplished through the traditional methods of gathering,
processing, storing, and preparing wild food." Integrated with
Division of Subsistence, Dept. of Fish and Game, Box 3-2000, Juneau, AK
99802.
9. See Twitchell, supra note 7, at 636; see also DAVID S. CASE, ALASKA
NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 275-76, 334, 339-41, 344-45, 349-51, 354-56
(1984) (defining legal elements of traditional Native subsistence, positing federal
trust responsibility to protect Native subsistence, and summarizing subsistence
history of Native regions); cf. Wolfe, supra note 5, at 16 (in 1989, about 45 per-
cent of rural villagers legally qualified for subsistence preference were Natives).
Native villages generally harvest more wild foods per capita than non-Native
villages, because of differences in factors such as personal income and distance
from the transportation system. See Alaskans' Per Capita Harvests of Wild
Foods, ALASKA FISH & GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 14-15. This Article follows
the accepted convention of referring to Natives and villages as "Alaska" and
"Alaskan" interchangeably. FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at i.
10. See H.R. REP.NO. 1045, supra note 8, at 76; BARKER, supra note 6, at
19-22, 73 (Eskimos always have been quick to adapt new technology that makes
subsistence safer and more efficient); Wolfe, supra note 5, at 19 (subsistence
users have long adopted "appropriate technology" like guns, fish nets, outboard
motors, and snowmobiles for use alongside traditional subsistence tools); Robert
Wolfe, Tools: A Crucial Difference, ALASKA FISH & GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at
20, 20-23 (describing mix of traditional and modem tools adopted by Yup'ik Es-
kimos for hunting and fishing along Bering Sea coast); LAEL MORGAN, AND THE
LAND PROVIDES 280-316 (1974) (account of Athabascan Indian subsistence using
mix of traditional and modem tools).
11. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 52; see generally BARKER, supra note 6,
passim (describing subsistence methods used by Yup'ik Eskimos); cf. THOMAS R.
BERGER, A LONG AND TERRIBLE SHADOW-WHITE VALUES, NATIVE RIGHTS IN
THE AMERICAS 1492-1992, at 129-32 (1991) (suggesting that the subsistence
economy of northern Native villages should not, and cannot, ever be replaced by
a cash economy); Wolfe, supra note 5, at 19 (subsistence harvests remain essen-
tial, but are threatened by new roads, commercial fishing, and laws that restrict
access); Terry Haynes & Sverre Pedersen, Development and Subsistence: Life
After Oil, ALASKA FISH & GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 24, 24-27 (economies of
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these daily tasks are the family and community structures of the
village. 2 Subsistence is central to coming-of-age rites, ritual food
sharing, and religious ceremonial offerings in Native culture. 3
Some villagers also view subsistence culture as a bulwark against
urban cultural values and. as a key to political self-determination. 4
Inupiat Eskimos and Athabaskan Indians still depend upon subsistence that is
threatened by restricted access and hunting competition brought by North Slope
oil development). The principal subsistence food is fish, which comprises by
weight some 65 percent of Alaska's subsistence harvest. Wolfe, supra note 5, at
17. Villagers harvest more weight of subsistence foods per capita than the amount
of fish and meat that other Americans buy, because the villagers substitute these
foods for milk, fruit, vegetables, and grains. See id. at 16; Alaskans' Per Capita
Harvests of Wild Foods, supra note 9, at 15. In addition to food, the subsistence
economy supplies villagers with material for clothing, fuel, construction; and
housewares. Wolfe, supra note 5, at 16-17. Subsistence also provides material for
saleable handicrafts and customary trade with other regions. See id. at 17-18; cf.
United States v. Alexander, 938 F.2d 942, 945-46 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing
meaning of "customary trade" within federal definition of subsistence); United
States v. Skinna, 915 F.2d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 1990).
12. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 55-59 (describing role of subsistence econo-
my in Native village life); see also Wolfe, supra note 5, at 19 (most productive
households contribute to community welfare by regularly sharing subsistence
resources with villagers less able to gather them); Magdanz, supra note 8, at 41,
44 (same); cf. id. at 43 (subsistence is estimated to produce over 40,000,000
pounds of food per year); H.R. REP. No. 1045, supra note 8, at 181-82 (cultural
and social life of villagers continues to be based on subsistence).
13. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 51-55; see also Hannah B. Loon, Sharing:
You are Never Alone in a Village, ALASKA FISH & GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at
34, 36 (describing different types of equitable, charitable, and ceremonial sharing
of subsistence harvests in Inupiaq Eskimo villages); BARKER, supra note 6, at 20,
37, 130 (discussing role of subsistence rituals in religion of contemporary Yup'ik
Eskimo villages); Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1069-70, 1072-73 (Alaska 1979)
(describing use of subsistence foods in funeral rituals or "potlach").
14. See BARKER, supra note 6, at 21-22; BERGER, supra note 3, at 72, 171-72;
cf. Case, supra note 7, at 1032-35 (advocating co-management of wildlife re-
sources by Native villages and the state); TUNGAVIK FEDERATION OF NUNAVUT
& MINISTRY OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT OF CANADA,
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INUIT OF THE NUNAVUT SETTLEMENT AREA AND
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA §§ 5.1.3, 5.2.1, 5.2.33, 11.4.1,
11.4.5, 11.5.1, 11.5.10, 12.2.2, 12.2.6, 12.4.2, 12.5.6 (signed May 25, 1993) (trea-
ty establishing Eskimo homeland in central Canadian arctic and providing for co-
management of wildlife, and Native participation in land use planning and project
decisions).
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The cultural and social benefits of the subsistence economy derive
directly from the health of subsistence resources and the land base
that supports them.
In ancient times, semi-nomadic Natives used nearly all of
Alaska's territory for subsistence, migrating between traditional
hunting grounds. Although modem villages are more fixed, resi-
dents still follow the cycle of the seasons over vast areas to sub-
sist. 5 As Alaska's population grows, these areas become in-
creasingly subject to development for commercial uses. 6 Mining,
logging, oil drilling, and road building destroy wildlife habitats or
exclude villagers from traditional hunting grounds. Development
also increases motorized access, bringing competition from sport
and commercial harvesters of the same wildlife. 7 Lawmakers have
acted to protect subsistence users by giving them priority in fish
and game management regulations. 8 The villagers' livelihood still
depends, however, on whether the landowners develop the land. 9
Much of this land is controlled by federal agencies.2" Until
15. See FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 536-37; BARKER, supra
note 6, at 18-22, 48, 93; see also Mike Coffing, Bear Boats: Floating Home
From Squirrel Camp, ALASKA FISH & GAME, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 12, 12-13 (de-
scribing a contemporary seasonal migration combining traditional and modem
modes of transportation).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 1045, supra note 8, at 184; H.R. REP. No. 96, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 158 (1979).
17. See H.R. REP. No. 96, supra note 16, at 158; CASE, supra note 9, at 297;
BARKER, supra note 6, at 115; Haynes & Pedersen, supra note 11, at 26-27;
Christopher Smith, Subsistence: A Collision of Cultures, ALASKA LIVING, Aug.-
Sept. 1992, at 14, 16.
18. 16 U.S.C. § 3114 (1994); see 36 C.F.R. §§ 13.40(c), 242.10(d)(4) (1995);
50 C.F.R. § 100.10(d)(4) (1995); Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312,
313 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
19. Cf ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 100-04 (1978)
(discussing examples of threats to subsistence in villages from state and federal
projects proposed prior to Native claims settlement).
20. Currently, over sixty percent of Alaska is federally owned and adminis-
tered by federal agencies. Specific land ownership is as follows [Area (acres x
1,000,000) / Percentage of Alaska]:
Bureau of Land Management [88.7 / 24.21, National Park Service [52.7 / 15.0],
Fish & Wildlife Service [75.3 / 20.6], U.S. Forest Service [22.2 / 6.1], Defense,
other federal agencies [2.1 / 0.6], State of Alaska [87.4 / 23.9], Private: Native
corporations [36.1 / 10.0], Private: other owners [1.0 / 0.3], Total [365.5 / 100.7]
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Alaska attained statehood in 1959, nearly all of its approximately
375,000,000 acres was owned by the federal government.2' Con-
gress granted the new state the right to select 103,000,000 acres to
use for economic development.22 State selections threatened to de-
velop lands that Native groups traditionally had claimed as their
hunting grounds. In 1971, Congress settled these Native land
claims, granting some 44,000,000 acres of land to new Native cor-
porations.23 The settlement extinguished ancient Native hunting
and fishing rights, and Congress relied on state and federal land
24managers to protect subsistence. In 1980, Congress passed the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA").'
The statute formalized federal land holdings under the Park Service,
Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service, and Bureau of Land
Management. Recognizing that its Native claims settlement had
(data current through October 1, 1993). The percentages do not total exactly 100
percent, presumably because of rounding errors.
Less than 20,000,000 acres (i.e., less than 5.5 percent of Alaska) remain to
be transferred out of the federal domain to satisfy state and Native corporation
land claims. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF
LAND MANAGEMENT, AK-912: ALASKA LAND DISTRIBUTION (Jan. 1994) (unpub-
lished data sheet available from the Bureau of Land Management AK 973-B, 22
W. 7th Ave. #13, Anchorage, AK 99513-7599); see also NASKE & SLOTNICK,
supra note 1, at 236 (when land transfers are completed, ownership will be ap-
proximately 60 percent federal, 28 percent state, 12 percent Native corporation,
and 1 percent other private lands).
21. See NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 1, at 158 (in 1958, federal govern-
ment owned 99.8 percent of Alaska's 378,300,000 acres).
22. See id.; Alaska Statehood Act § 6(b), Pub. L. No. 85-508 § 6(b), 72 Stat.
339, 340 (1958); see also MARY C. BERRY, THE ALASKA PIPELINE-THE POLI-
TICS OF OIL AND NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 27-28 (1975) (discussing details of the
statehood land grants).
23. See ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 142, 144; Alaska Native Claims Settle-
ment Act of 1971, Pub L. No. 92-203 §§ 11, 12, 14, 85 Stat. 688, 696, 701, 702
(1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1610, 1611, 1613 (1994)). The
Native corporations received rights to select land from the federal domain, subject
to a complex relationship with state land selection priorities. See infra note 82.
24. See 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1994); Joint Statement of the Committee of
Conference, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1971), reprinted
in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2247, 2250.
25. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371-2551 (1980) (codified in part at 16
U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1994)).
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failed to protect subsistence, Congress, in Title VIII of ANILCA,
set management rules for subsistence on federal lands.26 Title VIII
broadened these subsistence protections to include all other Alaska
rural residents, in addition to Natives, but the rules remain contro-
versial today. Title VIII also included a provision requiring the
federal agencies to protect subsistence in their land-development
decisions-section 810.28
26. See Pub. L. No. 96-487, Title VIII, 94 Stat. 2422-2430 (1980) (codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 3111-3126 (1994)); see also 125 CONG. REc. 9,904 (daily ed. May
4, 1979) (statement of Rep. Udall) (since 1971, neither Interior Secretary nor
state has taken adequate steps to protect the economy and culture of rural resi-
dents); H.R. REP. No. 1045, supra note 8, at 185 (House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs expects Interior Secretary "to respond more vigorously" to federal
duty to protect subsistence than heretofore); S. REP. No. 1300, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 432 (1978) (supplemental views of Senators Abourezk, Ford, and Durkin)
(contrary to express intent of Native Claims Settlement Act, Interior Secretary
has declined to close public lands to other users for subsistence protection).
27. See ANILCA §§ 101(c), 801(1), 802(1), 803, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101(c),
3111(1), 3112(1), 3113 (1994) (referring to rural residents); Kenaitze Indian Tribe
v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 313 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (Congress broadened Title VIII
to include all rural residents so that conflict between state constitution and a
Native preference would be avoided), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989); see also
McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1989) (ANILCA preference for rural
residents violates the state constitution); Smith, supra note 17, at 23-26 (discuss-
ing recent controversy centered on Title VIII management requirements).
28. Subsection 810(a) reads:
§ 3120. Subsistence and land use decisions
(a) Factors considered; requirements
In determining whether to withdraw, reserve, lease, or otherwise per-
mit the use, occupancy, or disposition of public lands under any pro-
vision of law authorizing such actions, the head of the Federal agency
having primary jurisdiction over such lands or his designee shall eval-
uate the effect of such use, occupancy, or disposition on subsistence
uses and needs, the availability of other lands for the purposes sought
to be achieved, and other alternatives which would reduce or eliminate
the use, occupancy, or disposition of public lands needed for subsis-
tence purposes. No such withdrawal, reservation, lease, permit, or
other use, occupancy or disposition of such lands which would sig-
nificantly restrict subsistence uses shall be effected until the head of
such Federal agency-
(1) gives notice to the appropriate State agency and the appropriate
local committees and regional councils established pursuant to section
3115 of this title;
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Section 810 of ANILCA commands any federal agency planning
a project on public land to make an initial study of the subsistence
impacts and how to avoid them.29 If the impacts may be "signifi-
cant," the agency must make a further study, which begins with a
hearing.3" Then it must make three findings about the design of
the project. These findings are: (1) subsistence impacts are neces-
sary and consistent with sound management, (2) use of land is min-
imal, and (3) subsistence impacts will be minimized.3' If the
requirements of section 810 are met, the agency can proceed with
development.32
Villagers have attempted to enforce section 810 in court, focusing
on two issues. The first issue was how an agency should determine
whether a project may "significantly" impact subsistence. 3  In sev-
(2) gives notice of, and holds, a hearing in the vicinity of the area in-
volved; and
(3) determines that (A) such a significant restriction of subsistence
uses is necessary, consistent with sound management principles for the
utilization of the public lands, (B) the proposed activity will involve
the minimal amount of public lands necessary to accomplish the pur-
poses of such use, occupancy, or other disposition, and (C) reasonable
steps will be taken to minimize adverse impacts upon subsistence uses
and resources resulting from such actions.
16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (1994).
29. See id.; see also Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414, 1419-20
(9th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Hodel] (requirement for agency to study subsistence
impacts is separate from requirement of National Environmental Policy Act to
study environmental impacts), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Amoco Prod. Co.
v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987) [hereinafter Amoco].
30. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(2) (hearing requirement); see also Kunaknana v.
Clark, 742 F.2d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Kunaknana] (notice and
hearing procedures are required if an agency determines that a project "may sig-
nificantly restrict subsistence use").
31. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(3); see also Hanlon v. Barton, 740 F. Supp.
1446, 1454 (D. Alaska 1988) [hereinafter Hanlon] (hearing and findings inform
agency of potential subsistence impacts and enable mitigation of them); City of
Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 750 F. Supp. 1406, 1426-29 (D. Alaska) [hereinafter
Clough 1] (analyzing an agency's three findings), rev'd on other grounds, 915
F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Clough II1].
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(d); see also S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
234 (1980) (clarifying that when the requirements of section 810 are satisfied
through land-use planning, a project may proceed even though it harms subsis-
tence uses), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070, 5178.
33. In some cases, villagers raised another broad issue: the scope of agency
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eral section 810 cases, villagers challenged agency definitions of
the significance threshold and agency conclusions that impacts
would not be significant. 4 Underlying this first issue was the
question whether an agency should import law from the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") to define significance within
ANILCA.35
The second issue raised by the villagers was how an agency,
once it determined that there might be significant impacts, should
make the three required findings. In one case, where an agency
made them, villagers challenged its support in the record and its
definitions of the findings.36 Underlying the second issue was the
question whether the findings imposed any substantive requirement
for an agency designing a project to protect subsistence.37
actions to which section 810 applies. See, e.g., Amoco, 480 U.S. at 554 (consider-
ing geographic scope of section 810).
34. See, e.g., Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 792 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th
Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Akutan I1], vacated, 480 U.S. 943 (1987) §hereinafter
Akutan III]; Hodel, 774 F.2d at 1422; Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1152; State v.
National Parks and Conservation Ass'n, No. J87-012 CIV, slip op. at 18-19 (D.
Alaska 1991), dismissed, No. 91-36297 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1992), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 72 (1993); Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. at 1425; Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1448-
55.
35. See NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994); see also id. § 4332(C) (re-
quiring environmental impact statement for "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the environment" (emphasis added)); cf. Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1152
(declining to decide as a general matter whether ANILCA's significance thresh-
old is higher than NEPA's); Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 16 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,245 n.1 (D. Alaska Jan. 13, 1986) [hereinafter Akutan 1] ("the
Ninth Circuit no doubt intended courts to draw on NEPA case law as a guideline
for determining significance" under section 810), affd, 792 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir.
1986), vacated on other grounds, 480 U.S. 943 (1987).
36. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1426-29; see also City of Tenakee Springs
v. Clough, 750 F. Supp. 1430, 1432 (D. Alaska 1990) [hereinafter Clough II]
(further discussion of third finding in same case); City of Tenakee Springs v.
Franzel, No. J86-024 CIV, slip. op. at 23-28 (D. Alaska May 24, 1991) (further
discussion of the three findings in later stage of same case), affd, 960 F.2d 776
(9th Cir. 1992).
37. Cf. Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. at 1421, 1427 (stating that the three findings
limit an agency's choice among alternatives it chooses to study, but do not re-
quire it to study any particular alternative); Clough 11, 750 F. Supp. at 1432 (third
finding imposes substantive duty to "mitigate" harm to subsistence, but does not
limit range of alternatives that agency must study); see infra part IV.A. (discuss-
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In answering these questions, the courts ratified agency planning
that undervalued the subsistence protections in section 810. Con-
gress intended section 810's procedures to inject subsistence into
project planning early, and thereby preserve subsistence resources
from unnecessary destruction." Although the courts did not permit
agencies to ignore these procedures completely,39 they did accept
agency definitions of "significance" that were inconsistent, and that
raised barriers to villagers seeking the full protections provided by
Congress.4 Courts also embraced agencies' use of NEPA law to
determine the significant impacts threshold under ANILCA.41 As a
result of these rulings, they affirmed agency determinations of non-
significance that seemingly violated Congress' intent to make fur-
ther evaluations readily available under section 810.42
In the case where an agency determined impacts might be signifi-
cant, a court ruled that Congress' three required findings placed
substantive limits on the agency's planning.43 The court did not
ing whether Congress demonstrated substantive intent).
38. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 544.
39. See Hodel, 774 F.2d at 1420-21; see also Kunaknana v. Watt, No. A83-
337 CIV, slip op. at 8, 23-24 (D. Alaska Dec. 20, 1983) [hereinafter Watt] (af-
firming application of section 810 to congressionally-mandated oil leasing pro-
gram), affd sub nom. Kunaknana v. Clark, 742 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1984).
40. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1450-51 (Forest Service project that increases
hunting competition and clearcuts 8 to 21 percent of subsistence game habitat not
"significant" if game supply remains sufficient to meet demand); Watt, No. A83-
337 CIV, slip op. at 42 (oil leasing project not "significant" unless there is
"large" reduction in game supply, "substantial" interference with access, or "ma-
jor" increase in hunting competition); see also infra parts II.B., III.B. (discussing
inconsistencies in agency threshold guidelines and resulting barriers to further
subsistence evaluation); cf. Haynes & Pedersen, supra note 11, at 26-27 (describ-
ing impacts of development following oil exploration on subsistence users).
41. See, e.g., Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1453-55 (rejecting section 810 subsis-
tence evaluation because it lacks an analysis of cumulative impacts required by
NEPA); Sierra Club v. Penfold, 664 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (D. Alaska 1987) [here-
inafter Penfold 1], affd, 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Penfold II].
Cf. infra part III.C. (discussing appropriateness of courts' assimilation of NEPA
law into section 810 significance threshold).
42. See infra notes 246, 255-56 and accompanying text (discussing Congress'
intent to provide a low threshold to further evaluation of projects that may sig-
nificantly restrict subsistence).
43. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1421, 1427. The district court viewed these
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enforce such limits, however, because it deferred to the agency's
discretion in interpreting section 810.' Therefore, the agency's
narrow construction of the three findings may have permitted un-
necessary destruction of subsistence resources, contrary to
Congress' purpose.
This Article considers the extent of an agency's duty to protect
subsistence uses in planning a public land project under section
810. Part I recounts the legislative history of the section. Part II
presents the statutory language that agencies have construed to dis-
cern the intent of section 810. Part II also summarizes the internal
guidelines that agencies have developed to implement section 810
and the four principal court cases reviewing agency interpretations
of the section.
Part III discusses the initial evaluation, section 810's requirement
to determine whether a project's impact will be "significant," and
how that determination relates to a significance threshold in NEPA.
The primary purpose of an initial evaluation is to minimize sub-
sistence impacts early in land use planning. This Article suggests
agencies should include subsistence-protective alternatives in devel-
oping their projects. Existing agency evaluation guidelines are in-
consistent and do not conform with section 810. It is also suggested
that agencies develop new regulations defining the "significance"
finding at the threshold of further evaluation. In addition, agencies
should use a lower threshold for section 810, fulfilling Congress'
intent to make its hearings and findings more readily available than
the elaborate procedures of NEPA.
Part IV of this Article discusses the findings an agency must
make if impacts are significant, concluding that Congress imposed a
substantive requirement for an agency to design project alternatives
that protect subsistence. Part V recommends that federal agencies
implement new evaluation procedures that reflect Congress' pur-
limits as limitations only upon an agency's discretion to choose among the pro-
ject alternatives that it already had studied. Id.; cf. infra note 318 and accompany-
ing text (suggesting that the three findings also limit an agency's discretion in
designing the project alternatives that it will study).
44. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1427-29; see also Clough H, 750 F. Supp.
at 1432 (reviewing one required finding); City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel,
No. J86-024 CIV, slip op. at 24-26, 28 (D. Alaska 1991) (reviewing all three
required findings), affd, 960 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1992).
ANILCA SECTION 810
pose, agencies integrate habitat protection with game management
priorities, and the President order agencies to issue joint regulations
standardizing subsistence evaluations. The Article concludes that
section 810 can better protect subsistence on public lands if agen-
cies infuse the letter and spirit of ANILCA into their land use plan-
ning.
I. THE ENACTMENT OF ANILCA SECTION 810
A. Historical Background
Prehistoric settlers occupied Alaska at least 10,000 years ago.45
Their descendants included the three major Alaska Native groups:
Eskimos in the north and west, Aleuts on the Alaska Peninsula and
islands in the southwest, and Indians in the interior and south-
east.' These aboriginal Natives subsisted by fishing, hunting, and
gathering, employing all of the land in balance with its carrying
capacity.47 Europeans first visited Alaska when an expedition com-
manded by the Russian explorer Vitus Bering put ashore in the
Aleutians in 1741.' 8 Finding a great wealth of furs, succeeding
Russian expeditions established settlements and enslaved Aleut
villagers to pursue the fur trade. In 1799, the reigning Tsar gave an
45. See Arnold, supra note 19, at 2-7; cf. BERRY, supra note 22, at 12 (human
traces in Arctic from 8,000 years ago). Archaeologists offer the age of these
Alaska settlements as evidence that humans migrated to North America over a
land bridge across the Bering Strait. See 2 LAWRENCE J. ALLEN, THE TRANS
ALASKA PIPELINE 14-15 (1976); Roseanne Pagano, Finding Pinpoints Continent's
Oldest Camp, OREGONIAN, March 26, 1993, at A16.
46. See Allen, supra note 45, at 15; WILLIAM R. HUNT, ALASKA-A BICEN-
TENNIAL HISTORY 11 (1976); cf. ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 8 (estimated popula-
tion of Eskimos, Indians, and Aleuts at time of first European contact was
74,000). The major linguistic groups among the Indians included Athabascan
speakers in the interior and Tlingit and Haida speakers along the southeast coast.
Cf. ALLEN, supra note 45, at 15; ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 8; WILLIAM W.
FITZHUGH & ARON CROWELL, CROSSROADS OF CONTINENTS--CULTURES OF
SIBERIA AND ALASKA 11 (1988).
47. See FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 536-37; Paul v. United
States, 20 Cl. Ct. 236, 252 (1990).
48. HECTOR CHEVIGNY, RUSSIAN AMERICA-THE GREAT ALASKAN VENTURE
1741-1867, at 28-29 (1965); ERNEST GRUENING, THE STATE OF ALASKA 6-8
(1968); ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 8; ALLEN, supra note 45, at 15; HUNT, supra
note 46, at 22-23.
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exclusive trading charter to the Russian-American Company. This
company governed Alaska for the next sixty-eight years.49 The
Russians traded with some Native groups but did not govern be-
yond the coastal areas conquered in the exploration era.50 By the
mid-nineteenth century, Russia was short of funds, regarded the
colony as a financial burden, and needed American friendship as a
bulwark against British power." By a treaty signed on March 30,
1867, Russia ceded Alaska to the United States for the sum of
$7,200,000.52
The 1867 Treaty of Cession allowed Russian colonists to become
U.S. citizens but left the status of the Natives to later disposition by
Congress.53 Thus began a pattern of deferring decision on Native
49. GRUENING, supra note 48, at 20. The guiding force of the Russian-Ameri-
can Company was Alexander Baranov. See id. at 19; HUNT, supra note 46, at 25;
CHEVIGNY, supra note 48, at 78-103. Baranov established the company's head-
quarters at New Archangel, now called Sitka. GRUENING, supra note 48, at 19;
HuNT, supra note 46, at 25.
50. See FIELD COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 429-30; GRUENING, su-
pra note 48, at 19-20; HUNT, supra note 46, at 25-26; ALLEN, supra note 45, at
15; BERRY, supra note 22, at 13. Indeed, there were only a few hundred Russians
in Alaska throughout the colonial period. ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 20-21. The
first Russian fort at Sitka was destroyed and its occupants killed by Tlingit Indi-
ans in 1802. GRUENING, supra note 48, at 19; CHEVIGNY, supra note 48, at 100-
03. Although the Indians were forced to retreat and the fort was rebuilt, they
remained a threat even to the Russian headquarters throughout the company's
tenure.
51. See RONALD J. JENSEN, THE ALASKA PURCHASE AND RUSSIAN-AMERICAN
RELATIONS 47-55, 59-60 (1975); ARCHIE W. SHIELS, THE PURCHASE OF ALASKA
1 (1967); GRUENING, supra note 48, at 20-21; CHEVIGNY, supra note 48, at 232-
41; ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 24.
52. HUNT, supra note 46, at 31; see GRUENING, supra note 48, at 23. The
American negotiator, Secretary of State William H. Seward, conceded the odd
$200,000 for a clause disclaiming any residual property rights in the Russian-
American Company or the Hudson's Bay Company. FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 430; see JENSEN, supra note 51, at 77; BERRY, supra note 22, at
14. The Treaty was ratified by the Senate on April 9, 1867, after a close vote.
JENSEN, supra note 51, at 104; see also id. at 79-92.
53. See Treaty With Russia, March 30, 1867, art. III, (15 stat. 539, 542
(1867)); ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 25-26; FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 430; CHEVIGNY, supra note 48, at 254. The Treaty actually excluded
only the "uncivilized tribes" from the immediate grant of citizenship, but even
those Natives who had been governed by the Russian-American Company were
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rights that Congress continued for almost a century. 4 For the first
seventeen years, there was little influx of whites because Alaska
was poorly administered by the military, and federal laws giving
land to settlers did not apply. Then Congress provided a civil gov-
ernment and extended the mining claim laws to Alaska in the Act
of 1884." Gold discoveries and the growth of a salmon-canning
industry by the turn of the century launched a rapid expansion in
the white population. 6 Although this expansion led to encroach-
ments on traditional Native hunting and fishing grounds, the gov-
ernment did not create Indian reservations as it had done in the old
West. 7 Instead, Congress' then-prevailing policy of assimilating
treated by the U.S. as "uncivilized." ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 26.
54. See S. REP. No. 405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1971); see also Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a)(1988) (immediate
need for just settlement of aboriginal Native land claims); H.R. REP. No. 523,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 2193-94
(Congress had simply not acted on great bulk of Alaskan aboriginal title claims);
ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 103 (noting that Congress "largely sidestepped" ab-
original claims for 78 years following the Organic Act); Paul v. United States, 20
Cl. Ct. 236, 239-40 (1990) (finding the legal status of Native rights had not been
resolved prior to 1971; general application of federal Indian law was ambiguous
or had been deferred).
55. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24. Section 8 of the Organic Act
barred any immediate ouster of the Natives from lands in their possession, but
the terms by which they could acquire title were "reserved for future legislation
by Congress." Id. at 26; see FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 431;
ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 68-71; BERRY, supra note 22, at 18; ALLEN, supra
note 45, at 18-19. The homesteading laws were subsequently extended to Alaska,
but were of no use to Natives because they were not citizens, and of little use to
whites because the land was unsurveyed and unsuitable for farming. BERRY, su-
pra note 22, at 18-19; ALLEN, supra note 45, at 19.
56. ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 71-72; BERRY, supra note 22, at 19; see
NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 1, at 69-71, 101-02. By 1900 the population,
swollen by gold miners, showed more whites than Natives for the first time. See
ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 71; GRUENING, supra note 48, at 121. With the de-
cline of the gold industry, the white and Native populations remained comparable
until the white population experienced another period of sustained growth, noted
in the census of 1939. See ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 71; FIELD COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 3, at 429, 435; BERRY, supra note 22, at 22-23. In 1990
there were twice as many Natives as in 1900, but they had fallen to about thir-
teen percent of Alaska's population. See ALASKA NORTHWEST BOOKS, THE
ALASKA ALMANAC 132 (1990).
57. Compare ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 30-36, 48-56 (detailing conquest,
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Native peoples into the general population led to the enactment of
the Alaska Native Allotment Act of 1906.58 Federal reservations of
public land in the early twentieth century were limited to national
forests, parks, monuments, and petroleum reserves.
59
In 1912, Congress made Alaska a territory with an elected legis-
lature.' The President created several Alaska Native reservations
by executive order, until Congress revoked this authority in
1919.61 In 1936, Congress authorized the Department of the Interi-
removal to reservations, abrogation of treaties, and allotment of reservations to
individuals in the old West) with id. at 80-82 (noting that Alaskan Native resis-
tance to both reservations and individual allotments was inconsistent with nomad-
ic subsistence customs); FIELD COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 432 (deny-
ing the request of Southeast Alaskan Indians for a reservation based on the policy
of eradicating traditional customs). One reservation was created at Annette Island
in southeast Alaska for the Christianized Metlakahtla Indians who had emigrated
from Canada for religious reasons. Id.; see Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U.S. 78, 86 (1918).
58. Act of May 17, 1906, ch. 2469, 34 Stat. 197, amended by Act of Aug. 2,
1956, ch. 891, 70 Stat. 954 (including Aleuts within allotment eligibility) (re-
pealed 1971). The Act, which permitted Natives to select 160 acres of unre-
served, non-mineral lands as homesteads held in trust, failed to transfer a signifi-
cant amount of land to Native title. See ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 80-82; FIELD
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 434-35. BERRY, supra note 22, at 20; AL-
LEN, supra note 45, at 19; CASE, supra note 9, at 131-38.
59. The Tongass National Forest was reserved in 1902, the Chugach in 1907,
Mt. McKinley National Park in 1916, followed by Katmai National Monument in
1918, and the Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 on the Arctic Slope in 1923. BER-
RY, supra note 22, at 20-21; see ALLEN, supra note 45, at 20. In 1906, Gifford
Pinchot, Chief of the U.S. Forest Service, induced President Roosevelt to with-
draw Alaska's coal lands from mining to prevent a monopoly; pro-development
forces in Alaska burned Pinchot in effigy and denounced him as a communist.
HUNT, supra note 46, at 98-102; see GRUENING, supra note 48, at 130-35.
60. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 387, 37 Stat. 512; see GRUENING, supra note
48, at 150-53, 157. In 1915, the territorial legislature provided a means for some
Alaska Natives to become citizens, but it was not until 1924 that Congress grant-
ed citizenship to all indigenous peoples on United States territory. Citizenship Act
of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253; see ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 83; FIELD COM-
MITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 435.
61. Congress had authorized presidential withdrawals for Indian reservations
in 1910. See CASE, supra note 9, at 86-88; see generally FIELD COMMTrEE RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 435 n.38-45 (listing executive orders issued between 1914
and 1917). Between 1925 and 1933, the President also created five revocable
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or to designate Native reservations upon consent of their resi-
dents.62 Many Alaskans opposed the reservation policy, and only
six reservations were designated during the World War II era.63
The war brought extensive military development and a new wave
of white settlers to Alaska.' Some eighty Native villages peti-
"public purpose" reserves for the "vocational training" of Alaska Natives. CASE,
supra note 9, at 97-99.
62. Act of May 1, 1936, ch. 254, 49 Stat. 1250, applying to Alaska the
Wheeler-Howard Act of 1934 (Indian Reorganization Act), 48 Stat. 986. Section
2 of the 1936 Act permitted administrative reservation of previous executive
order reservations and other public lands "actually occupied" by Alaska Natives.
Id. § 2 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 496 (1970), repealed by Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2793); see CASE,
supra note 9, at 99-100; FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 436; AR-
NOLD, supra note 19, at 86; GRUENING, supra note 48, at 364.
Also, during the Indian Reorganization Act era, the Tlingit and Haida Indi-
ans of southeast Alaska successfully lobbied for a jurisdictional act to enable
them to receive compensation for the loss of their aboriginal rights in the reserva-
tion of the Tongass National Forest. Act of June 19, 1935, ch. 275, § 2, 49 Stat.
388; see Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 452,
453-54 (Cl. Ct. 1959); CASE, supra note 9, at 67-68; BERRY, supra note 22, at
23; FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 437; cf. id. at 438-39 (discussing
claims for taking of aboriginal title filed by Native groups with the Indian Claims
Commission, and noting that as the drive towards Alaskan statehood progressed,
recognition of claims decreased).
63. See ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 86-88 (whites objected to locking up de-
velopment resources, and Natives objected to being confined in small areas); AL-
LEN, supra note 45, at 21 (whites objected to closure of half of the territory);
GRUENING, supra note 48, at 367-68 (whites feared the economic impact that
reservation of one-third to one-half of Alaska would have on activities such as
mining); BERRY, supra note 22, at 22-23 (noting that some whites, fearing land
closures from Native claims, developed racist attitudes that still exist).
64. See GRUENING, supra note 48, at 316; BERRY, supra note 22, at 23; AL-
LEN, supra note 45, at 21. The military development was given urgency by the
capture of two of the Aleutian Islands by the Japanese. See HUNT, supra note 46,
at 107-10. The U.S. Army spent nearly 20 million dollars to construct a highway
connecting Alaska to the forty-eight states. Id. at 110-12. Total military expendi-
tures in Alaska during the war exceeded one billion dollars. Id. at 107-08, 112.
These expenditures and the influx of soldiers and construction workers brought
"the biggest boom the territory had ever experienced." Id. at 112. The boom con-
tinued after the war, fueled by military spending for cold war defenses. See id. at
113-15; BERRY, supra note 22, at 23-24. The population of the territory nearly
doubled with the influx of new white residents between 1939 and 1950. See AR-
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tioned for reservations, but the government shifted away from the
self-determination policy of the thirties, and the Interior Department
took no action.65 Defense projects, housing construction, and
homesteading on federal lands supported continuing immigration to
Alaska in the 1950s.' In 1956, a long-running movement for
statehood led to the ratification of a proposed constitution by the
67territory's voters.
After a decade-long battle between local advocates and large
corporations that profited from the territorial tax status, Congress
acted in 1958, and Alaska became a state on January 3, 1959.68 To
NOLD, supra note 19, at 71; BERRY, supra note 22, at 23; HuNT, supra note 46,
at 112. This new population fostered an increasing desire for statehood for Alas-
ka, GRUENING, supra note 48, at 318; and among the Natives, an increasing con-
cern about encroachment on traditional hunting and fishing grounds. See AR-
NOLD, supra note 19, at 88.
65. See ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 88; BERRY, supra note 22, at 22; ALLEN,
supra note 45, at 21; FIELD COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 437; S. REP.
No. 405, supra note 54, at 93. The Alaska reservation policy of the Indian Reor-
ganization Act was founded, in part, on the federal trust responsibility to protect
Native subsistence. See CASE, supra note 9, at 101, 107-08, 111. The policy
failed when the authority of the Department of the Interior proved inadequate to
enforce exclusive Native fishing rights within reservation boundaries. See id. at
101-107 (discussing Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949)); cf
GRUENING, supra note 48, at 361-71 (discussing history of reservation effort).
66. See BERRY, supra note 22, at 23-24; HuNT, supra note 46, at 114-15, 127.
67. 1955 Alaska Sess. Laws 46 (cited with approval in Alaska Statehood Law,
Pub. L. No. 85-508 § 1, 72 Stat. 339 (1958)); GRUENING, supra note 48, at 497-
500; HUNT, supra note 46, at 128-29. The Alaska Constitutional Convention
considered whether to provide land title to support Native subsistence activities,
but demurred, regarding that as a federal responsibility. See ARNOLD, supra note
19, at 90; VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA'S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 137-39
(1975); cf. BERRY, supra note 22, at 25 (convention feared that attempting to
settle Native claims would postpone grant of statehood).
68. There was substantial opposition to the granting of Alaska's statehood in
Congress and the executive branch. See GRUENING, supra note 48, at 463-92,
500-04; NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 1, at 146-57; HUNT, supra note 46, at
125-30. Congress finally voted in favor of statehood on July 7, 1958. Alaska
Statehood Law, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958), reprinted in note pre-
ceding 48 U.S.C. § 21 (1988). Alaska's citizens ratified the admission on August
26, 1958, state elections were held on November 25, 1958, and President Dwight
Eisenhower proclaimed Alaska a state of the United States on January 3, 1959.
Proclamation No. 3269, 24 Fed. Reg. 81 (1959), reprinted in note preceding 48
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assure its economic viability, Congress gave the new state the ex-
traordinary right to select about 103,000,000 acres of land from the
federal holdings-more than all other western states combined.69
The state waived its right to select lands that might belong to the
Natives.70 Since most of the federal land was unsurveyed and its
U.S.C. § 21 (1988).
69. See BERRY, supra note 22, at 27-28; FIELD COMMITrEE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 439; S. REP. NO. 405, supra note 54, at 94. The actual grant permitted
the state to select up to 400,000 acres of land from the national forest reserves
and another 400,000 acres from the public lands for community expansion or
recreation, plus 102,550,000 acres from the public lands for any purpose. Alaska
Statehood Law, § 6(a)-(b), 72 Stat. 339, 340, reprinted in note preceding 48
U.S.C. § 21. This exceeded the amount of land granted to all of the western
states combined. BERRY, supra note 22, at 27. It also exceeded the then total
92,400,000 acres of federal reservations for power, petroleum, forestry, and pres-
ervation in Alaska; representing over one-fourth of the total land area of
375,000,000 acres in Alaska. See id. at 29-30; cf. H.R. REP. No. 97, pt. 1, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 382 (1979) (dissenting views of Rep. Morris K. Udall et al.
on revised H.R. 39, Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1979)
(characterizing Statehood Law as "by far the most generous land grants ever
made out of the Federal domain"); NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 1, at 157
(comparing grants to Alaska with grants to other states). Unlike most states, Alas-
ka was permitted to select lands with known mineral value, Alaska Statehood
Law § 6(i), to assume existing oil and gas leases by selecting the underlying
federal lands, id. § 6(h), and on remaining federal lands, to receive 90 percent
instead of the usual 37.5 percent of mineral revenues. See BERRY, supra note 22,
at 28.
70. The Alaska Statehood Law Pub. L. No. 85-508 § 1, 72 Stat. 339, con-
firmed the State Constitution adopted by the 1956 Convention, which made no
provision for Native land claims. See supra note 67. The Statehood Law itself,
however, contained a broad waiver of state title:
As a compact with the United States said State and its people do
agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to [re-
tained federal lands] and to any lands or other property (including
fishing rights), the right or title to which may be held by any Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts (hereinafter called natives) ... except when held
by individual natives in fee without restrictions on alienation.
Id. at 339. Congress continued its long-standing policy of deferring consider-
ation of Native land claims, providing in equally broad language that the
state's disclaimer would not "recognize, deny, enlarge, impair, or otherwise
affect any claim" and that nothing in the law "authorizes, establishes, recogniz-
es, or confirms the validity or invalidity of any such claim." Id. The validity
and extent of Native claims were left to future action by Congress or the
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value unknown, the statehood law provided twenty-five years to
complete the state selections.7 The state began a slow and system-
atic process of selecting the lands it would receive.72 Early in the
1960s, Native groups, already threatened by state game laws and
federal project plans, became concerned that state land patents
would foreclose their subsistence activities.
In 1961, Native groups began to file formal protests against pro-
posed state land selections. These protests snowballed, leading the
Department of the Interior to impose a "land freeze" in 1966."3
The land freeze halted petroleum leasing and most other transfers
out of the federal domain, pending resolution of the Native claims.
Then, in 1968, the Atlantic-Richfield Company announced a spec-
tacular oil discovery at Prudhoe Bay on the North Slope.74 In
courts. ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 91; FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
3, at 439; cf BERRY, supra note 22, at 30-32 (a principal concern of the draft-
ers was that future land developers be able to take clear title from the state).
71. See Alaska Statehood Law, § 6(a)-(b), 72 Stat. 339, 340.
72. See BERRY, supra note 22, at 33; cf S. REP. No. 1300, supra note 26, at
390 (supplemental views of Sen. Ted Stevens on H.R. 39) (by the 1970s, the
state had a computerized resource assessment, rating every township in Alaska
according to eleven criteria, enabling selection of the most valuable lands).
73. See FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 440; S. REP. No. 405,
supra note 54, at 96-97. By 1968, forty Native groups had filed protests covering
296,600,000 acres and including most of the state selections to date, the federal
public lands, and the federal reserved lands in Alaska. See id. at 96; HUNT, supra
note 46, at 160; FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 440, 453. Cf AR-
NOLD, supra note 19, at 119 (acreage of protests exceeded area of the state).
These Native protests included the potential oil fields in the North Slope petro-
leum reserve. BERRY, supra note 22, at 44; S. REP. NO. 405, supra note 54, at
97. In 1966, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall responded to the protests by
suspending oil exploration lease issuance in these areas. Id. In 1967, the Secre-
tary announced that all protested land transfers would be suspended except where
suspension would delay actual construction projects. Id.; FIELD COMMITTEE RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 440. The state sued to enjoin the Secretary to recognize its
selections, but was denied summary judgment. Alaska v. Udall, 420 F.2d 938,
940 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom. Alaska v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 1076
(1970); see S. REP. No. 405, supra note 54, at 97. In 1969, the Secretary formal-
ized the land freeze through an administrative order protecting Native rights
pending congressional action. Id. at 98.
74. See BERRY, supra note 22, at 86, 91-92, 262; ALLEN, supra note 45, at
10, 71, 114; Naske & Slotnick, supra note 1, at 180, 248. Prior to this discovery,
nineteenth century explorers reported natural oil seeps in south central Alaska,
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1969, the Department of the Interior formalized its land freeze by
administrative order. At the same time, a consortium of oil compa-
nies sought land with secure title to build a pipeline 800 miles
south to the ice-free port at Valdez-the costliest project ever un-
dertaken by private industry. The land claims threatened to halt the
project indefinitely. Spurred by this threat, Congress finally turned
to the long deferred Native claims.75
B. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971
The freeze on federal lands united Native groups, the state, the
oil industry, and development interests in seeking legislation to
settle the Native land claims. There was no agreement, however, on
the legal strength and value of those claims.76 Between 1967 and
and explorers reported seeps on the North Slope early in the twentieth century.
See HUNT, supra note 46, at 3-4, 116; ALASKA ALMANAC, supra note 56, at 76-
77; BERRY, supra note 22, at 86. President Harding had set aside the North Slope
as Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4, and government mapping had confirmed its
potential, but had not made any major discoveries. See id. at 87; HuNT supra
note 46, at 116. Atlantic Richfield Oil Company made the first commercially
important oil discovery in south central Alaska, which by 1968, comprised 60
percent of Alaska's mineral production. See HUNT, supra note 46, at 116; BERRY,
supra note 22, at 89. When ARCO announced its major discovery at Prudhoe
Bay in 1968, the state was ready to utilize this source of economic growth. See
id. at 89-92. In September of 1969, the state auctioned oil leases for some of its
land selections in Prudhoe Bay to oil companies for $900,000,000. Id. at 97-100;
see ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 131; Paul v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 236, 253
(1990).
75. Cf. ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 139-40 (Department of Interior could not
issue permit for pipeline until Native claims were settled); BERRY, supra note 22,
at 123 (oil companies ultimately agreed that there could be no pipeline until land
title was resolved).
76. Compare S. REP. No. 401, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 221 (1971) ("Native pop-
ulation has arguable claims to nearly all of Alaska's territory-as much as 90
percent."); HUNT, supra note 46, at 161 (Bureau of Indian Affairs argued that
Natives should receive all lands that they had hunted or fished); Alaska Native
Land Claims: Hearings on S. 2906 and related bills before the Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1968) [hereinafter
ANCSA Hearings] (state position is that Native claims have "strong moral
grounds" regardless of legal basis) with S. REP. No. 401, supra, at 221, 239-40,
242, 244 (Native claims "have absolutely no legal basis" and are a "give-away
program" to a favored minority unsupported by any legal obligation); id. at 189
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1971, bills were introduced in Congress to provide cash settlements
ranging from $65,000,000 to $1,000,000,000 and Native lands rang-
ing from 100,000 to 60,000,000 acres.77 In addition to confirming
fee title to portions of their ancestral land, some of the proposals
also sought to provide Natives with subsistence access to the re-
mainder of Alaska's federal lands.78 A 1968 report commissioned
by the Senate affirmed the importance of subsistence activities.79
This report of the Federal Field Committee gave a statistical ac-
count of Native poverty and the reliance of rural villagers on sub-
sistence. The Alaska Federation of Natives hired former Supreme
(aboriginal claims were extinguished by Russia's treaty of cession and moral
claims were extinguished by spending for Native welfare programs); ARNOLD,
supra note 19, at 123; BERRY, supra, note 22, at 57; H.R. REP. NO. 523, supra
note 54, at 53-54, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2243-44 (dissenting view of
Rep. John P. Saylor to H.R. 10367, bill that was basis of enacted claims settle-
ment) Natives have abandoned large portions of their ancestral lands and lack
proof to support historic claims that would justify a generous settlement. Id.
77. See ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 119-20, 129, 133-34, 137-44; BERRY,
supra note 22, at 50-52, 58-59, 65-66, 75-76, 80-83, 124-30, 134, 138, 148-52,
160-62, 172, 180-84, 196-97, 203-10; cf ANCSA Hearings, supra note 76, at 6-
13 (land and oil royalty provisions of proposed S. 2906); id. at 16, 19 (land and
claims court jurisdiction of proposed S. 1964); id. at 21-22 (claims court jurisdic-
tion of proposed S. 2690); id. at 494-95 (oil royalty of proposed state claims
settlement enacted by Alaska Legislature); H.R. REP. No. 523, supra note 54, at
51-52, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2241-42 (listing Department of the
Interior settlement proposals).
78. See ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 120; BERRY, supra note 22, at 62, 125,
151, 173, 184; FIELD COMMrrrEE REPoRT, supra note 3, at 441; Paul v. United
States, 20 Cl. Ct. 236, 252 (1990); see also ANCSA Hearings, supra note 76, at
13 (proposed "aboriginal use and occupancy right" to federal lands extending 100
years from settlement); id. at 77 (same); id. at 505, 508 (proposed fifty year non-
exclusive right to hunting, fishing, trapping, and berrying, enforceable against
future private owners by a reservation clause in federal grants); id. at 53, 65 (Na-
tive explanation that surface access to large areas is needed to preserve nomadic
hunting). Congress could have provided expressly such reserved subsistence
rights, even on lands open to state selection or private entry. Cf. United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 378, 381-84 (1905) (Native reservation of fishing access
rights in cession of tribal land).
79. See FIELD COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 12-13, 39, 50-54, 441,
529, 537; cf. S. REP. No. 405, supra note 54, at 74 (praising report); BERRY,
supra note 22, at 62 (acerbic description of Sen. Henry M. Jackson's motives in
commissioning report).
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Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg as its counsel in 1969, and in
1971 it also engaged professional lobbyists."s Native efforts and
the support of the oil industry finally won the Nixon
Administration's backing for a comprehensive claims settlement
bill.
On December 18, 1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
("ANCSA") became law." ANCSA shielded village lands from
state selection while Native groups had an opportunity to select
some 40,000,000 acres of land to obtain in fee. 2 Natives also
80. See ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 132, 138; cf United States v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 612 F.2d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1980) (canon of statutory construc-
tion favoring Indians in case of ambiguity was vitiated because Natives were
represented by sophisticated counsel in formulation of Alaska Native claims set-
tlement).
81. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1629e (1994)). Native delegates from all of the regions except the Arctic
Slope voted to accept the settlement on the day that President Nixon signed it
into law. See ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 153; BERRY, supra note 22, at 214; cf.
Flidais E. Wolf & Tim M. Pearson, The Second Destruction of Prince William
Sound, EARTH ISLAND J., Spring 1993, at 30 (of 60,000 eligible Natives, only
500 voted for ANCSA in referendum).
82. To enable the Native selections, ANCSA temporarily withdrew all of the
unreserved federal lands surrounding rural Native villages from state selection
and private entry. See 43 U.S.C. § 1610. This withdrawal ultimately placed ap-
proximately 100,000,000 acres of Alaska off-limits to state land selection until
the Native selections could be at least partially completed. See H.R. REP. No. 97,
supra note 69, at 164; BERRY, supra note 22, at 227.
Traditional Native villages of at least 25 residents received a priority right
to select from the immediately surrounding federal lands. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1610-
1611(a); BERRY, supra note 22, at 209. These village selections would provide
fee title patents to the surface estate of up to 22,000,000 acres of land for local
use. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 161 1(a)-(b), 1613(a)-(b). The state could then proceed with
its land selections throughout Alaska. See BERRY, supra note 22, at 209-10. Fi-
nally, the regional Native corporations could select an additional 16,000,000 acres
from the remaining area around the villages, receiving both surface and subsur-
face rights for development. See id.; 43 U.S.C. § 161 l(b)-(c).
The Interior Secretary also would allocate 2,000,000 acres of the Natives'
40,000,000 acre settlement to preserve cemeteries and historic sites. See 43
U.S.C. § 1613(h). In addition, Native groups received title to about 3,700,000
acres of St. Lawrence Island, Venetie, and other former Indian reservations,
bringing the total settlement to nearly 44,000,000 acres. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1978), SUMMARY SHOWING THE SUBSTITUTE ADOPTED BY THE SUB-
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would receive cash payments totalling $962,500,000 over several
years.13 The Act created a system of village corporations and Na-
tive regional corporations to receive the lands and payments. 4 To
satisfy conservationists, section 17(d)(2) of ANCSA authorized the
Interior Secretary to withdraw additional large areas of public lands
for possible inclusion in conservation reservations the "d-2
lands."85 The price of the Natives' settlement was a complete ex-
COMMITTEE at 3 (1978), reprinted in II ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND
GAME, PUBLIC LAW 96-487, ALASKA NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS CONSERVA-
TION ACT-LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 171 (1981) [hereinafter ANILCA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
83. These payments included $462,500,000 to be paid from the U.S. Treasury
in specified installments over eleven years. 43 U.S.C. § 1605. The remaining
$500,000,000 was to be paid by giving the Natives two percent of the gross roy-
alties received by the state and federal governments from oil and other minerals
developed in Alaska. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(3), 1608. To place these pay-
ments in perspective, there were approximately 37,400 Natives living in small,
rural villages, a total Native population of about 53,000 in Alaska, and about
18,000 Alaska Natives residing outside the state who registered to participate in
the cash portion of the claims settlement. ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 196. If all
of these participants received a portion of the cash settlement, its per capita value
was approximately $13,500. It has been reported, however, that the actual cash
pay-out to Natives not living in villages was $6,525 and that most villagers re-
ceived a total of only $375. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 27.
84. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1602(g), (j), 1604, 1605(c), 1606, 1607, 1610(b)(1),
1611, 1613. ANCSA provided for twelve Native regional corporations in
Alaska's geographic and ethnographic regions, plus a thirteenth corporation for
Natives living outside the state. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a), (c); see also ARNOLD,
supra note 19, at 164-96 (describing each of the regional corporations). The stock
of each regional corporation was to be issued to the Natives then residing in that
region. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g). Subject to required sharing among regional corpora-
tions, payments from the claims settlement and profits from the corporate lands
were to be distributed to village corporations and to the shareholders. See id.
§§ 1605(c), 1606(i)-(m); ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 158-59. Village corporations
would select, manage, and convey lands, and operate local businesses. See id. at
159-60, 196-201; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606(j)-(m), 1607, 1613(a)-(c). Although the Act
permitted them to incorporate as nonprofits, id. § 1607(a), all of the villages
elected to form corporations for profit, to facilitate distributing benefits to indi-
vidual Natives. ARNOLD, supra note 19, at 198.
85. "Withdrawal" of public land constitutes labelling it, usually temporarily,
as unavailable for specified uses. 1 GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L.
GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 9.01 (1990). Withdrawals may
be made by any branch of government. See id. "Reservation" of withdrawn land,
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tinguishment of aboriginal claims to land, water, hunting, and fish-
ing rights within Alaska. 6
Although Congress recognized the importance of subsistence to
Alaska Natives, ANCSA contained no express protection for subsis-
tence in its final form.87 The Senate version of ANCSA would
usually permanent, constitutes affirmatively dedicating it to a federal purpose. Id.
Reservations are decreed by Congress, or by the Executive Branch under a con-
gressional delegation of authority. Id. Conservation reservations include national
parks and monuments, wildlife refuges, national forests, and wilderness areas. See
id. §§ 9.01-9.02. Public lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM") and open to mineral entry are unreserved. See id. § 9.02[4]; cf.
ANILCA §§ 401-404, Pub. L. No. 96-487, §§ 401-404, 94 Stat. 2396-98 (1980)
(reserving conservation areas on BLM lands); ANILCA § 102(4), 16 U.S.C.
§ 3102(3) (1994) (defining term "public lands"). But see COGGINS &
GLICKSMAN, supra, § 9.02[5] (arguing that BLM lands closed to homesteading
are "de facto reserved").
Section 17 of ANCSA provided the Interior Secretary with new grants of
authority to withdraw public lands in Alaska from state selection. See 43 U.S.C.
§ 1616 (1994). Section 17(d)(1) gave the Secretary a three-month window to
withdraw an unlimited acreage to protect "the public interest." Id. § 1616(d)(1).
Section 17(d)(2) gave the Secretary a nine-month window to withdraw up to
80,000,000 acres suitable for reservation in the four systems of the national
parks, forests, refuges, and scenic rivers. Id. § 1616(d)(2); cf. ANILCA § 102(4),
16 U.S.C. § 3102(4) (1994) (defining term "conservation system unit"). These
latter withdrawals became known as the "d-2 lands." See S. REP. No. 1300, su-
pra note 26, at 107. The Secretary was to recommend within two years which d-
2 lands should be permanently reserved; Congress would then have five years to
act on the recommendation. See 43 U.S.C. § 1616(d)(2)(C), (D); see also infra
note 92 (discussing the actual withdrawals).
86. 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1994); cf United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
612 F.2d 1132, 1135-37, 1139 (9th Cir. 1980) (legislative history shows that
extinguishment clause is to be construed broadly; holding that ANCSA retroac-
tively extinguished all trespass claims based upon Natives' aboriginal title).
Whether aboriginal Native subsistence rights to the outer continental shelf (be-
yond the geographic scope of ANCSA) survive is a subject of continuing litiga-
tion. See Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1278-80 (9th Cir. 1989).
87. See H.R. REP. No. 523, supra note 54, at 5, reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2195 (passed in lieu of S. REP. No. 405, supra note 54, at 81-
82, 101); cf. 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994) (no express policy to preserve opportunity
for subsistence activities). International treaties designed to conserve particular
animals contained express exemptions permitting Alaska Natives to continue
subsistence hunting of these species. See CASE, supra note 9, at 279-86. Shortly
after it passed ANCSA, Congress enacted a subsistence exemption for coastal
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have directed the Interior Secretary to classify 20,000,000 acres of
the public lands for a subsistence priority, and to enforce the priori-
ty through emergency closures of these subsistence zones to other
users.8 The Conference Committee intended to protect subsis-
tence, but omitted these directives, reasoning that the Secretary
would use existing withdrawal authority backed by state manage-
ment protections.89 It appears that the committee's confidence was
Natives in the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b)
(1994), a provision imposing strict liability in favor of subsistence users in the
Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Act of 1973, 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1), (a)(4) (1994);
and subsistence exemption for all residents of Native villages in the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1994). See S. REP. No. 413, supra
note 32, at 231, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5175; CASE, supra note 9, at
286, 288-92.
88. Entry by other users during closure of a "Subsistence Use Unit" would
have been punishable by fine and imprisonment. Compare S. 35, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 21(a)(5) (1971) and S. REP. No. 405, supra note 54, at 43-44, with id. at
81-82 (declining to confirm Native title to 60,000,000 acres for subsistence pro-
tection, but using administrative classification of public lands for subsistence
priority to reach same objective).
89. A Joint Statement by the Conference Committee provides:
The Senate amendment to the House bill provided for the protection
of the Native peoples' interest in and use of subsistence resources on
the public lands. The [C]onference [C]ommittee, after careful consid-
eration, believes that all Native interests in subsistence resource lands
can and will be protected by the Secretary through the exercise of his
existing withdrawal authority. The Secretary could, for example, with-
draw appropriate lands and classify them in a manner which would
protect Native subsistence needs and requirements by closing appro-
priate lands to entry by non-residents when the subsistence resources
of these lands are in short supply or otherwise threatened. The Confer-
ence Committee expects both the Secretary and the State to take any
action necessary to protect the subsistence needs of the Natives.
Joint Statement of the Committee of Conference, H. CONF. REP. No. 746,
supra note 24, at 37, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2250; see S. REP. No.
413, supra note 32, at 231, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5175.
The members of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, in
particular, were persuaded that subsistence was already protected, so the Na-
tives could tailor their own land selections to future economic development:
"there will be little incentive for the Natives to select lands for subsistence use
because during the foreseeable future the Natives will be able to continue their
present subsistence uses regardless of whether the lands are in Federal or State
ownership." H.R. REP. No. 523, supra note 54, at 5, reprinted in 1971
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misplaced. The Department of the Interior never made any subsis-
tence land classifications. In addition, State management, confound-
ed by constitutional bars against preferences, proved inadequate to
protect subsistence users." As pressure on subsistence increased,
federal legislation was needed to restore the Native rights that
ANCSA had terminated.9' ANCSA's provision to withdraw public
land for conservation reservations provided the impetus for Con-
gress to revisit subsistence.
Under section 17(d) of ANCSA, Secretary of the Interior Rogers
C.B. Morton withdrew most of the public land in Alaska from state
selection or private entry in March of 1972.92 Later in 1972, a
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2195. Both houses ultimately concluded that the intent of
ANCSA, as expressed by the Conference Committee, was to protect Native
subsistence. See S. REP. No. 413, supra note 32, at 231, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5175; H.R. REP. No. 97, supra note 69, at 230-31; H.R. REP.
No. 1045, supra note 8, at 183; S. REP. No. 1300, supra note 26, at 195-96;
CASE, supra note 9, at 294-95.
90. See S. REP. No. 1300, supra note 16, at 432 (supplemental views of Sens.
Abourezk, Ford, and Durkin on H.R. 39); CASE, supra note 9, at 295; see also
supra note 26 (citing criticism of Interior Department's effort). The problems
with state protection of subsistence included state constitutional bars to a racial
preference for Natives, political domination of state management by urban sport
and commercial harvesting interests, and financing of fish and game management
through grants encouraging sport and commercial use. CASE, supra note 9, at
295-98; see H.R. REP. No. 1045, supra note 8, at 184 (subsistence uses threat-
ened by inadequate state and federal action).
91. CASE, supra note 9, at 298; cf. H.R. REP. No. 1045, supra note 8, at 184-
85 (federal responsibility to protect subsistence on public lands may be carried
out by legislation authorizing state management regulations).
92. Pub. Land Order No. 5179, 37 Fed. Reg. 5579 (1972); S. REP. No. 1300,
supra note 26, at 109; see S. REP. No. 413, supra note 32, at 129-33, reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5073-78 (summarizing history of ANCSA d-2 land
withdrawals); see also supra note 85 (describing authority for the withdrawals).
Alaska sought to complete its statehood land selections in January, 1972. See
BERRY, supra note 22, at 224-25. Interior Secretary Rogers Morton withdrew the
full 80,000,000 acres of d-2 lands, however, and with section 17(d)(1)
withdrawals and Native selection withdrawals, this blocked state selection on
nearly all public lands in Alaska. See id. at 225-27 (Secretary Morton also with-
drew 99,000,000 acres to enable Native land selections; foreclosing 44,000,000
acres of the 77,000,000 acres that the state had tried to select); S. REP. No. 413,
supra note 32, at 131, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5075-76; H.R. REP. No.
97, supra note 69, at 164; H.R. REP. No. 1045, supra note 8, at 127-28 (addition-
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state suit challenging this action was settled, giving the state a por-
tion of its land selections.93 The state remained anxious to com-
plete its selections and retain priority over Native selections and
federal reservations. In December of 1973, Secretary Morton made
final recommendations for Congress to reserve some 83,000,000
acres of public land in new or expanded conservation areas.94
ANCSA required these lands to remain withdrawn from state selec-
tion for five years, until December 18, 1978, unless Congress acted
to confirm or deny the reservations.
al views of Reps. Bauman, Young, and Emery on H.R. 39); cf. Patrick Pourchot,
The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act-A Selective Legislative
History 3 (Dec. 19, 1980) (unpublished paper, on file with the Fordham Envi-
ronmental Law Journal) (almost all of Alaska's 375,000,000 acres was in federal
ownership; nearly 50,000,000 acres already were reserved in parks, national for-
ests, and wildlife refuges); ROBERT CAHN, THE FIGHT TO SAVE WILD ALASKA
13 (1982) (Secretary Morton withdrew 45,000,000 acres of d-1 "public interest"
lands and 80,000,000 acres of d-2 "national interest" lands); BERRY, supra note
22, at 227 (Secretary Morton also withdrew 99,000,000 acres to enable native
land selections; foreclosing 44,000,000 acres of the 77,000,000 acres that the
State had tried to select). Conservation interests lobbied Interior Secretary Rogers
Morton intensively to assure these withdrawals.
93. See S. REP. No. 413, supra note 32, at 132, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5076; S. REP. NO. 1300, supra note 26, at 110; EUGENE H.
BUCK, ALASKA NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS (D-2) LEGISLATION 4 (Lib. of Cong.
Congressional Research Serv. Issue Brief No. IB77110, Dec. 10, 1980), reprinted
in I ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 1, 5. One source has
suggested that the state brought this suit primarily to facilitate negotiations with
the Interior Department. See BERRY, supra note 22, at 227. But see id. at 9, 211-
12 (the language of ANCSA was ambiguous regarding selection priorities). The
settlement left the state with 42,000,000, out of the 70,000,000 acres it had se-
lected, toward its total entitlement of 104,000,000 acres. H.R. REP. No. 1045, .su-
pra note 8, at 127 (additional views of Reps. Bauman, Young, and Emery). The
d-2 land withdrawals made by Secretary Morton in 1972 subsequently were up-
held against challenges brought by prospective purchasers of oil and gas leases.
See Burglin v. Morton, 527 F.2d 486, 487-89 (9th Cir. 1975).
94. 38 Fed. Reg. 35,508, 35,511 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 1045, supra note 8, at
32; see S. REP. NO. 413, supra note 32, at 133, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5077; H.R. REP. NO. 97, supra note 69, at 144; S. REP. NO. 1300, supra note
26, at 111; see also H.R. SERIAL No. 13, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 552 (1979) (De-
partment of the Interior chronology of national interest lands).
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C. The d-2 Lands and the Enactment of ANILCA
Secretary Morton's section 17(d)(2) withdrawals, the "d-2 lands"
freeze, triggered seven years of legislative debates that culminated
in Congress' passage of ANILCA in 1980. During these debates,
the principal proponent of d-2 lands legislation was a coalition of
conservation organizations, the "Alaska Coalition,"95 which re-
ceived support from Natives in return for supporting subsistence.
This coalition sought to keep whole ecosystems and complete wa-
tersheds within federal control, preserved from development in
conservation reservations: parks, wildlife refuges, and wilderness
areas. The principal opponents were the State of Alaska and indus-
tries favoring commercial development.96 These opponents sought
95. The Alaska Coalition grew from meetings of Alaskan conservation groups
and Alaskan representatives of national environmental organizations. See CAHN,
supra note 92, at 10-11, 15. Eventually, the Coalition encompassed over 50 na-
tional organizations and 1500 local groups, including conservation, recreation,
and trade union interests. It was led by four large organizations: the Wilderness
Society, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and the National Audubon Society.
See id. at preface, 15-16; Pourchot, supra note 92, at 26; Alan Berlow, Well-
Organized Environmental Lobby Wins a Bout With Development Interests, 37
CONG. Q. 940, 940 (1979).
The Alaska Coalition received support from Alaska Native groups in ex-
change for supporting their subsistence rights. See CAHN, supra note 92, at 23-
24; CASE, supra note 9, at 299. Native corporations had a very practical reason to
support enactment of a d-2 lands bill: the d-2 withdrawals impeded patenting
their ANCSA land selections. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GAO, LAND TITLE
SHOULD BE CONVEYED To ALASKA NATIVES FASTER i, 7, 42-43 app. I (Rep.
No. CED-78-130, June 21, 1978) (seven years after ANCSA, regional corpora-
tions had obtained only twenty percent, and Native villages had obtained only
seven percent of their land entitlements). But see BUCK, supra note 93, at 3-4
(state selections also were stalled by d-2 withdrawals, but state did not support
enactment of Alaska Coalition bills).
96. See CAHN, supra note 92, at 24; Pourchot, supra note 92, at 24, 29-30,
35. The opponents formed Citizens for the Management of Alaska Lands
("CMAL"), funded by over seventy organizations doing business in Alaska. Id. at
29. The principal industries involved were the oil, mining, and timber companies.
See id. Other opponents included the National Rifle Association and Alaska sport
hunting groups organized as the "Real Alaska Coalition." Id.; CAHN, supra note
92, at 24. CMAL contributed substantial sums of money and professional lobby-
ists to supplement the funds appropriated by the state to lobby Congress. See id.;
BERLOW, supra note 95, at 940.
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to delay reservations until the lands' mineral deposits could be
identified and selected or classified for development. If there was to
be legislation, the opponents sought minimal parks and wilderness,
with most acreage managed by the state, the Forest Service, or the
Bureau of Land Management to permit development. Between the
Alaska Coalition and the state was a third interest group: the fed-
eral administrators. In the Congresses following ANCSA, each of
these three groups introduced several d-2 lands bills in both Hous-
es.
97
Presidents Nixon and Ford showed no interest in pursuing Secre-
tary Morton's 1973 recommendations to reserve d-2 lands. In 1977,
the Carter Administration took office, and the Alaska Coalition
enlarged its reservation proposals in a new House bill.9 Interior
Secretary Cecil Andrus responded with an administration proposal
that expanded the Morton recommendations; the state countered
with a bill emphasizing multiple-use management. 99 During 1977,
a House subcommittee held extensive hearings on the Alaska
lands." ° The House passed a bill in May of 1978, that included
97. See H.R. REP. No. 1045, supra note 8, at 32-35 (summarizing bills intro-
duced in the House from 1972 to 1978); S. REP. No. 413, supra note 32, at 134,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5078-79 (summarizing bills introduced in the
Senate from 1977 to 1979); cf. Pourchot, supra note 92, at 5-8, 47 (summarizing
most significant d-2 lands proposals from 1973 to 1980).
98. This bill, the original H.R. 39, was introduced in the House by Morris
Udall in January of 1977. See H.R. REP. No. 97, supra note 69 at 168-69; CAHN,
supra note 92, at 16; BUCK, supra note 93, at 20; Pourchot, supra note 92, at 23.
It included some 113,000,000 acres, with over 110,000,000 in parks and refuges.
See Pourchot, supra note 92, at 23, 47 app. C. Wilderness designations would
encompass nearly 150,000,000 acres in the new and existing reservations. Id.
99. The Andrus proposal, announced on September 15, 1977, expanded Secre-
tary Morton's 83,000,000 acre recommendations to 92,000,000 acres, with nearly
87,000,000 in parks and refuges. The proposal also included 43,000,000 acres of
new wilderness designations. See Pourchot, supra note 92, at 6, 25, 47 app. C.
The state's bill, introduced in the Senate by Ted Stevens, called for
82,000,000 acres of reservations, with 18,500,000 in parks and refuges. See
CAHN, supra note 92, at 18; Pourchot, supra note 92, at 6, 47 app. C. No new
wilderness was designated. A majority of the land-nearly 57,000,000
acres-was to be placed in a new system of federal-state cooperative manage-
ment. Pourchot, supra note 92, at 6, 47 app. C.
100. H.R. 39 was considered by the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs and Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. H.R. REP. No. 1045,
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much larger reservations than Secretary Andrus had proposed.'
In the Senate, a d-2 lands bill was reported out of committee but
not passed before the ninety-fifth Congress adjourned in October of
1978.02
ANCSA stipulated that the d-2 land withdrawals would expire in
December, 1978. Consequently, on November 16, 1978, Secretary
Andrus withdrew 110,000,000 acres to continue the land freeze for
three years, using authority in the Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act of 1976.'03 On December 1, President Carter pro-
supra note 8, at 34-35. Subcommittees on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation
and the Environment, and Oversight and Alaska Lands, conducted extensive hear-
ings in Alaska and in other states. See id. at 34; CAHN, supra note 92, at 18-19;
Pourchot, supra note 92, at 6, 26-27. Over 2,000 witnesses testified, more than
on any other bill since the Civil Rights bills in the 1960s. See Pourchot, supra
note 92, at 26-27.
101. This amended version of H.R. 39 passed in the House by a large majority
in May, 1978. CAHN, supra note 92, at 21. The bill included 124,600,000 acres,
all but 5,000,000 acres of it in parks and refuges. See id.; Alaska National Inter-
est Lands Conservation Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 39 before the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, H.R. SERIAL No. 13, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 552-53 (1979) (chronology of d-2 lands legislation by U.S. Department of
the Interior). It also proposed to designate 65,500,000 acres as wilderness. CAHN,
supra note 92, at 21.
102. The Senate Committee on Energy and National Resources conducted a
record 46 markup sessions, finally reporting out a d-2 lands bill in October of
1978, near the end of the 95th Congress. See Pourchot, supra note 92, at 6, 36.
Key Senate and House members met in an ad hoc conference committee to pro-
duce a compromise acceptable both to the full Senate and to the House. Id. at 7.
Compromise appeared close on a bill that included 100,700,000 acres of reserva-
tions and designed 50,700,000 acres of wilderness. See H.R. REP. No. 97, supra
note 69, at 92. It was blocked, however, by Alaska's Senator Mike Gravel, who
opposed passage of any d-2 lands law. See id.; CAHN, supra note 92, at 21-23; cf.
Kathy Koch, Balancing Act: Alaska Lands Developments Leave No Clear Win-
ners, 38 CONG. Q. 396, 397 (1980) (Secretary Andrus attributes death of 1978
bill to "deliberate obstructionism" by Sen. Gravel); Kathy Koch, Senate Passes
Alaska Lands Legislation, 38 CONG. Q. 2447, 2447 (1980) (bill was never called
up on Senate floor because of Gravel's threat to filibuster); Kathy Koch, House
Clears the Senate's Alaska Lands Bill, 38 CONG. Q. 3377, 3377 (1980) (Sen.
Gravel defends his opposition to ANILCA, conceding it cost him his Senate
seat).
103. Public Land Order No. 5653 (Nov. 16, 1978), amended by Public Land
Order No. 5654 (Nov. 17, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 59,756 (1978), reprinted in H.R.
242 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
claimed seventeen new national monuments in Alaska, totalling
56,000,000 acres."' Five months later, in May of 1979, the House
passed another d-2 lands bill including an even greater area. 5
But the Senate did not consider a d-2 bill again until July of 1980.
In August of 1980, the Senate finally passed a bill that reserved
about five-sixths of the land protected by the House bill."° Even
REP. No. 13, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 555-58, 564-67 (1979); see id. at 554; S. REP.
No. 413, supra note 32, at 133, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5078; H.R.
REP. No. 97, supra note 69, at 93, 144 n.1; cf. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1994)
(emergency withdrawal provision, § 204(e) of FLPMA); H.R. REP. No. 13, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 559 (1979) (letter to Secretary Andrus from House Committee
Chairman Udall declaring emergency); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155,
1157-58 (D. Alaska 1978) (declining to enjoin withdrawal because it was an
emergency action and there had been a sufficient study of the environmental and
subsistence impacts).
104. Proclamations 4611-4627, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,009-031 (1978), reprinted in
H.R. No. 13, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 571-690 (1979); see id. at 554; S. REP. No.
413, supra note 32, at 133, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5077-78; H.R.
REP. No. 97, supra note 69, at 93; cf. Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-
433 (1994) (statutory authority for President Carter's reservation of national mon-
uments). The reservation of monuments was upheld against a state challenge
claiming that presidential action should be subject to environmental review, Cart-
er, 462 F. Supp. at 1160, and an industry challenge claiming that the reserved
areas did not fit the statutory requirements for monuments. See Anaconda Copper
Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853, 1855 (D. Alaska July 1, 1980);
cf. Comment, Congressional Stall Prompts Administrative Actions to Protect the
Alaska National Interest Lands, 8 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10245, 10248
(Dec. 1978) (Antiquities Act had been used by several previous presidents to
reserve monuments up to 1,600,000 acres in area). National monuments ordinari-
ly are permanent reservations, but President Carter stated that these would stand
"until Congress makes other provisions for the land." James E. Carter, "Statement
By The President" accompanying monument proclamations (Dec. 1, 1978), re-
printed in H.R. REP. No. 13, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 568, 569-70 (1979) (purposes
of the monuments include preservation of exceptional natural wonders and ensur-
ing that Natives can continue subsistence way of life).
105. On May 16, 1979, a large majority of the House passed the coalition-
sponsored Udall-Anderson version of H.R. 39. CAHN, supra note 92, at 24-25;
Julia Rose, Conservationists Win in House Alaska Vote, 37 CONG. Q. 939, 939;
Pourchot, supra note 92, at 7. It included about 127,500,000 acres, nearly all of it
in parks, refuges, and national monuments. See Pourchot, supra note 92, at 7-8;
BUCK, supra note 93, at 12-13. The bill also designated 68,600,000 acres of wil-
derness in new and existing reservations. Id.
106. On August 18, 1980, the Senate voted to invoke cloture on a filibuster by
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so, it was substantial: it doubled America's national parks, trebled
the refuges, and quadrupled the area of wilderness. The House did
not consider the Senate version until after President Carter was de-
feated in the general election in November. Then, in a lame duck
session, the House bowed to changed political realities and accepted
the Senate version. 7 In what may have been his crowning con-
servation achievement, President Carter signed ANILCA into law
on December 2, 1980."8
Alaska Senator Mike Gravel. BUCK, supra note 93, at 7, 17; Pourchot, supra note
92, at 8, 29; CAHN, supra note 92, at 28-29. The Senate then approved the
Tsongas-Jackson-Roth-Hatfield substitute (the new H.R. 39) by a vote of 72 to
16. CAHN, supra note 92, at 29; BUCK, supra note 93, at 7, 17. The bill included
a total of about 107,000,000 acres of reservations, with some 97,300,000 acres in
parks, park preserves, monuments, and wildlife refuges. See BUCK, supra note
93, at 10. It also designated 56,400,000 acres of wilderness in new and existing
reservations. These totals included approximately 25,700,000 acres less in refuges
and 10,800,000 acres less in wilderness than the version of H.R. 39 approved by
the House in 1979. Cf. Koch, Senate Passes, supra note 102, at 2448 (comparing
acreage of the two bills). Nevertheless, the bill created federal reservations larger
in area than the State of California. Alaska Geographic Society, Alaska National
Interest Lands, The D-2 Lands, ALASKA GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 4, 1981, at 8.
107. See Koch, House Clears, supra note 102, at 3377-78. The changed reali-
ties were: the election of President Reagan, who might not enforce the admin-
istrative withdrawals that sequestered the d-2 lands; the election of a Republican
Senate; and the shift to a more conservative House. These changes made it un-
likely that a future Senate would agree to a bill closer to the one passed by the
House in 1979. Id. at 3377-78; BUCK, supra note 93, at 7; Pourchot, supra note
92, at 31. On November 12, 1980, the House capitulated, approving the Senate
bill on a voice vote. 126 CONG. REC. H10552 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1980).
108. See Koch, Senate Passes, supra note 102, at 2448 (President reiterated
before passage that enacting ANILCA was his "highest environmental priority");
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
2755, 2758 (Dec. 8, 1980).
The 180-page Act was a hard-won compromise, see 16 U.S.C. § 3101
(1994), the culmination of nine years of debate, some forty bills, and well over
25,000 pages of legislative history. See I-XLI ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 82. Nevertheless, neither side was happy with the Act, and both sides
vowed to revisit it with amendments in a future congress. See Koch, House
Clears, supra note 102, at 3377. In addition, some of ANILCA's language was
never smoothed by floor debate, and since there was no conference, the Act con-
tained ambiguities affecting its implementation. See CAHN, supra note 92, at 31.
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D. Congress' Subsistence Protections: ANILCA Title VIII
The House and Senate each received about ten ANILCA bills in
the ninety-fifth Congress of 1977-78, and similar numbers in the
ninety-sixth Congress of 1979-80."° Nearly all the bills declared a
policy to protect the resources needed for subsistence. This policy
was based on Congress' finding that, even after the passage of
ANCSA, subsistence uses remained essential to certain Alaskans'
existence."0  The initial bills included some subsistence
109. The Department of the Interior compiled a section-by-section comparison
of the texts of the major d-2 lands bills in both the ninety-fifth and ninety-sixth
Congresses. See Gary Widman, Associate Solicitor for Conservation and Wildlife,
U.S: Department of the Interior, Introduction to and Summary of Comparable
Sections to the Alaska Lands Act (1980); XL ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 82, at 6, 15, 231-92 (comparing major versions of ANILCA Title VIII
for subsistence protections).
The House bills of the ninety-fifth Congress are reprinted in I ANILCA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 204-32, 245-86, 288-371, 372-543, 544-
730, 731-811; II ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 1-166, 167-
222. The Senate bills of the ninety-fifth Congress are reprinted in III ANILCA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 1-84, 85-230, 231-382, 383-660, 663-
701, 703-32, 628-62; II ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 419-
627, 733-97.
The House bills of the ninety-sixth Congress are reprinted in III ANILCA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 661-839; IV ANILCA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 82, at 1-209, 210-484, 485-770; V ANILCA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 82, at 1-281, 282-562, 563-807; VI ANILCA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 82, 1-345, 346-967; VII ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 82, at 1-357, 358-86, 387-441; X ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 82, at 806-28, 829-36. The Senate bills of the ninety-sixth Congress
are reprinted in VII ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 442-776;
VIII ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 1-195, 196-450, 451-877,
878-1000; IX ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 1-450, 451-897;
X ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 1-805.
110. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701 (Oct. 17, 1977). The findings of
this Bill were that subsistence was essential to both Natives and other rural resi-
dents, that there was no alternative means to supply food, that the policies of
ANCSA required Congress to protect subsistence, and that local people must
participate in the management of resources. Id.; cf. ANILCA § 801, 16 U.S.C.
§ 3111 (1994) (enacting these findings, with additional finding that subsistence
was threatened by pressure from Alaska's growing population). The policies de-
rived from these findings were that subsistence should be the priority use of re-
newable resources, that subsistence should receive a preference when conserva-
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protections in a title designed to set standards for federal reserva-
tion administration.' Then, midway through the ninety-fifth Con-
gress, the bills acquired a separate subsistence title the precursor of
ANILCA Title VIII.12 The new title included a paragraph on
land-use planning that was to become section 810."13 Apart from
that paragraph, the new title protected subsistence by prescribing
requirements for state and federal managers of fish and game on
public lands. The principal requirements controlled competition
tion restrictions became necessary, and that cooperative management by landown-
ers should be used to promote subsistence. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 702 (Oct. 17, 1977). ANILCA enacted these policies with the additional provi-
so that, consistent with conservation, public land management should cause the
least possible adverse impact on subsistence users. See ANILCA § 802, 16
U.S.C. § 3112.
From the early bills forward, the scope of the subsistence policy included
both Natives and other Alaskans who depended upon subsistence. See H.R. 39,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(a)(3) (Oct. 12, 1977); H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 703(4) (Oct. 17, 1977). Cf. Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 313
n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that Congress broadened the preference for protect-
ing only subsistence used by Native Alaskans to include all rural residents at the
request of the state), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
111. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701 (Jan. 4, 1977) (federal regula-
tion, curtailment of competing consumptive uses, consultation with users, re-
porting); H.R. 2082, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106(g) (Jan. 19, 1977) (discussing
federal regulation); H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(a)-(c) (Oct. 12, 1977)
(state regulation, subsistence preference); S. 499, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108
(Jan. 28, 1977) (providing framework for federal regulation); S. 500, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 701 (Jan. 28, 1977) (federal regulation, subsistence preference, consul-
tation with users, reporting); S. 1500, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701 (May 12, 1977)
(same); S. 1787, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4304 (June 30, 1977) (the state of Alas-
ka shall regulate the taking of fish and game subject to the Act and that subsis-
tence purposes shall be given preference in cases of depletion); S. 2465, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 701(a)-(c) (Jan. 31, 1978) (state regulation, subsistence prefer-
ence).
112. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 701-720 (Oct. 17, 1977) (staff and
Interior Department recommendations for substitute text following markup), re-
printed in I ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 460-79; S. 2944,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 701-715 (Apr. 19, 1978), reprinted in III ANILCA LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 148.
113. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 714 (Oct. 17, 1977); S. 2944, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 707 (Apr. 19, 1978).
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from non-subsistence users for these resources, and ensured sub-
sistence users' access to federal reservations.
The new title controlled competition by giving subsistence users
a preference, in times of shortage, over users "taking" the same re-
sources for other consumptive uses.'1 4 Although early bills pro-
114. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 702(1), 706(b)(2) (Oct. 17, 1977);
S. 2944, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 702(2) (Apr. 19, 1978). This subsistence prefer-
ence was present even in some bills that preceded the creation of a separate sub-
sistence title. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(b) (Jan. 4, 1977); H.R. 39,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(a)(5) (Oct. 12, 1977); S. 500, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 701(b) (Jan. 28, 1977). The preference was enacted as one of three items of
subsistence policy in section 802 of ANILCA:
(2) nonwasteful subsistence uses of fish and wildlife and other renew-
able resources shall be the priority consumptive uses of all such re-
sources on the public lands of Alaska when it is necessary to restrict
taking in order to assure the continued viability of a fish or wildlife
population or the continuation of subsistence uses of such population,
the taking of such population for nonwasteful subsistence uses shall be
given preference on the public lands over other consumptive us-
es ....
16 U.S.C. § 3112(2) (1994) (no punctuation following "Alaska" in original).
The other two items of policy were: to cause the least possible impact on sub-
sistence users consistent with conservation of resource populations, and to
utilize cooperative land management. Id. § 3112(1), (3). ANILCA does not
define which "other consumptive uses" are subject to the subsistence prefer-
ence. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3102, 3113. A few of the early bills listed the subordi-
nated uses as "recreational, sport, or other consumptive uses." S. 2944, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 702(2) (Apr. 19, 1978); S. 1500 amend. no. 2176, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 802(2) (May 16, 1978); H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 702(2) (received in Senate May 23, 1978); H.R. 3636, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 102(5) (Apr. 10, 1979).
The subsistence preference policy was implemented in section 804 of
ANILCA: "Except as otherwise provided the taking on public lands of fish and
wildlife for nonwasteful subsistence uses shall be accorded priority over the
taking on such lands of fish and wildlife for other purposes." 16 U.S.C.
§ 3114. The term "taking" is defined broadly. See ANILCA § 102(18), 16
U.S.C. § 3102(18); H.R. 12625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 103(5) (May 9, 1978)
(same definition in earlier bills); see also infra part V (B) (discussing analogy
to Endangered Species Act, where regulation includes significant habitat modi-
fication within definition of a taking).
In most Senate versions of section 804 the favored status of subsistence
was labelled a "preference," and that term is used here. See, e.g., H.R. 39
amend. no. 1961, Senate Calendar No. 442, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 804 (Aug.
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posed federal administration of this preference, Title VIII of
ANILCA gave the state an option to regulate subsistence on federal
lands, subject to federal oversight.15 The early bills also confined
the subsistence preference to "subsistence zones" designated by the
6, 1980). But see, e.g., S. 1500, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 804(c)(3) (May 16,
1978) (earlier Senate bill referring to subsistence "priority"). In enacting sec-
tion 804, however, Congress changed the wording from a subsistence "pref-
erence" to a subsistence "priority." See H.R. Con. Res. 452, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess J (34) (passed by House Nov. 21, 1980; passed by Senate Dec. 1, 1980).
This does not appear to be a substantive change: the words "priority" and
"preference" are sometimes used in defining one another. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1178, 1193-94 (6th ed. 1990); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1787, 1804 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1986).
115. See ANILCA § 805(d), 16 U.S.C. § 3115(d) (1994); see also id.
§ 3115(e) (providing fifty percent federal funding of administrative costs if state
undertakes subsistence management). Regulation, in this context, refers to the
setting of hunting and fishing seasons, bag limits, methods of capture, and the
definition of users eligible for the subsistence preference. See Bobby v. Alaska,
718 F. Supp. 764, 768-70 (D. Alaska 1989); H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 701(a)(2), (3) (Oct. 12, 1977).
The provisions for federal monitoring, ANILCA §§ 806, 816(b), 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3116, 3126(b), and for federal court enforcement of the preference by subsis-
tence users, in particular, ANILCA § 807, 16 U.S.C. § 3117, were controversial.
See 126 CONG. REC. S15, 131 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980) (statement of Sen.
Stevens); 126 CONG. REC. H 11, 111-15 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1980) (statement of
Rep. Udall). The State was concerned about federal intrusion on state preroga-
tives in the management of fish and game, and about fragmenting management of
natural habitats along political boundaries. See Alaska National Interest Lands:
Hearings on H.R. 39, H.R. 2219 before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Env't of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 413-14, 417-20, Serial No. 4 (Feb. 26, 1979) (state-
ments of Dr. Ronald 0. Skoog, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Fish and
Game). Subsistence groups, citing previous failures to protect subsistence, were
willing to accept state management of federal lands only with federal oversight.
See id. at 674-76, 679-81, 695 (comments of Donald Mitchell, Counsel, Alaska
Federation of Natives); id. at 679 (comments of Morris Thompson, President,
Alaska Federation of Natives). Even after the Senate finally passed a d-2 lands
bill late in the ninety-sixth Congress, the preference enforcement section was
overhauled again before it was enacted as ANILCA section 807. See H.R. Con.
Res. 452, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (30), at 7-9 (1980) (passed by House Nov. 21,
1980; passed by Senate Dec. 1, 1980); see also XL ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 82, at 258-63 (comparing different versions of preference en-
forcement clause).
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Interior Secretary." 6 Later bills eliminated the subsistence zones,
applying the preference broadly to all of Alaska's federal lands." 7
Some bills supplemented the broad preference over non-subsistence
users with abatement priorities among subsistence users during
acute shortages."' The subsistence preference and abatement pri-
116. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 703(3), 704, 705, 706(a) (Oct. 17,
1977); H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 703(3), 704, 705, 706(a) (Oct. 28,
1977); H.R. 10888, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 601(a)-(c) (Feb. 9, 1978); see also,
e.g., H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(a), (b) (Jan. 4, 1977) (subsistence man-
agement zones were contained in bills preceding appearance of a separate subsis-
tence title); cf. H.R. REP. No. 97, supra note 69, at 539-43 (dissenting views of
Reps. Udall, Burton, Seiberling, and others) (describing history of subsistence
management zone concept).
117. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 704(c)(2), 704(c)(3)(B) (Feb. 15,
1978); S. 2944, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 704(c)(2)-(3)(A) (Apr. 19, 1978); see
also ANILCA §§ 802(2), 804, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3112(2), 3114 (1994) (making sub-
sistence the priority consumptive use on the public lands of Alaska, without refer-
ence to subsistence management zones); id. § 3102(3) (defining "public lands"
without reference to such zones).
118. Bills introduced before the advent of a separate subsistence title did not
contain subsistence abatement priorities. See, e.g., H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 701(b) (Jan. 4, 1977); S. 500, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(b) (Jan. 28, 1977);
cf. S. 1787, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4304 (June 30, 1977) (preference for subsis-
tence taking in case of wildlife shortage to be granted to "local residents"). Some
of these early bills used factors to determine eligibility for subsistence similar to
the factors that would later be used to determine abatement priorities among
subsistence users. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(a)(3) (Oct. 12, 1977)
(customary and direct dependence on subsistence as mainstay of livelihood, area
of domicile, availability of alternative resources); S. 1500, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 701(c) (May 12, 1977) (primary and direct dependence on local resources); S.
2465, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 701(a)(3) (Jan. 31, 1978) (customary and direct
dependence, area of domicile, availability of alternative resources). With the
introduction of a separate subsistence title, the bills provided abatement priorities
among subsistence users, in the event that the preference over other consumptive
uses was insufficient to preserve the resource. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 709(b) (Oct. 17, 1977). Initially, the priority favored Alaskan Natives, see id.,
but a race-neutral formula soon appeared, giving three criteria for fixing the pri-
ority among subsistence users:
Whenever it is necessary to restrict the taking of populations of fish
and wildlife on [federal] lands for subsistence uses in order to protect
the continued viability of such populations, or to continue such uses,
such preference shall be based on-
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orities sought to prevent over-harvesting, thereby promoting
Congress' policy of conserving wildlife on federal lands." 9 Con-
gress enacted both the subsistence preference and conservation pri-
orities in section 804 of ANILCA.
While section 804 became the most controversial, 20 other sec-
(1) customary and direct dependence upon the populations as the
mainstay of livelihood;
(2) local residency; and
(3) the availability of alternative resources.
H.R. 39 amend. no. 4742, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 704(b)(5) (Oct. 15, 1978).
At the same time these d-2 bills were introduced in Congress, Alaska
enacted similar subsistence abatement priorities under state law. See Madison
v. Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game, 696 P.2d 168, 174 (Alaska 1985). Imposed
only after non-subsistence uses were curtailed, these restrictions on lower pri-
ority subsistence uses came to be called "tier-II" restrictions. See id.; Smith,
supra note 17, at 25-27. Tier-II restrictions enforcing abatement priorities un-
der ANILCA section 804 are the subject of intense popular debate in Alaska.
See id. They should not be confused with the "tier-il evaluation" under
ANILCA section 810, which is required if an agency finds that a development
project may significantly restrict subsistence uses. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at
1448; infra parts III.B., IV.
119. From the start, one policy of the d-2 lands bills was to preserve "sound
populations of, [and] habit for, resident and nonresident wildlife species." H.R.
39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(a) (Jan. 4, 1977) (pre-dating inclusion of subsis-
tence title); S. 1500, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b) (May 12, 1977) (same); see
H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(1)(d) (Oct. 17, 1977) (including similar
policy statement, and introducing full subsistence title); S. 2944, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 2(b) (Apr. 19, 1978) (same). To serve this policy, the bills restricted
subsistence uses when curbing other uses was not enough to conserve the re-
source. See, e.g., H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 706(b)(2) (Oct. 17, 1977)
("necessary curtailments on consumptive uses of wildlife shall be imposed first
upon other consumptive uses and only as a last resort upon subsistence uses to
the extent necessary for the prevention of waste and the continued viability of the
wildlife resource").
120. See Smith, supra note 17, at 22-24 (discussing section 804, 16 U.S.C.
§ 3114). The state undertook to implement section 804's subsistence preference
on federal lands, and Interior Secretary James Watt certified that this program
was in compliance with ANILCA § 805(d) in 1982. See Kenaitze Indian Tribe v.
Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989). In
1989, however, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the subsistence program's
rural preference, required by ANILCA, violated equal access provisions of the
state's constitution. See McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 9 (Alaska 1989). Cam-
paigns to amend the constitution to rescue the state's subsistence laws failed. See
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tions of Title VIII also arose from Congress' policy of minimizing
subsistence impacts from land management. Section 811 guaranteed
subsistence users' access to federal lands and their right to employ
motor vehicles on these lands. Other sections of the title required
wildlife managers to consult with subsistence users.'2' Sections
Smith, supra note 17, at 24. In July, 1990, the federal government assumed man-
agement of subsistence on federal lands in Alaska. See Federal Subsistence
Board, RECORD OF DECISION--SUBSISTENCE MANAGEMENT FOR FEDERAL PUB-
LIC LANDS IN ALASKA, ROD-i (1992); Subsistence Management Regulations for
Federal Public Lands in Alaska, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,940 (1992) (chronicling federal
takeover and development of federal subsistence management regulations); see
also 36 C.F.R. §§ 13.40-.51 (1995) (federal subsistence regulations for Alaska
national parks); id. §§ 242.1-.27 (1995) (federal subsistence regulations for other
public lands); 50 C.F.R. §§ 36.11-.16 (1995) (federal subsistence regulations for
wildlife refuges); id. §§ 100.1-.27 (1995) (federal subsistence regulations for
wildlife refuge monuments); cf. id. § 100.14(d) (requirements for state petition to
re-assume subsistence management responsibilities under ANILCA section 805(d)
on federal lands); 36 C.F.R. § 242.14(d) (same). The state did not suffer willingly
this intrusion upon its authority to manage fish and game. See State's First
Amended Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 15, Alaska v. Babbitt,
No. A92-264 CIV (D. Alaska Mar. 5, 1993) (alleging that Title VIII provides no
authority for federal management of fish and wildlife on public lands), dismissed,
John v. United States, No. A90-484 CIV, slip op. at 17, 21 (D. Alaska Mar. 30,
1994) rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alaska v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 549, 550 n.2
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Alaska State Legislature v. Alaska, 116 S.
Ct. 68, further proceeding sub nom. Alaska Fish & Wildlife Fed'n v. Alaska, 116
S. Ct. 272 (1995).
121. The bills included a congressional finding that continued subsistence re-
quired people with personal knowledge to have "a meaningful role in the man-
agement of fish and wildlife and of subsistence uses on the public lands in Alas-
ka." S. 2944, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 701(6) (Apr. 19, 1978); see H.R. 39, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(5) (Oct. 17, 1977) (similar language); see also ANILCA
§ 801(5), 16 U.S.C. § 3111(5) (1994) (same language). Two early House bills
expressly included wildlife habitat within the list of resources to be managed
under this finding. H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(5) (Oct. 17, 1977); H.R.
39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(5) (Oct. 28, 1977). Although they retained the
finding of a need for a local role in wildlife management, later bills and
ANILCA did not contain the reference to habitat. See H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 701(5) (Oct. 15, 1978); S. 2944, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 701(6) (Apr. 19,
1978); ANILCA § 801(5), 16 U.S.C. § 3111(5); see also id. § 3120(a)(1) (provi-
sion in section 810 requiring notice to local subsistence committee when federal
land development will significantly restrict subsistence use); id. § 3115 (local
committees to suggest regulations; regional councils to evaluate resources and
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806 and 816 required federal monitoring and oversight of these
wildlife managers' decisions. Section 802 required federal agencies
to cooperate with non-federal landowners in managing contiguous
wildlife habitat. All of these sections promoted the basic policy of
Title VIII, expressed in sections 801 and 802, to preserve users'
opportunities for subsistence.
The policy of Title VIII, in turn, was a fundamental element of
Congress' scheme to establish new federal reservations in ANILCA.
One of the broad purposes articulated in Title I of ANILCA was to
enable Alaskans engaged in a "subsistence way of life" to contin-
ue.'22 In Titles II and III, Congress implemented this purpose by
designating subsistence among the uses that agencies would pro-
mote in new parks and refuges.'23 Titles IV through VII relied on
regulations, subsistence managers to follow recommendations of regional councils
unless they are unsupported).
122. In section 101, Congress gave four broad purposes for enacting ANILCA:
(1) to create new conservation reservations; (2) to preserve natural values; (3) to
protect the subsistence way of life; and (4) to balance conservation with econom-
ic development. See 16 U.S.C. § 3101(a)-(d) (1994). Within its first two purpos-
es, sections 101(a) and 101(b) included "cultural ... and wildlife values," "sound
populations of, and habitat for, wildlife," and "resources related to subsistence
needs" among the things to be protected in new reserves. See id. § 3101(a)-(b).
The third purpose of ANILCA was to enable "rural residents engaged in a
subsistence way of life to continue to do so." Id. § 3101(c). The only caveat was
that subsistence had to remain consistent with scientific wildlife management and
the purposes for which Congress had dedicated each reservation. See id. The
fourth purpose of ANILCA also promoted subsistence, but less directly. This
purpose was to avoid further legislation by achieving "a proper balance" between
preservation and more intensive use of natural resources to promote economic
development. See id. § 3101(d). Subsistence straddled that balance because it
required agencies to protect wildlife while permitting users a harvest that satisfied
their "economic and social needs." See id.
123. Title II of ANILCA added or expanded thirteen units in the national park
system, expressly including subsistence among the purposes for which eight of
them were designated. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 410hh(1)-(3), (4)(a)-(b), (d)(ii), (7)(a),
(9), 410hh-1(3)(a), (1994) (permitting subsistence uses by local residents and/or
listing "protect the viability of subsistence resources" among designated purposes
of eight parks and park preserves); see also id. § 410hh(8)(a), (10) (not listing
subsistence, but listing habitat protection among purposes for two more pre-
serves); id. § §410hh-2 (permitting subsistence generally in preserves); cf. id.
§§ 410hh(5), 410hh-1(1)-(2) (not mentioning subsistence among designated pur-
poses of one park and two monuments); id. § 410hh-4 (permitting commercial
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prior law to assign the uses for new recreation, forest, scenic river,
and wilderness areas. 24 These titles did not designate uses for
each area, 25 relying instead on the management sections of Title
fishing in one of these monuments). See generally id. §§ 3118, 3125, 3126(a),
3201, 3202 (1994) (prescribing management authority for subsistence in park sys-
tem units). In addition to protecting subsistence resources, some of the other
listed uses of park units included preserving geological features, conserving na-
tive fish and wildlife, researching natural processes, studying archaeological sites,
and permitting reindeer grazing. See, e.g., id. § 410hh(1)-(2). Congress did not
completely determine each federal agency's priorities, but instead listed the uses
that are to be promoted "among others." See id.
Title III added or expanded sixteen units in the national wildlife refuge
system, expressly including subsistence among the listed purposes for all but one
of them. See Pub. L. No. 96-487 §§ 302(1)(B)-(9)(B), 303(1)(B)-(3)(B),
303(5)(B)-(7)(B), 94 Stat. 2385-88, 2390-93 (1980) (listing "the opportunity for
continued subsistence uses," consistent with wildlife conservation and conserva-
tion treaties, among purposes for which Fish and Wildlife Service is to manage
refuges); see also id. § 303(4)(B) (not listing subsistence, but listing conservation
of wildlife and their habitats, and "wildlife-oriented recreation," among purposes
for expanding one refuge). In addition to protecting subsistence uses, other listed
purposes of the refuges included conserving a natural diversity of fish and wild-
life and habitats, fulfilling international fish and wildlife treaties, and supplying
clean water. See, e.g., id. § 302(l)(B); see also id. § 302(8)(B) (adding educa-
tional purposes to the list); id. § 303(1)(B) (adding scientific research purpose to
list).
124. See 16 U.S.C. § 460mm-l(a) (1994) (providing that BLM shall administer
new conservation area under Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
("FLPMA"), Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7, 16, 30, 43 U.S.C.)); id. § 403 (Interior Department shall administer
new recreation area under FLPMA and other law); id. § 1274(a)
(1994)(designating new wild and scenic rivers within park and refuge systems via
amendments to existing Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-541, 82 Stat.
906 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1994)); Pub. L. No. 96-
487 § 707, 94 Stat. 2396 (1980)(providing that new wilderness areas be adminis-
tered under the Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994)); see also id. 16 U.S.C. § 539(b)
(1994) (providing that Forest Service administer new additions to two national
forests under existing forest laws, but requiring multiple use activities to be "con-
sistent with the conservation of fish and wildlife and their habitat").
125. See Pub. L. 96-487 §§ 401-708, 94 Stat. 2396-2422 (1980); cf. 16 U.S.C.
§ 460mm(a) (1994) ("multiple use and sustained yield" program for conservation
area); 16 U.S.C. § 539(b) (1994) ("conservation of fish and wildlife and their
habitat" and consistent multiple use activities for national forest additions); Pub.
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VIII to provide the subsistence opportunities that ANCSA had
failed to protect.
Congress drafted section 810, like the management sections, to
protect subsistence on all of Alaska's federal lands. Unlike the
management sections, however, section 810 sought to supply fish
and wildlife to subsistence users for the long term, by conserving
habitats. 26 Congress addressed habitats by injecting subsistence
into federal agencies' land use and project planning decisions. The
language of section 810 required agencies to evaluate the impacts
of project plans on subsistence and, if they were significant, to
minimize those impacts.
II. LANGUAGE AND CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 810
A. The Language of Section 810
Section 810 began as a single paragraph in the 1977 House bill
that first introduced a full subsistence title.' 27 Its drafters intended
L. 96-487 §§ 503(h)(3)(B), 505 (food-fish, wildlife, and habitats included in
environmental study and regulation of mine in national forest monument); 16
U.S.C. § 460mm-4(a) (1994) ("fish and wildlife, and other values" among man-
agement priorities for recreation area); id. § 3202 (fish and wildlife management
on new reservations to conform with state and federal law); id. § 3203(b) (Forest
Service may permit hatcheries to promote fish production in national forest wil-
derness); id. § 3204(a) (agencies may permit temporary campsites that support
fishing and hunting on new reservations).
126. See John v. United States, No. A90-0484 CV, slip op. at 7 n.12 (D. Alas-
ka Mar. 30, 1994) rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alaska v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d
549 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Alaska State Legislature v. Alaska, 116 S.
Ct. 68 (1995), further proceeding sub nom., 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995); see also
Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1453-55 (section 810 evaluation must include cumulative
impacts of future actions that may affect supply of resources over the long term).
127. The section, and Title VIII, were first introduced by the staff of the House
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee as amendments to the original Alaska
Coalition bill prior to markup. See 1 ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
82, at 372 (handwritten introduction to bill). The full original text of the section
was as follows:
SUBSISTENCE AND LAND-USE DECISIONS
§ 714. In determining whether to withdraw, reserve, lease or otherwise
permit the use, occupancy or dispositions of public lands in any re-
gional [subsistence] zone under any provision of law authorizing such
actions, the Secretary or his designee shall evaluate the subsistence
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this paragraph to add subsistence to the list of factors that federal
agencies considered in making land-use decisions.128 They institut-
needs of the persons affected, the availability of nonsubsistence lands
for the purposes sought to be achieved, and other alternatives which
would reduce or eliminate the requirement of any taking of lands
needed for subsistence uses. No withdrawal, reservation, lease, permit,
or other use, occupancy, or disposition of such lands authorized under
the laws of the United States which would significantly restrict sub-
sistence uses shall be effected until after notice and a hearing in the
general vicinity of the area involved, and a determination by the agen-
cy that a limitation of subsistence uses is necessary and unavoidable.
H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 714 (Oct. 17, 1977), reprinted in 1 ANILCA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 475-76. Earlier d-2 land bills had a
policy to protect subsistence in wildlife management but did not address
agencies' land use decisions. See, e.g., H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ l(b),
701 (Jan. 4, 1977). The land use decisions section, and the subsistence title,
were not introduced in the Senate until six months after the House bill. See S.
2944, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 707 (Apr. 19, 1978); S. 1500 amend't no. 2176,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 807 (May 16, 1978).
128. Telephone Interview with Donald Mitchell, Counsel, Alaska Federation of
Natives/Anchorage (Apr. 16, 1993). The section including subsistence in land use
decisions was inspired by proposed BLM regulations under the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1988), which would
have included a subsistence impacts review in public lands classification deci-
sions. Mitchell Interview, supra. The section was intended to assure that subsis-
tence would be a "relevant factor" within the requirement that agencies consider
all such factors in adjudicating land use proposals. Id.; see Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (citing Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1992)). Although NEPA requires agencies
to consider environmental impacts, long term productivity, and irreversible com-
mitments of resources, it does not expressly include subsistence as an environ-
mental factor. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
Donald Mitchell was the principal drafter of the subsistence title of
ANILCA. See Alaska Lands: Hearings on H.R. 39 Before the Subcomm. on Fish-
eries and Wildlife Conservation and the Env't of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (Mar. 16, 1978) (House Serial No.
95-34) (remarks of Curtis Bohlen, consultant to the committee); Alaska National
Interest Lands: Hearings on H.R. 39, H.R. 2219 Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Env'
t of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1 st Sess.
673-76 (Feb. 14, 1979) (House Serial No. 96-4) (statement of Donald Mitchell,
Counsel, Alaska Federation of Natives); Telephone Interview with John W. Katz,
Special Counsel, State of Alaska (Apr. 19, 1993).
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ed the broad requirement that agencies consider subsistence impacts
"[iun determining whether to withdraw, reserve, lease, or otherwise
permit the use, occupancy, or disposition of public lands ... under
any provision of law."'29 Congress ultimately enacted the para-
graph incorporating subsistence in land use decisions as subsection
810(a) of ANILCA. Like the bills that introduced it, subsection
810(a) specified two levels of subsistence evaluation in its first and
second sentences. The courts subsequently labelled these two levels
"tier-I" and "tier-II." 
30
Congress made no material changes to the language of tier-I
between its introduction and'its enactment three years later. 3 ' The
language required an agency to "evaluate the effect of [each new]
use . . on subsistence uses and needs, the availability of other
lands for the purposes sought to be achieved, and other alternatives
which would reduce or eliminate the use ... of public lands needed
for subsistence."'' Tier-I thus included three factors: (1) subsis-
tence impacts, (2) alternative sites for a project, and (3) alternatives
to the project itself. These factors imposed a duty that was proce-
dural because they determined what an agency must evaluate with-
out setting standards for the allowable extent of subsistence im-
pacts.
Tier-II did establish such standards, but it applied to a narrower
category of land use decisions. From its origin, the bills defined the
category by requiring an agency to complete tier-II for any new use
"which would significantly restrict" subsistence uses. 33 Through
this definition, Congress required an agency to make a threshold
determination of the significance of project impacts, to see whether
it must complete tier-Il.13 ANILCA did not define "significant,"
129. See supra note 127; see also ANILCA § 810(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)
(1994) (same language in enacted bill).
130. See Akutan M, 792 F.2d at 1377; Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1448; Clough I,
750 F. Supp. at 1424-25.
131. Compare H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 714 (Oct. 17, 1977) (quoted in
note 127, supra), with ANILCA section 810(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (quoted in
note 28, supra).
132. 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (first sentence).
133. 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a); see H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 714 (Oct. 17,
1977) (original bill).
134. See Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1151. The Act never defined what would be
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and in most of the cases raising section 810 claims, subsistence
users argued that agencies erred in their threshold findings of no
significant restriction.135 Although the agencies never developed
"significance" definitions consistent with section 810, courts were
reluctant to mandate tier-II, according-perhaps excessive- defer-
ence to their planning role.
3 6
If an agency is required to complete tier-II, it must give notice,
hold a local hearing, and make specified findings about its project
design. In the original bills, the required findings were that a new
subsistence restriction was "necessary and unavoidable."'37
Congress' only material change to the language before it enacted
tier-II in subsection 810(a) was to expand an agency's duty by
requiring three findings:
required to "significantly restrict" subsistence uses. See ANILCA §§ 102, 803,
810(a), 16 U.S.C. §§ 3102, 3113, 3120(a) (1994). One drafter of Title VIII has
noted that Congress never gave any consideration to what would constitute a sig-
nificant restriction of subsistence. Katz Telephone Interview, supra note 128.
Another has suggested Congress would have never enacted section 810 if "sig-
nificantly restrict" had been defined so as to remove agency discretion to develop
federal lands. Mitchell Telephone Interview, supra note 128. Shortly after
ANILCA was enacted, a working group of federal agencies, state agencies, and
subsistence users met to develop standard definitions under section 810, but none
were adopted. See id. (discussing Alaska Land Use Council (ALUC) Working
Group I recommendations); cf ALUC WORKING GROUP II RECOMMENDATIONS,
infra note 158 (report of separate working group recommending subsistence eval-
uation methods).
135. See, e.g., Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1149, 1152; Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at
1449, 1451-52; Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1425.
136. See, e.g., Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1449-52, 1454-55, 1458-59 (holding
that Forest Service used wrong legal standards to determine "significance," but
denying injunction because agency contended that restriction was insignificant
and subsistence users did not establish irreparable harm).
137. H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 714 (Oct. 17, 1977); H.R. 39, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 714 (Oct. 28, 1977); H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 707(3)
(Feb. 15, 1978); see S. 2944, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 707(3) (Apr. 19, 1978)
("necessary and unavoidable and minimizes the land and impacts on subsistence
uses involved"); cf. H.R. 10888, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6010) (Feb. 9, 1978)
(project subject "[tlo the maximum extent practicable[,] ... steps to ameliorate or
eliminate adverse impacts").
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(A) such a significant restriction of subsistence uses is necessary,
consistent with sound management principles for the utilization of
the public lands,
(B) the proposed activity will involve the minimal amount of pub-
lic lands necessary to accomplish the purposes of such use, occu-
pancy, or other disposition, and
(C) reasonable steps will be taken to minimize adverse impacts
upon subsistence uses and resources resulting from such ac-
tions."'
Unlike the tier-I procedure and tier-II hearing, the words "neces-
sary,' ' 9 "minimal,'"1" and "minimize"'' in the tier-IL findings
138. 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(3). The requirement for three distinct tier-II findings
came fairly early in the evolution of Title VIII. See, e.g., H.R. 12625, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 707(3) (May 9, 1978) (first House use of three discrete find-
ings); S. 1500 amend, no. 2176, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 807(3) (May 16, 1978)
(first Senate use).
139. The agency must determine that "such a significant restriction of subsis-
tence uses is necessary, consistent with sound management principles for the
utilization of the public lands." ANILCA § 810(a)(3)(A), 16 U.S.C.
§ 3120(a)(3)(A) (1994). Committee reports clarify that this finding has two
subparts: the agency must determine that the subsistence restriction is "necessary
and consistent with sound management principles." S. REP. No. 413, supra note
32, at 274, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5218; H.R. REP. No. 97, supra
note 69, at 286 (emphasis added).
The finding's use of sound management principles echoes Congress' reli-
ance throughout Title VIII on scientific management to conserve fish and wildlife
populations. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3112(1), 3114, 3115(b), 3118(b), 3122, 3123,
3125(1), 3124(3), 3126(b); see also id. § 3101(c) (general intent of Act to protect
subsistence "consistent with management of fish and wildlife in accordance with
recognized scientific principles" and each reservation's purpose); id. § 3101(b)
(general intent to maintain "sound populations of, and habitat for, wildlife spe-
cies. . . " and to protect subsistence resources); cf. H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 706(b)(1) (Oct. 28, 1977) (state management program for federal lands
must have "as its central element the maintenance of the optimum sustainable
population of the fish and wildlife species utilized by subsistence users"); Seattle
Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 299-302 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying regu-
lation at 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 that required Forest Service to maintain "viable
populations" of fish and wildlife). Although it did not directly reference section
810, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources did provide guid-
ance to agencies managing subsistence resources:
The Committee intends the phrase "the conservation of healthy popu-
lations of fish and wildlife" to mean the maintenance of fish and wild-
life resources and their habitats in a condition which assures stable
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and continuing natural populations and species mix of plants and ani-
mals in relation to their ecosystems, including recognition that local
rural residents engaged in subsistence uses may be a natural part of
that ecosystem; minimizes the likelihood of irreversible or long-term
effects upon such populations and species; and ensures maximum
practicable diversity of options for the future. The greater the igno-
rance of the resource parameters, particularly the ability and capacity
of a population or species to respond to changes in its ecosystem, the
greater the safety factor must be.
The Committee recognizes that the management policies and legal
authorities of the National Park System and the National Wildlife
Refuge System may require different interpretations and application of
the "healthy population" concept consistent with the management
objectives of each system.
S. REP. No. 413, supra note 32, at 233, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5177; id. at 235, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5179 (reference to "natural and healthy
populations" in ANILCA § 815(1) recognizes that wildlife in parks may get
greater protection than in other federal reservations); 36 C.F.R. § 242.4 (1992)
(Forest Service regulations using language of Senate committee report to define
the term "[c]onservation of healthy populations of fish and wildlife").
140. The agency must find that "the proposed activity will involve the minimal
amount of public lands necessary to accomplish the purposes of such use, occu-
pancy, or other disposition." ANILCA § 810(a)(3)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(3)(B)
(1994). One of the drafters of Title VIII has noted that this finding followed
familiar public land law patterns wherein special set-asides from federal reserva-
tions are confined to "the smallest area compatible" with the purpose of the set-
aside, Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994); or "the smallest practica-
ble tract," ANCSA § 3(e), 43 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1988). Telephone Interview with
Stan Sloss, Counsel, Subcommittee on National Parks, House Committee on Nat-
ural Resources (April 29, 1993). Mr. Sloss was on the legislative staff of the
House subcommittee that drafted Title VIII. See Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act: Markup Session on H.R. 39 Before the Subcomm. on General
Oversight and Alaska Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 799-800 (Jan. 30, 1978), reprinted in XXVIII
ANILCA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 82, at 21-22; Mitchell Telephone
Interview, supra note 128. The first Senate version phrased this finding different-
ly, requiring the agency to determine that its subsistence restriction "minimizes
the land and impacts on subsistence uses involved." S. 2944, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 707(3) (Apr. 19, 1978).
141. The agency must find that "reasonable steps will be taken to minimize
adverse impacts upon subsistence uses and resources resulting from such ac-
tions." ANILCA § 810(a)(3)(C), 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(3)(C) (1994). Most of the
House bills would have required an agency to take "adequate" impact-minimizing
steps, rather than "reasonable" steps. See, e.g., H.R. 12625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
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established subsistence protection standards for land use decisions.
In the sole case that reviewed tier-II findings, City of Tenakee
Springs v. Clough, the district court recognized that these substan-
tive standards limited the discretion of an agency, the Forest Ser-
vice, to approve a logging project. 42 The court did not require the
agency to redesign its project in Clough, however, because it de-
§ 707(3)(C) (May 9, 1978); H.R. 39, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 705(a)(3)(C) (Jan.
15, 1979); H.R. 39, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 706(a)(3)(C) (May 24, 1979). But see
H.R. 39 amend., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 709(a)(3)(C) (Mar. 28, 1979) ("reason-
able steps"); H.R. 39 Union Calendar No. 40, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 810(a)(3)(C) (Jan. 15, 1979). The requirement to use reasonable steps was first
proposed in a House bill early in the ninety-sixth Congress. See H.R. 39 amend.,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 709(a)(3)(C) (Mar. 28, 1979) (Rep. Breaux). It was in-
cluded in a Senate bill later in that term, see H.R. 39 amend. no. 626, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 710(a)(3)(C) (Nov. 15, 1979) (Sen. Tsongas), and used in all
later Senate versions of section 810. See H.R. 39, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 810(a)(3)(C) (Aug. 4, 1980) (first version to number the land use decisions
section as section 810); H.R. 39 amend. no. 1961, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 810(a)(3)(C) (Aug. 6, 1980); H.R. 39, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 810(a)(3)(C)
(passed Senate Aug. 19, 1980). The Senate committee report characterizes the
change as a technical amendment that "substitutes the well-recognized legal stan-
dard of 'reasonable' in place of 'adequate' . . . although it should be recognized
that steps which are 'inadequate' to minimize adverse impacts will rarely be
'reasonable' within the meaning of this section." S. REP. No. 413, supra note 32,
at 234, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5178; cf City of Tenakee Springs v.
Franzel, No. J86-024 CIV, slip op. at 27-28 (D. Alaska May 24, 1991) (affirming
agency impact-minimizing steps as reasonable because they were neither arbitrary
nor capricious, but not reaching the issue of whether steps were adequate), affd,
960 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1992). While the term "adequate" appears to provide more
guidance than the term "reasonable," the substantive standard in the third finding
remains unchanged: the agency must "minimize" subsistence impacts.
Unlike the other tier-I findings, the third finding is prospective: "reason-
able steps will be taken to minimize adverse impacts." 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(3)(C)
(emphasis added). Section 810 does not specify who must take these future steps.
See id.; see also S. REP. No. 413, supra note 32, at 234, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5178 ("steps which the head of a Federal agency must take"); cf.
Clough 11, 750 F. Supp. at 1432 (dictum that agency may delegate responsibility
for its "mitigation measures" to state agencies, provided a finding that reasonable
steps to be taken are not arbitrary and capricious).
142. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1427 (discussing "necessary" finding); cf.
Franzel, No. J86-024 CIV, slip op. at 25 ("necessary" finding permits agency to
reasonably consider and reject subsistence-protective alternatives).
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ferred to the agency's factual conclusion that logging was necessary
and to the legal construction of what the three findings required.
In addition to the paragraph that became subsection 810(a), a
Senate bill late in the ninety-fifth Congress added language that be-
came subsections 810(b) and 810(c). 43 Subsection 810(b) required
an agency to report its tier-II evaluation in an environmental impact
statement if NEPA required it to write such a statement.'" Con-
gress may have sought by this provision to reduce paperwork, ceas-
ing the reporting of separate environmental and subsistence evalua-
tions. Subsection 810(c) addressed the long-delayed land selection
process by exempting state and Native corporations' selections from
subsistence evaluation. Agencies incorporated subsection 810(b) in
their section 810 guidelines, and expanded upon it by integrating
the subsistence evaluation even when NEPA required only an envi-
143. See H.R. 39 amend. no. 4742, Senate Calendar No. 1215, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 710(b)-(c) (Oct. 15, 1978). The House picked up the language of subsec-
tions 810(b) and 810(c) three months later in its first d-2 lands bill of the ninety-
sixth Congress. See H.R. 39, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 705(b)-(c) (Jan. 15, 1979).
144. Subsection (b) reads:
(b) Environmental impact statement
If the Secretary is required to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment pursuant to [NEPA], he shall provide the notice and hearing and
include the findings required by subsection (a) of this section as part
of such environmental impact statement.
16 U.S.C. § 3120(b) (1994). Subsection 810(b) cited NEPA section 102(2)(C),
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994), for the environmental impact statement ("EIS")
requirement. The subsection did not expressly require an agency to integrate its
subsistence evaluation if an environmental assessment ("EA") or categorical
exclusion was all NEPA required. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(b). But see Penfold 11,
857 F.2d at 1313 n. 11 (noting that an EIS or an EA must include the subsis-
tence evaluation).
Subsection 810(b) referred to "notice and hearing" and "findings," but
not to tier-I's requirement to "evaluate" subsistence impacts, suggesting to one
court that § 810(b) did not mandate including tier-I in an EIS. See Watt, No.
A83-337 CIV, slip op. at 57-59 (holding that an agency need not recite a tier-I
FONSR in its EIS). But see infra note 175 (agency had to disclose its tier-I
determination if users were to play a meaningful role in subsistence manage-
ment).
1996] ANILCA SECTION 810
ronmental assessment.145 Subsection 810(b) engendered little liti-
gation, and subsection 810(c) spawned none."
A House bill early in the ninety-sixth Congress added the final
language: subsection 810(d).'47 This subsection allowed an agency
to go forward with a project "[a]fter compliance with the procedur-
al requirements of this section and other applicable law."'" A
145. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, FSH 2609.25,
SUBSISTENCE MANAGEMENT AND USE HANDBOOK §§ 2.1 (environmental assess-
ment), 2.2 (draft EIS), 2.3 (final EIS) (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter FOREST SERVICE
GUIDELINES]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, SUBSISTENCE AND LAND USE
DECISIONS POLICY §§ IV.A. (environmental assessment), IV.B. (EIS) (June 1984)
(W. Horn, Deputy Under Secretary) [hereinafter INTERIOR DEPARTMENT
GUIDELINES]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
ALASKA REGIONAL OFFICE, ANILCA SECTION 810 PROCEDURES §§ IV.A. (EA),
IV.B. (EIS) (Nov. 26, 1984) [hereinafter PARK SERVICE GUIDELINES]; U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, INSTRUCTION
MEMORANDUM No. AK 86-350: POLICY FOR SECTION 810 COMPLIANCE WITH
THE ALASKA NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS CONSERVATION ACT §§ III.A. & V.B.
(EA), V.C. (EIS) (Aug. 26, 1986) [hereinafter BLM GUIDELINES]; U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, REFUGES AND WILDLIFE
WR- 11: RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES FOR COMPLIANCE WITH ANILCA SECTION
810 §§ III.A., V.A. (EA), V.B. (draft EIS), V.C. (final EIS) (accepted by Alaska
Land Use Council Nov. 19, 1984) [hereinafter FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE
GUIDELINES].
146. Cf. Watt, No. A83-337 CIV, slip op. at 57-59 (810(b) requires an EIS to
contain tier-II findings, but not to contain a tier-I determination of no significant
restriction); Dinyea Corp., 90 Int. Bd. Land App. 163, 166-67, 1986 IBLA
LEXIS 282 at *7-*10 (1986) (Interior Board of Land Appeals) (citing 810(c)
policy of unimpeded state land selection in dismissing Native corporation's claim
that BLM ignored subsistence impacts when it opened a utility corridor to allow
state, but not Natives, to select the land).
147. See H.R. 39 Union Calendar No. 40, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 810(d) (Apr.
18, 1979) (Rep. Udall). The Senate adopted the language of subsection 810(d) in
a bill introduced some three months later in the same term. See H.R. 39 amend.
no. 626, Senate Calendar No. 442, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 710(d) (Nov. 15,
1979) (Sen. Tsongas). After adding subsection 810(d), Congress enacted section
810 with no further changes.
148. Subsection (d) reads:
(d) Management or disposal of lands
After compliance with the procedural requirements of this section and
other applicable law, the head of the appropriate Federal agency may
manage or dispose of public lands under his primary jurisdiction for
any of those uses or purposes authorized by this Act or other law.
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Senate report sought to clarify subsection 810(d) by stating that an
agency could approve a project even if its evaluation showed harm
to subsistence. 49 One agency, the Forest Service, later contended
that subsection (d) meant section 810 was purely procedural, impos-
ing no limits on agency discretion. The courts have not resolved
whether subsection 810(d) vitiated the substantive language of sub-
section 810(a), and agencies' section 810 guidelines did not address
the question. 50 Congress' language in the tier-II findings did,
however, appear to limit agency discretion by its plain meaning.
The Forest Service interpretation that subsection 810(d) withdrew
the substantive mandates of subsection 810(a) was also inconsistent
with Congress' purpose in Title VIII to minimize subsistence im-
pacts of land management. 5'
16 U.S.C. § 3120(d) (1994); see also id. § 3125 (1994) (savings clause for
other applicable laws). Because the other applicable law has both procedural
and substantive requirements, see, e.g., id. (citing the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994) and other federal wildlife statutes),
the grammar of subsection 810(d) suggests that section 810's requirements are
solely procedural. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(d); cf H.R. 39, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 706(a) (May 24, 1979) (House bill in which subsection containing tier-I and
tier-H subsistence review requirements is entitled "Evaluation"); H.R. 3651,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 706(a) (Apr. 23, 1979) (same); H.R. 3636, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 706(a) (Apr. 10, 1979) (same). But cf H.R. 39 amend, no. 4742,
Senate Calendar No. 1215, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 710(a) (Oct. 15, 1978) (ear-
lier Senate bill in which same subsection is entitled "Other Uses, Etc.").
149. According to Senate Report No. 413, subsection 810(d)
clarifies that the requirements of Section 810 are 'procedural' in that
until the requirements of the section have been satisfied the proposed
action may not proceed, but once the requirements of the section are
satisfied and incorporated into existing land use planning processes the
proposed action may proceed even though its effect may be adverse to
subsistence uses.
S. REP. No. 413, supra note 32, at 234 (characterizing addition of 810(d) as a
"technical" amendment), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5178.
150. See Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. 1427; see also FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES,
supra note 145, § 1.4-2 (no discussion of meaning of § 810(d)); INTERIOR DE-
PARTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § III.D.2. (same); PARK SERVICE GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 145, § III.D.2. (same); BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145,
§ IV.D.2. (same); FISH AND WILDLIFE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § IV.D.2.
(same).
151. See 16 U.S.C. § 3112(1); see also infra part IV (discussing tier-II require-
ments in greater detail).
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B. Administrative Construction of Section 810
Most of Alaska's federal lands are administered by the Depart-
ment of the Interior or agencies within it: the National Park Ser-
vice, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Land Man-
agement ("BLM"). 5 2 The nation's two largest national forests,
managed by the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture,
are also subject to section 810.153 Some agencies began conduct-
ing subsistence evaluations when ANILCA went into effect in
1981, but they had no formal procedures for these evaluations.'54
Subsistence users first challenged a subsistence evaluation in
court when they sued the BLM in Kunaknana v. Watt in 1983.
Perhaps as a result of that suit, the BLM issued internal guidelines
for conducting subsistence evaluations in May of 1984.155 Work
Group number I of ANILCA's state-federal Alaska Land Use
Council ("ALUC") built on the BLM draft, adopting section 810
152. See supra note 20; see also ALASKA ALMANAC 96 (similar tabulation);
see generally Alaska Geographic Society, supra note 106, at 13 (map of respec-
tive agencies holdings).
153. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, FS-383: LAND
AREAS OF THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM 14-15 (Sept. 30, 1991) (listing Forest
Service acreage as 16.7 million for the Tongass and 5.5 million for the Chugach
National Forest); see also Steven A. Daugherty, Comment, The Unfulfilled Prom-
ise of an End to Timber Dominance on the Tongass: Forest Service Implementa-
tion of the Tongass Timber Reform Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 1573, 1574-75 (1994)
(describing Tongass National Forest attributes).
154. Telephone Interview with Robert King, Senior Cultural Resource Program
Manager, U.S. Department of the Interior-Bureau of Land Management, Alaska
Region (Jan. 11, 1994); see also Watt, No. A83-337 CIV, slip op. at 33 (BLM
had not developed section 810 guidelines at time of suit); cf. infra note 155 (dis-
cussing issuance of BLM and Forest Service guidelines).
155. In the oil leasing decision reviewed in Watt and Kunaknana, the BLM's
lack of section 810 guidelines led it to issue an amended record of decision and
tier-i FONSR after it had begun holding hearings. See Watt, No. A83-337 CIV,
slip op. at 32-38. The BLM drafted its first section 810 guidelines in 1984, after
the district court's decision in Watt. King Telephone Interview, supra note 154;
see BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, at 1 (transmitting an Aug. 26, 1986 revi-
sion of BLM's original May 11, 1984 guidelines). The Forest Service had issued
section 810 guidelines earlier, in January, 1982 and July, 1983. See U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, FINAL RE-
PORT--SUBSISTENCE MANAGEMENT AND USE: IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE VIII
OF ANILCA V-17 (Mar. 1985) [hereinafter 1985 SECTION 806/813 REPORT].
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procedures later in 1984,156 and the Interior Department promul-
gated similar guidelines as minimal standards for all of its agen-
cies. "'57 Work Group number II of ALUC drafted methods for col-
lecting and analyzing subsistence data in February of 1985, but the
agencies ended their participation in 1990 without approving these
methods. 5 ' The BLM revised its internal section 810 guidelines
in 1986. Neither the BLM nor the other federal agencies ever is-
sued formal section 810 regulations, which suggests they did not
seek public involvement in defining their responsibilities under the
section.
All of the major federal land agencies eventually did adopt inter-
nal section 810 guidelines, based on ALUC's recommendations or
the BLM's later revision.5 9 Each agency's guidelines defined the
156. See ALASKA LAND USE COUNCIL, RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES FOR COM-
PLIANCE WITH ANILCA SECTION 810 § I (Nov. 19, 1984), reprinted in 1985
SECTION 806/813 REPORT, supra note 155, at app. J-1; see also id. at V-17 (dis-
cussing working group history); King Telephone Interview, supra note 154
(same); cf. 16 U.S.C. § 3181 (establishing ALUC with sunset in 1990). The U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service adopted the ALUC guidelines verbatim. See FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145.
157. See INTERIOR DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 145; see also Memo-
randum from William P. Horn, Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Department of the
Interior to Assistant Secretaries re. Subsistence and Land Use Decisions Policy
(June 19, 1984) (transmitting Interior Department guidelines and authorizing
individual agencies to develop supplemental guidelines) (on file with John W.
Hiscock, Subsistence Manager, Alaska Regional Office, National Park Service,
2525 Gambell St., Rm. 107, Anchorage, AK 99503-2892).
158. See WORKING GROUP 1I-ALASKA LAND USE COUNCIL, GUIDELINES FOR
THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF SUBSISTENCE USE INFORMA-
TION FOR ALASKA NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS CONSERVATION ACT 810 DETER-
MINATIONS 1 (Aug. 18, 1986) [hereinafter ALUC WORK GROUP II RECOMMEN-
DATIONS]; see also STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, ALAS-
KA HABITAT MANAGEMENT GUIDE-GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF WILD-
LIFE AND THEIR HABITAT AND ON HUMAN USE OF FISH AND WILDLIFE H-1
(1986) (similar recommendations by State Division of Subsistence) (on file with
Terry L. Haynes, Statewide Coordinator, Division of Subsistence, Alaska Dept. of
Fish and Game, 1300 College Rd., Fairbanks, AK 99701-1599); cf. U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF THE INTERIOR FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, FINAL RE-
PORT-SUBSISTENCE MANAGEMENT AND USE: IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE VIII
OF ANILCA A-15, B-15, B-85 (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter 1988 SECTION 806/813
REPORT] (noting that ALUC had not finalized Work Group II recommendations
for subsistence evaluation methods).
159. See King Telephone Interview, supra note 154. An exception was the
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"significantly restrict subsistence uses" threshold that determined
whether the agency must make a tier-Il evaluation of a project. 61
Each definition of "significance" used factors such as the extent to
which a project reduced game abundance, redistributed game, or
interfered with subsistence hunters' access. Different definitions,
however, weighted these factors differently. Some guidelines, for
example, required a "major" game redistribution or "substantial"
Department of Defense. The U.S. Army administers some 1,600,000 acres of
Alaska at Forts Richardson, Greely, and Wainright. Telephone Interview with
William Gossweiler, Public Affairs, Fort Richardson, Alaska (Jan. 27, 1994). The
Army Corps of Engineers also has jurisdiction over wetlands projects. See 33
U.S.C. § 1344 (1994); cf. Telephone Interview with Abigail A. Dunning, Office
of District Counsel, Army Corps of Engineers, Elmendorf, Alaska (May 12,
1994) (Corps has never done a subsistence evaluation); Alaska v. Babbitt, 54
F.3d 549, 552-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (navigable waters with federal reserved water
rights are subject to ANILCA's subsistence protections). The U.S. Air Force
manages lesser areas of land at Elmendorf and Eielson Air Force bases and re-
mote sites in the Aleutians. Gossweiler Interview, supra (also indicating that U.S.
Navy is closing base at Adak, in the Aleutians, and that the U.S. Coast Guard
base at Kodiak is not in a subsistence area); cf. Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1147,
1149 (development of U.S. Naval Petroleum Reserve on Alaska's North Slope is
administered by Department of the Interior).
The Department of Defense never adopted guidelines for section 810 evalu-
ations. Gossweiler Interview, supra. Possibly, the Defense Department reasoned
that section 810 was inapplicable because its urban military bases were outside
traditional subsistence areas, Telephone Interview with William Quirk, U.S. Army
environmental specialist, Fort Richardson, Alaska (Jan. 27, 1994), or were able to
exclude all private uses on national security grounds. Telephone Interview with
James Hostman, Department of Defense, Elmendorf, Alaska (Jan. 7, 1994). Al-
though the Defense Department considered and rejected the possibility that mili-
tary overflights affected subsistence resources, it does not appear to have evaluat-
ed the impacts of military base projects on game species that migrate off military
lands. See id. The text of section 810, however, applies to federal agencies dis-
posing of public land "under any provision of law," without making an exception
for the Department of Defense. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (1994).
160. See FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, §§ 05(B), 1.1(1), 3.2;
INTERIOR DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 145, §§ III(A)(1), III(B)(1);
PARK SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, §§ III(A)(1), III(B)(1), app.
ANILCA Section 810 Background (1) & (3), app. ANILCA Section 810 Format
V; BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, §§ IV(A)(1), IV(B)(1), IV(B)(2), V(B)(4),
app. 3, app. 5, app. 8, app. 11 pt. II "810 Finding"; FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE
GUIDELINES, supra note 145, §§ IV(A)(1), IV(B).
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bar to access for "significance," while others did not.'61 The
guidelines thus created inconsistencies in the conditions, leading
different agencies to do tier-II evaluations. Such inconsistencies
arguably were contrary to Congress' policy of protecting the oppor-
tunity for subsistence on all federal lands.
In applying the section 810 guidelines, agencies focused their
tier-I evaluations on whether projects exceeded the significance
threshold that triggered tier-II. This focus on significance was con-
sistent with tier-I's first evaluation factor-the extent of a project's
subsistence impacts, because the impacts are a key determinant of
"significance." Congress included two other factors in tier-I, how-
ever, that went beyond the significance determination. Congress
apparently designed its second factor-whether other lands were
available-to help an agency avoid subsistence impacts in siting a
project. 62 The third tier-I factor-whether other projects were
available- likewise helped an agency define more protective al-
161. Compare FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § 05(B) (restric-
tion significant if it results in "substantial" reduction in subsistence through re-
duced abundance or "major" redistribution of game, "substantial" interference
with access, or "major" non-subsistence competition); id. § 3.2 (adding comments
that reduction must be "large," or redistribution be more than "occasional," to be
significant); BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § IV(B)(2), app. 8 (same "sub-
stantial," "major," and "large" requirements); FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE
GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § IV(B) (same except no comment that reduction of
game must be "large" or increase in competition be "substantial") with INTERIOR
DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § III(A)(1) (tier-I evaluation address-
es game abundance, redistribution, and access, without requiring conditions to be
"substantial" or "major" to be significant) (not mentioning competition); PARK
SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § IU(A)(1), app. ANILCA Section 810
Background 1, app. ANILCA Section 810 Format V (finding restriction signifi-
cant if it changes abundance, distribution, access, or competition, without requir-
ing change to be "substantial" or "major" and adding "habitat loss" as another
factor that can make a restriction significant).
162. Some agencies' guidelines appear to recognize Congress' intent to avoid
subsistence impacts in tier-I, because they provide practical information for an
agency to use in relocating its projects to non-subsistence lands. See BLM
GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § IV(A)(2) (agency must examine whether "other
lands" are suitable, available, and designated for uses compatible with proposed
project); FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § IV(A)(2)
(same); FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § 1.1(2) (same, except no
directive to examine land ownership in determining availability).
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ternatives. While tier-I did not require agencies to reduce subsis-
tence impacts already below the threshold, Congress clearly intend-
ed them to consider such reductions in planning a project. Further,
the second and third tier-I factors commanded agencies to develop
subsistence-protective alternatives at the inception of planning. In
confining tier-I evaluations to the "significance" finding, agencies
neglected the primary purpose of tier-I: injecting subsistence protec-
tion into each project at an early stage.
For tier-II, agency guidelines all recited the three findings that
subsection 810(a)(3) required, without further explanation.'63 In
Clough, the only case that interpreted tier-II, the Forest Service
issued its tier-II findings as bare conclusions, without any analysis
showing how they were supported by subsistence data."6 Never-
163. See FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § 1.4; INTERIOR DE-
PARTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § III(D)(2); BLM GUIDELINES, supra
note 145, § IV(D)(1), app. 10; FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra
note 145, § IV(D)(1); cf BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, app. 5 (section 810
evaluation must be based on reasonable predictions, not worst case scenarios); id.
app. 6 (section 810 evaluation of "other lands" need only consider lands available
to divert a project from subsistence lands); id. app. 7 (section 810 evaluation of
"other alternatives" must include both other feasible ways to complete the same
project, and other projects).
164. See Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. 1426-29; Clough 11, 750 F. Supp. at 1432; see
also City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, No. J86-024 CIV, slip op. at 23-28 (D.
Alaska May 24, 1991), affd, 960 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1992); UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE, TONGASS NATIONAL FOREST
R1O-MB-81E, ALASKA PULP CORPORATION LONG-TERM TIMBER SALE CON-
TRACT-FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS FOR
THE 1981-86 AND 1986-90 OPERATING PERIODS-ANALYSIS AREA 3: FRESHWA-
TER-WHITESTONE ch. 4, at 132-33 (1989) (on file with Forest Service Alaska
Region, Federal Building, P.O. Box 21628, Juneau, AK 99802-1628) [hereinafter
ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS]. The agency's "necessary, consistent with sound man-
agement" finding recited consistency with the 50-year logging contract and sever-
al federal and state statutes and management plans, referencing previous chapters
of the EIS without indicating what protective alternatives had been rejected. See
id. ch. 4, at 132. The "minimum amount of public lands" finding referred to a
"balance between impacting the fewest acres, meeting existing contract commit-
ments, and minimizing impacts on other resources." Id. ch. 4, at 132-33. The
agency's preferred alternative, however, was the one that had the greatest impact
on subsistence game habitat. See id. ch. 2, at 33-34, 38, 42-45, ch. 4, at 84-89,
118-20. The agency's "reasonable steps ... to minimize adverse impacts" finding
referred to standards and guidelines "designed to maintain fish and wildlife habi-
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theless, the purpose of section 810, to protect subsistence resources
from unnecessary destruction, required the agency to formulate a
range of protective alternatives. The words of tier-II, "necessary,"
"minimal," and "minimize," then required the agency to compare
the subsistence impacts of these alternatives. To ensure that its
planners formulated and compared the alternatives properly, the
Forest Service should have had detailed tier-II procedures in its
section 810 guidelines.165 The absence of tier-IL procedures may
tat productivity at as high a level as possible, consistent with meeting existing
timber harvest contract commitments." Id. ch. 4, at 132-33. The agency rejected,
however, alternatives that provided greater subsistence protection while still effec-
tively meeting its timber harvest needs. See id. ch. 2, at 42-45. Further, the
agency's site-specific "mitigation measures," see id. ch. 2, at 45, did not prevent
it from logging extensively in previously-unlogged drainages-prime wildlife habi-
tat. See id. at app. A-1. In more recent projects, the Forest Service has sought
input from subsistence users in formulating the alternatives supporting its tier-II
findings. See, e.g., I UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREST
SERVICE, TONGASS NATIONAL FOREST R10-MB-304A, NORTHWEST BARANOF
TIMBER SALE-DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ch. 2, at 10-11, ch.
4, at 45-46, 58-59 (1995) (on file with Forest Service Chatham Area, 204
Siginaka Way, Sitka, AK 99835) [hereinafter NORTHWEST BARANOF 1995 DEIS].
165. Although it has never formalized them in its guidelines, the Forest Service
has employed a draft of detailed procedures to support its "significance" determi-
nations in tier-I. See JACK KRUSE, DRAFT-A GUIDE TO 810 ANALYSES IN
SOUTHEAST ALASKA (1993); see also Telephone Interview with Larry Robert,
Subsistence Coordinator, Stikine Area, U.S. Forest Service Tongass National
Forest (Oct. 21, 1993) (discussing Kruse's use of Southeast Chichagoff timber
sale as a model to develop detailed tier-I procedures). These procedures employ a
geographic subsistence database for the Tongass, which the agency gathered at a
cost of several hundred thousand dollars, with a computer model that predicts
when deer habitat will become inadequate to meet hunters' demand. See Tele-
phone Interview with Jack Kruse, Professor, Institute of Social and Economic
Research, University of Alaska at Anchorage (Oct. 21, 1993). Although the com-
puter model has limited value in determining whether a restriction will be "signif-
icant," the geographic information enables users to make important contributions
to project planning in tier-II hearings. See id. The Forest Service has expanded its
"habitat capability" model to predict impacts on other game animals in the
Tongass. See, e.g., NORTHWEST BARANOF 1995 DEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at
46-48. Its section 810 guidelines, however, provide no details of how to make the
three findings required by tier-Il. See FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note
145, § 1.4(1).
ANILCA SECTION 810
have compromised Congress' scheme by allowing the agency to
omit subsistence-protective alternatives from its evaluation.1
66
Administrative construction of section 810 has produced a lack of
emphasis on protective alternatives in tier-I, inconsistent definitions
of "significant" restriction, and weakly supported findings in tier-II.
While agencies might eventually resolve these issues individually,
subsistence management would be improved immediately if there
were generally-applicable regulations to make every evaluation
consistent with the purposes of section 810. Judicial review of
agency evaluations has not generated such consistency to date.
C. Judicial Construction of Section 810
The courts have decided only a few challenges to agencies' tier-I
evaluations, and only one challenge to a tier-II evaluation.'67
166. Cf. ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 20 (amount of
winter range for deer remaining after logging would be similar for all alterna-
tives), ch. 4, at 28 (proposed timber harvest alternatives would have approximate-
ly the same effect on all wildlife habitats). But see id. ch. 4, at 84 (preferred
alternative is projected to cause greatest impact on deer habitat).
167. The tier-I decisions have spanned the fifteen years since Congress enacted
ANILCA. See, e.g., Watt, No. A83-337 CIV (D. Alaska Dec. 20, 1983); Village
of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1984), later proceeding, Hodel, 774
F.2d 1414, rev'd sub nom. Amoco, 480 U.S. 531, dismissed on remand sub nom.
Village of Gambell v. Babbitt, 999 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1993); City of Angoon v.
Marsh, No. A84-126 CIV (D. Alaska Apr. 15, 1984), rev'd, 749 F.2d 1413 (9th
Cir. 1984), later proceeding directly addressing section 810 sub nom. City of
Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 197
(1987); Akutan 1, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,245; Penfold I, 664 F.
Supp. 1299; Sierra Club v. Marsh, 701 F. Supp. 886 (D. Maine 1988), rev'd, 872
F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989); Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. 1446; Clough 1, 750 F. Supp.
1406; NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 870 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Alaska v. National
Parks & Conservation Ass'n, No. J87-012 CIV (D. Alaska Sep. 17, 1991), dis-
missed sub nom. Alaska v. United States, Nos. 91-36297, 91-36299, 91-36303,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 33377 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 72
(1993); Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tourism Ass'n v. Morrison, 60 F.3d 647
(9th Cir. 1995); cf. John v. United States, Nos. A90-0484 CV, A92-0264 CV (D.
Alaska Mar. 30, 1994), rev'd sub nom. Alaska v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 549 (9th Cir.
1995) (suggesting through its holding that federal projects in certain waters tradi-
tionally used for subsistence fishing may be subject to evaluation under section
810), cert. denied sub nom. Alaska State Legislature v. Alaska, 116 S. Ct. 68,
further proceeding 116 S. Ct. 272 (1995).
19961 269
270 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
These cases discussed the geographic scope of section 810,168 its
two-tiered structure, the significance threshold, tier-I findings, and
remedies for deficient evaluations. Four decisions had particularly
important effects on agencies' construction of section 810:
Kunaknana v. Clark, Sierra Club v. Penfold, Amoco Production
Company v. Village of Gambell, and the extended series of opinions
in Hanlon v. Barton and City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough.169
1. Kunaknana
Kunaknana v. Clark, the first judicial review of a subsistence
evaluation, was important because it examined the two-tiered Struc-
ture of section 810 and the significant restriction threshold. The
case arose from an appropriations bill, which Congress passed
shortly after ANILCA in 1980, commanding the BLM to lease
lands for oil exploration in the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska
("NPR-A"). 170 The BLM made an environmental impact statement
("EIS"), ranked the subsistence values of 500 tracts in the NPR-A,
and selected tracts to lease.' 71 In 1983, subsistence users sued to
The sole tier-II challenge evolved from the subsistence users' tier-I case in
Hanlon. See Clough III, 915 F.2d at 1309-10 (discussing history of the litigation);
see also Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1421, 1426-29 (reviewing agency's tier-II
findings); Clough II, 750 F. Supp. at 1432 (same); City of Tenakee Springs v.
Franzel, No. J86-024 CIV, slip op. at 23-28 (D. Alaska May 24, 1991) (same).
The dozen or so cases that courts have decided under section 810 of
ANILCA may be compared with the hundreds they have decided under NEPA.
See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty:
A Preface, 20 ENVTL. L. 447, 451-53 (1990) (discussing decline in success of
NEPA plaintiffs).
168. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 547, 554 (section 810 does not extend to outer
continental shelf); Angoon, 803 F.2d at 1028 (section does not extend to private
lands adjacent to public land); NRDC v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. at 883-84 (section
does not extend to Arctic National Wildlife Refuge until Congress authorizes In-
terior Department to develop it).
169. These cases are listed in roughly chronological order in note 167, supra.
The Clough case was an outgrowth of the litigation in Hanlon. See Clough III,
915 F.2d at 1309-10 (describing history of the case).
170. See Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1147, 1149-51 (citing Naval Petroleum Re-
serves Production Act Amendments of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 6508 (1994)).
171. The district court's opinion described the leasing process. See Watt, No.
A83-337 CIV, slip op. at 29-32.
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enjoin the leases, claiming the BLM had not made a required tier-II
evaluation under section 810.172 The agency issued a modified re-
cord of decision, finding that leasing would not significantly restrict
subsistence so no tier-IT evaluation was required. The district court
upheld the agency's decision to proceed without a tier-IT evaluation,
and, in 1984, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that holding.'73
The principal issues in Kunaknana were whether Congress re-
quired an agency to complete tier-IL for every project, and if not,
what kind of projects did trigger it. Subsection 810(a) mandated
tier-II evaluation for a new use "which would significantly restrict
subsistence." The Ninth Circuit held that this language invoked tier-
II, not for every project, but only for those where an agency made
a finding of significant restriction.' The district court also held
that subsection 810(b) did not demand tier-II for every project that
required an EIS.'75 These holdings, that tier-I was triggered only
by a "significant" restriction, were consistent with the plain mean-
ing of subsections 810(a) and 810(b).
In Kunaknana, after affirming that tier-II was triggered only by a
significant restriction, the Ninth Circuit examined this "signifi-
cance" threshold. The Court of Appeals concluded that an agency
must complete tier-II if it finds that a project "may" significantly
restrict subsistence.76 The court possibly derived this "may" test
172. See id. at 5, 10. The BLM had no guidelines for complying with section
810 at the time of the suit. See id. at 33. The agency was apparently confused at
first about what ANILCA required, and made some efforts to provide the hearing
and findings of tier-II. See id. at 5-8, 33-34, 37-38.
173. Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1152.
174. Id. at 1151.
175. See Watt, No. A83-337 CIV, slip op. at 53-57. While the court's reading
of the tier-II requirement was reasonable, it went overboard in holding that the
BLM need not disclose making a FONSR in tier-I. See id. at 57-60. Congress
found, in enacting Title VIII, that the national interest required giving local sub-
sistence users "a meaningful role in the management ... of subsistence uses." 16
U.S.C. § 3111(5) (1994). Users could not play a meaningful role if they were
excluded from an agency's threshold evaluation whether a project would signifi-
cantly restrict subsistence. Whether or not subsection 810(b) required including it
in an EIS, Congress' purpose to involve users required an agency to publish its
FONSR if it determined not to provide the protections of tier-II. But see Watt,
No. A83-337 CIV, slip op. at 60 (suggesting subsistence users "must presume"
FONSR if an EIS lacks tier-II findings).
176. See Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1151; see also Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1452-
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from NEPA law, because Congress did not use the word "may" in
ANILCA subsection 810(a). NEPA law, in contrast, does require an
EIS if a project "may" have a significant impact on the environ-
ment.'77 Congress did not refer to NEPA in subsection 810(a), and
the court declined to compare the NEPA and ANILCA thresholds
in Kunaknana. Agencies subsequently construed ANILCA's "would
significantly restrict" language as demanding a higher probability of
impacts than the court had required-a "likelihood"--before tier-II
was triggered.' The Ninth Circuit then rejected a "likelihood"
standard in favor of Kunaknana's "may" test.'79 The court's con-
55 (project threatens "significant" restriction because of cumulative subsistence
impacts of reasonably foreseeable future actions).
177. The "may" test is imposed by regulations of the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality, which provide that NEPA's threshold is met if an action "will or
may" have significant effect on the environment. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.3 (1995);
cf. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994) (NEPA statute does not use "may," but instead
triggers EIS for actions "significantly affecting" the environment); 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.22 (1995) (discussing treatment of reasonably foreseeable future impacts
in an EIS); id. § 1508.18 ("major federal action" includes impacts that "may" be
major). In the Ninth Circuit, the "may" test is satisfied, and an agency must
therefore make an EIS if plaintiffs raise "substantial questions" about whether a
project may have a significant impact. See Alaska Wilderness Recreation & Tour-
ism Ass'n v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 623, 732 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs can raise
"substantial questions" in the Ninth Circuit by simply alleging facts which, if
true, would show an action may significantly degrade the environment. See
Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342, 1351 (9th Cir. 1992). The D.C.
Circuit has not directly adopted the "may" test, but employs similar standards for
the probability of significant impact that requires an EIS. Cf. Los Angeles v.
NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (agency must not ignore "arguably
significant consequences").
178. See FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, §§ 1.1(1), 1.3(3),
2.1(3), 2.2(3) ("likely"); id. §§ 04(A), 05(B), 2.3(2), 2.5 ("expected"); INTERIOR
DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 145, §§ III(A)(1), III(C)(1) ("likely"); id.
§ III(C)(1) ("reasonably foreseeable"); PARK SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note
145, §§ III(A)(3), III(C)(1) ("likely"); id. § III(B)(1) ("reasonably foreseeable");
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § IV(A)(1) ("likely");
id. § IV(B) ("expected"); cf BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § IV(A)(1)(a)
("likely"); id. § IV(B)(1) ("Do not use wording like: 'probably' or 'likely"' in
finding of no significant restriction").
179. See Hodel, 774 F.2d at 1421-22; Akutan 11, 792 F.2d at 1378-79; cf.
Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1448-49 (rejecting "likely" standard but substituting
"significant possibility" for Ninth Circuit's "may" test). Notwithstanding the
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struction was supportable on two grounds, independent of NEPA
law.
First, subsection 810(a) prohibited an agency from approving a
project that would cause significant restriction unless it made a tier-
II evaluation. By wording tier-II in the form of a prohibition, Con-
gress required an agency to find no probable significance before it
proceeded with a project that lacked tier-II findings.8 °
Kunaknana's "may" test was consistent with the prohibitive lan-
guage because it required tier-II if an agency found some proba-
bility of significant restriction.
In addition to tier-II's language, the "may" test was consistent
with Congress' purpose in tier-II and Title VIII. In tier-II,
Congress' purpose was to protect subsistence resources from unnec-
essary destruction. The "may" test promoted this purpose by pro-
tecting subsistence resources if there was any possibility that a
project would significantly harm them. In Title VIII, one of
Congress' purposes was to involve subsistence users in managing
resources.'' When triggered, tier-II required an agency to hear
these users to determine whether it could reduce its destruction of
resources. Setting the trigger low increased an agency's burden by
requiring more hearings, but increased subsistence users' involve-
ment by providing more tier-II evaluations. The Ninth Circuit's
"may" test thus followed both the language and purpose of section
810.
Ninth Circuit's rejection of the "likely" test, the federal agencies have retained it
in their section 810 guidelines. See supra note 178.
180. Congress has not authorized an agency to proceed without tier-II evalua-
tion even if a significant restriction is unlikely. Congress prohibited an agency
from creating any significant restriction until it completed tier-II, perhaps with the
understanding that tier-Il would not impose the burdens of an environmental
impact statement. Cf. Bill No. S. 9, S. 222, H.R. 39 Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act (d-2 lands): Markup Session on S.9, The Alaska Lands
Bill Before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 41 (Oct. 9, 1979) (statement of Sen. Stevens) ("there is no intent to
create any new kind of a priority that places subsistence uses into a category that
could lead to sort of a what some people called a new type of NEPA statement").
181. See 16 U.S.C. § 3111(5) (1994); see generally Case, supra note 7, at
1015-21 (discussing problems with statV implementation of ANILCA's subsis-
tence priority and user involvement provisions during the 1980s).
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In Kunaknana, however, the Ninth Circuit implicitly imported
other law from NEPA besides the "may" test. The court accepted
the BLM's finding of no significant restriction based in part on the
agency's mitigation efforts-a NEPA concept."2 The Ninth Cir-
cuit thus began a line of cases that relied on NEPA law to define
ANILCA's significance threshold. This wholesale importation of
NEPA law was inappropriate because Congress enacted ANILCA
with different language and a different purpose: to add subsistence
protections beyond those of existing law.
2. Penfold
Decided in 1987, three years after Kunaknana, Sierra Club v.
Penfold was important because the district court expressly relied on
NEPA law to define a "significant" restriction. In Penfold, subsis-
tence users and environmental groups again challenged the BLM,
this time for permitting mining on four wild and scenic rivers with-
out evaluating effects on subsistence and the environment."8 3 Sedi-
ment from several mines had combined to destroy subsistence fish-
eries and drinking water supplies. The subsistence users sought to
enjoin the agency from permitting large mines, and from failing to
control small mines that required no permits.
The district court reasoned that NEPA cases were "helpful in
interpreting" section 810.184 Based on NEPA's requirement for cu-
182. See Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1151 ("the agency removed certain lands,
such as [c]aribou calving areas and [b]lack [b]rant molting areas, from potential
leasing and included stipulations ... in order to preclude future restrictions on
subsistence uses"); cf. Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342, 1353-54
(9th Cir. 1992) (agency may support NEPA finding of no significant impact with
"significant measures" to mitigate project impacts); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1995)
(NEPA regulations defining "mitigation"). The Kunaknana court also accepted
the BLM's reliance on cumulative impacts analysis, another NEPA concept. 742
F.2d at 1151; cf. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7) (1995) (project is "significant" under
NEPA "if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the
environment"). The Ninth Circuit's deference to BLM interpretations of ANILCA
under NEPA law, see 742 F.2d at 1150, was questionable in view of the fact that
BLM was only one of many agencies required to enforce section 810. Cf.
Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1455 n.50 (pointing out that Forest Service interpretation
of cumulative impacts requirement conflicted with BLM interpretation).
183. See Penfold 1, 664 F. Supp. at 1301, 1306-07.
184. Penfold 1, 664 F. Supp. at 1307. The district court derived this NEPA
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mulative impacts evaluation, the court ordered the BLM to address
such impacts by completing tier-II of ANILCA. The court delayed
its injunction, however, to protect miners' investments. In failing to
weigh the impact of that delay on subsistence users, the district
court overlooked Congress' purpose in section 810: to protect those
users.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed in Penfold whether
the BLM had a duty to monitor small mines. The court concluded
that such monitoring was a "marginal federal action" beyond the
scope of NEPA and section 810.85 The court apparently misinter-
preted NEPA regulations, which required an EA for all actions to
determine whether they were "major [flederal actions" that demand-
ed an EIS. Further, Congress did not limit ANILCA to major feder-
al actions. Instead, it applied section 810 to new uses "under any
provision of law," thereby requiring a subsistence evaluation for
any use of public land an agency could regulate. The court should
have required the BLM to evaluate subsistence impacts of small
mines because the agency had authority to control those mines."6
Both courts in Penfold thus blurred their treatment of NEPA and
analogy from its earlier decision in Akutan. See Akutan 1, 16 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,245, 20,245 n.1 .
185. Penfold H, 857 F.2d at 1314. The issue in this aspect of the dispute was
whether the BLM was required to make environmental and subsistence evalua-
tions of "notice" mines, which it had classed as too small to demand that miners
file plans of operation. See id. at 1309-10 (describing difference between "notice"
mines and "plan" mines). The Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled that the BLM had no
duty to evaluate the effects of "notice" mines, id. at 1314, but was required to
conduct programmatic evaluations of the cumulative effects of "plan" mines. See
id. at 1320-22; cf. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1995) (requiring EA for all agency
actions not clearly subject to an EIS or categorically excluded); id. § 1508.18
(identifying NEPA's major federal action criterion as synonymous with "signifi-
cantly" impact-the threshold for an EIS, not for NEPA applicability). Most of
the Ninth Circuit's analysis pertained to the applicability of NEPA; the court
addressed ANILCA only as an afterthought. See Penfold II, 857 F.2d at 1314.
186. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (1994) (agency's mandate to complete subsis-
tence evaluation before permitting "use, occupancy, or disposition" of public
lands under any provision of law); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1994) (authority of
Interior Department to withdraw public lands from entry); S. REP. No. 1300,
supra note 26, at 431-32 (supplemental views of Sen. Abourezk, Ford, and
Durkin) ("we still expect the [Interior] Secretary to take any action necessary to
protect the subsistence needs of (Alaska) Natives").
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ANILCA in considering the requirements, remedy, and scope of
section 810. Congress must have expected agencies to do more than
NEPA required, however, because NEPA had been in force for a
decade when it enacted section 810.
3. Amoco
Amoco Production Company v. Village of Gambell is an impor-
tant case because it provides the only Supreme Court interpretation
of section 810. The Court decided Amoco in 1987, although the
conflict began shortly after ANILCA took effect in 1980.87 It
stemmed from an Interior Department plan to lease outer continen-
tal shelf ("OCS") lands under the Bering Sea for oil exploration.
The Department of the Interior bypassed section 810 because it
interpreted ANILCA not to apply to the OCS.'8 8 Native villagers,
who subsisted on marine mammals and fish from the OCS, sued to
enjoin the leases, claiming they violated both aboriginal hunting
and fishing rights and section 810.
The district court denied both claims, holding that neither ab-
original rights nor ANILCA reached the OCS.189 Interior issued
the leases and oil companies began exploration. In 1984, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court. Reasoning that the OCS was "in
Alaska" under both statutes, the Court of Appeals held that ANCSA
extinguished aboriginal rights to the OCS, but ANILCA replaced
them with section 810 protections." On remand, the district court
found the leases violated section 810, but denied an injunction
based on lack of harm to subsistence, too much harm to oil explor-
ers, and the public interest in developing the OCS. In 1985, the
Ninth Circuit reversed again and ordered an injunction. The Court
of Appeals held that Interior's violations created a presumption of
irreparable injury, and the public interest in subsistence superseded
the public interest in development."' The Supreme Court reversed
once more, on two grounds. The Court held that ANILCA did not
187. See Village of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub
nom. Amoco, 480 U.S. 531.
188. See Hodel, 774 F.2d at 1419-20.
189: See Clark, 746 F.2d at 573.
190. See id. at 575-76, 579-82.
191. See Hodel, 774 F.2d at 1422-23, 1425-26.
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mandate an injunction for violations, and that section 810 did not
extend to the OCS.'92
The Court based its first holding on the interpretation that
ANILCA preserved judicial discretion whether to issue an injunc-
tion. The Court also examined whether an injunction was required
to meet Congress' purpose "to protect Alaskan subsistence resourc-
es from unnecessary destruction." '193 Dividing the oil project into
stages-planning, leasing, exploration, and production-the Court
saw no need to enjoin exploration because Interior found that
threats to subsistence would not arise until production. Balancing
the equities, the Court reasoned exploration presented no imminent
threat to subsistence, while an injunction would immediately cost
oil companies seventy million dollars. Absent an immediate threat,
the Court held, the public interest in oil exploration outweighed
protecting subsistence.'94 The holding did not remove agencies'
duty to complete tier-II because the Court's analysis was confined
to injunctive remedies for tier-II violations.
In fact, throughout its first holding, the Court assumed Interior
did violate section 810. This assumption was consistent with
ANILCA, which invoked tier-II for every lease leading to a sig-
nificant restriction. NEPA law, in contrast, permitted an agency to
defer its environmental impact statement until after the leasing
stage of an oil project.'95 Although it denied an injunction in
Amoco, the Court's assumption of a section 810 violation con-
formed with Congress' design to give subsistence protection beyond
what NEPA afforded. The second holding also was consistent with
192. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 544-46, 546-55. Two concurring justices observed
that ruling section 810 inapplicable to the OCS disposed of the case, so ruling
that ANILCA violations did not mandate an injunction would be superfluous. See
id. at 555-56 (concurring opinion by Justices Stevens and Scalia).
193. Id. at 544.
194. See id. at 545-46; see also id. at 542 (court of equity must balance com-
peting claims of injury and give "particular regard" to the public interest).
195. See Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 614-17 (9th Cir. 1984)
(agency need not consider worst case spill in off-shore production when it is only
at the stage of selling oil exploration leases); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(i),
1508.28(b) (encouraging agencies to "tier" EIS for early stage of a project to a
supplement or an EA for later stage of same project).
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the important role ANILCA provided for tier-II in early project
planning.
The Court's second holding in Amoco was that section 810 did
not apply to OCS lands. The Court construed the term "in Alaska"
to limit ANILCA and ANCSA to the political boundaries of the
state. "'96 Reasoning that the OCS was beyond these boundaries, the
Court held neither ANILCA's subsistence protections nor ANCSA's
extinguishment of aboriginal rights applied there. This holding
potentially gave the villagers greater offshore subsistence
protections than section 810, if they could establish their aboriginal
rights to the OCS."9'
With respect to inland waters, the Ninth Circuit recently rejected
a claim that, under Amoco, ANILCA's protections included all
navigable rivers "in Alaska."'' 8 The Court of Appeals did rule,
196. The Court reasoned that the term "in Alaska" excluded the OCS by its
plain meaning because the continental shelf was not within the state's political
boundaries. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 546-48. The Court found nothing in the
legislative history to refute this plain meaning interpretation. See id. at 553-54.
Although the Court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit's reliance on the canon of
statutory construction that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of Natives, it
found no ambiguity to invoke the canon. See id. at 555. According to the Court,
the "clearly expressed intent of Congress" was to limit section 810 evaluations to
onshore lands. See id. But see Twitchell, supra note 7, at 662-64 (suggesting
Congress intended ANCSA to settle Native claims to the OCS and intended
ANILCA to substitute Title VIII protections there).
197. See Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1278-80 (9th Cir. 1989)
(plain meaning in ANCSA of phrase "in Alaska" limits scope of extinguishment
of aboriginal rights to political boundaries of state), dismissed sub nom. Village
of Gambell v. Babbitt, 999 F.2d 403, 406-08 (9th Cir. 1993) (villagers' claims
now moot because oil companies have explored and relinquished leases, and also
unripe because no further leases are contemplated, thus no federal jurisdiction
exists).
198. See Alaska v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 549, 553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Alaska State Legislature v. Alaska, 116 S. Ct. 68 (1995), further proceeding 116
S. Ct. 272 (1995). The claim was brought by subsistence fishers of the Indian
village of Mentasta seeking to continue a traditional fishery in the navigable
waters of the Copper River, within Wrangell-St. Elias National Park. See id. at
550. The state had closed their subsistence fishery, although it permitted commer-
cial harvesting of the same salmon. See John v. United States, Nos. A90-0484
CV, A92-0264 CV, slip op. at 22-24 (D. Alaska Mar. 30, 1994), rev'd by Alaska
v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d at 549. The Federal Subsistence Board, which protected sub-
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however, that ANILCA included those navigable rivers in which
the federal government had reserved water rights. 99 This ruling
potentially extended the protections of section 810 to important
inland fishing grounds.2' Thus, although Amoco held section 810
sistence hunting on public lands, concluded it could not protect subsistence fish-
ing because the navigable waters within the park belonged to the state, so they
were not "public lands." See id., slip op. at 24-25, 27.
In Amoco, the Supreme Court had observed in a footnote that the United
States might "hold title" to an interest in the OCS, even if the OCS did not other-
wise fit within ANILCA's definition of public lands. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 548
n.15. The Mentasta villagers sought to build on this dictum, arguing that a navi-
gable river was "public land" subject to ANILCA because the United States "held
title" to its navigation servitude. See John, slip op. at 35-39. The Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument, holding that the servitude was not a property interest to
which the United States could hold title. Alaska v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d at 553. There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit held, the navigation servitude did not convert Alaskan
rivers into "public lands" within the meaning of ANILCA. See id. (citing City of
Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1027 n.6 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 870 (1987)).
199. See Alaska v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d at 554. In making a reservation, such as a
park, from the public lands, the United States may reserve sufficient unappropri-
ated water to fulfill its purpose. See id. at 553-54; cf. Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (originating doctrine of implied reservation of water
rights in context of Indian reservation). The Ninth Circuit reasoned the United
States must have reserved some water in making its Alaska reservations, and
therefore "held title" to a property interest in some Alaskan rivers. See Alaska v.
Babbitt, 54 F.3d at 554. The court left the agency administering each reservation
with the responsibility of identifying which rivers had implied reservations of
water rights, and therefore were "public lands" subject to ANILCA. Id. Although
the Mentasta villagers sought a subsistence preference under ANILCA section
804, see id. at 550, a river with federal reserved water rights would also be sub-
ject to the protections of section 810, because it too applies to "public lands." See
16 U.S.C. § 3120(a). But see Totemoff v. State of Alaska, 1995 Alas. LEXIS 85,
*24-*37 (Alaska Aug. 7, 1995) (holding that neither navigation servitude nor
federal reserved water rights brings inland waters within ANILCA definition of
public lands, thus "federal government has no authority to regulate hunting and
fishing in Alaska's navigable waters").
200. See John, slip op. at 30 (when Interior Department proposed to leave
subsistence regulation in navigable waters to the state, many individuals com-
mented that most subsistence resources lie in those waters); id. at 41 (navigable
waters are the most productive for subsistence users); see also Alaska Lands:
Hearings on H.R.39 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation
and the Env't of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th
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neither mandated injunctions nor covered the OCS, the Supreme
Court's decision preserved avenues for subsistence users to protect
the resources of both the OCS and inland waters.
4. Hanlon and Clough
The fourth important section 810 case produced several court
decisions reviewing Forest Service management of the vast Tongass
National Forest in southeast Alaska. Of special interest are the dis-
trict court's opinions in Hanlon v. Barton, because the court applied
ANILCA's "significant restriction" threshold, and City of Tenakee
Springs v. Clough, because it contains the only review to date of an
agency's tier-Il findings. Although these district court decisions
sought to interpret section 810, they resolved neither its meaning
nor the underlying dispute about logging policies because the Ninth
Circuit decided them on other grounds.
The litigation arose from a 1956 contract in which the Forest
Service agreed to supply timber to the Alaska Pulp Corporation
("APC") for fifty years.20' The agency's purpose was to induce
Cong., 2d Sess. 450 (Apr. 6, 1978) (statement of Ronald Skoog, Commissioner,
Alaska Department of Fish and Game) ("perhaps 85 percent of the subsistence
needs of the Native peoples in particular are satisfied by marine mammals and
fish. Now, these particular species occur on [s]tate lands, not [fiederal lands")
(arguing state should regulate subsistence on all lands in Alaska); FIELD COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 50-51 (fish and marine mammals are principle
subsistence resources in the tradition of Native villages in most areas). The Ninth
Circuit noted that the result of the Mentasta village case would be "a complicated
regulatory scheme" with federal agencies managing subsistence on navigable
rivers with reserved water rights, and state agencies managing it on other rivers.
See Alaska v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d at 554. The situation should be less complicated
when an agency applies section 810 to a river on federal lands, because section
810 concerns land use planning, and the state should have no conflicting plan on
these lands. But even if the surrounding lands are private, the federal government
has an interest in section 810 evaluation of new projects if a river is navigable.
Cf. Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994) (federal permit program for
discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters).
201. See Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. at 1410; see also Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at
1446 (giving date of contract formation as 1957). The Forest Service originally
formed the contract with APC's predecessor, Alaska Lumber & Pulp Co., see
City of Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985), to give
the company an incentive to build a pulp mill that would create jobs in Sitka. See
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APC to build a pulp mill that would benefit the local economy by
granting it exclusive logging rights to a large area of old growth
forest. Following the enactment of NEPA, the Forest Service began
to write timber operating plans supported by EISs at five-year inter-
vals. The agency's NEPA responsibilities expanded in 1976, when
the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA") mandated broad-
scale land-use planning. 2 2 Pursuant to this mandate, the Forest
Service approved a ten-year Tongass Land Management Plan sup-
ported by a programmatic EIS in 1979. In 1980, the agency ap-
proved an operating plan for the APC contract area in the period
1981 to 1986, supported by a site-specific EIS "tiered" to the pro-
grammatic EIS. 3
Congress also enacted ANILCA in 1980, including in the statute
a compromise on the controversial issue of Tongass land use.2'
Jim Grode, Comment, The Tongass Timber Reform Act: A Step Towards Rational
Management of the Forest, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 873, 875 (1991); Daniel G.
Drais, Note, The Tongass Timber Reform Act: Restoring Rationality and Respon-
sibility to the Management of America's Largest National Forest, 8 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 317, 320-21 (1989). In addition to APC, the Forest Service entered into
another fifty-year contract with Ketchikan Pulp Co. ("KPC") to induce it to build
a pulp mill in Ketchikan. Id.; cf. Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co.,
699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that APC and KPC conspired to restrain
trade in timber on the Tongass). After the Clough case was concluded, APC
decided to close its Sitka mill until the pulp market improved, and the Forest
Service cancelled its fifty-year contract. See Buck Lindekugel, It's Over! Forest
Service Ends APC's Timber Monopoly, RAVENCALL, Spring 1994, at 1, 4 (South-
east Alaska Conservation Council, Juneau); Tongass Timber Contract Cancelled:
Another in the Crosshairs, IN BRIEF, Summer 1994, at 1, 19 (Sierra Club Legal
Defense Fund). The government may be liable for damages resulting from the
cancellation. See Grode, supra, at 893-95; cf. RANDAL O'TOOLE, THE $64 MIL-
LION QUESTION: How TAXPAYERS PAY PULPMILLS TO CLEARCUT THE TONGASS
NATIONAL FOREST 8, 10-11, 32 (March, 1993) (Cascade Holistic Economic Con-
sultants research paper no. 27) (analyzing recent losses to U.S. Treasury from
APC contract).
202. See National Forest Management Act § 6, Pub. L. No. 93-378, § 6, 88
Stat. 477 (1974) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994)); cf. Zieske v.
Butz, 412 F. Supp. 1403, 1405-06 (D. Alaska 1976) (prior to 1976, prohibition
on clearcut logging applied to national forests in Alaska).
203. See Block, 778 F.2d at 1403-04; cf. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1995) (defining
"tiering" of environmental impact statements).
204. See Drais, supra note 201, at 324-28; S. REP. NO. 413, supra note 32, at
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This compromise preserved about a third of the forest's land area
and timber base in wilderness areas and monuments. To assist the
timber industry, Congress provided a fund of $40,000,000 per year
to support Forest Service timber production at a specified level.2 5
Under ANILCA's policies, the Forest Service continued a logging
and road-building program that had adverse impacts on the fisheries
and wildlife that supported subsistence."
In 1984, residents of the non-Native village of Tenakee Springs,
in the APC logging area, challenged Forest Service construction of
a new road.2 7 The following year, in City of Tenakee Springs v.
Block, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the 1981 to 1986 operating
plan EIS lacked sufficient detail, and ordered a preliminary injunc-
tion against the logging road. Late in 1986, the Forest Service ap-
proved a new operating plan for the period 1986 to 1990-the first
such plan to include a section 810 review. In 1987, in City of
Tenakee Springs v. Courtright, the district court enjoined some road
construction and logging under this new plan because the agency's
supporting EIS did not comply with NEPA. °8
224-30, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5168-74 (committee wilderness rec-
ommendations); id. at 391-407, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5333-49 (additional views
of Sen. Metzenbaum and Sen. Tsongas)); id. at 440-43, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5379-82 (separate views of Sen. Gravel).
205. See Drais, supra note 201, at 329 (citing ANILCA § 705(a), 16 U.S.C.
§ 539d(a)); cf. O'TOOLE, supra note 201, at 32 (Forest Service budget process re-
wards managers for losing money on timber sales); K.A. SODERBERG & JACKIE
DuRETTE, PEOPLE OF THE TONGASS-ALASKA FORESTRY UNDER ATTACK 277-
79 (1988) (timber industry compromised, by accepting wilderness designations
and reduced harvest quota, to obtain automatic funding of intensive management
program through Tongass Timber Supply Fund).
206. See, e.g., Drais, supra note 201, at 348-59; KRUSE, supra note 165, at 5-6,
16; ROBERT F. SCHROEDER & MATTHEw KOOKESH, ALASKA DEPT. OF FISH AND
GAME, SUBSISTENCE HARVEST AND USE OF FISH AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES AND
THE EFFECTS OF FOREST MANAGEMENT IN HOONAH, ALASKA 138-46, 229-34
(1990); cf. THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, THE ALASKA LANDS ACT: A BROKEN
PROMISE 41-44 (1990) (arguing that logging costs and subsistence and environ-
mental impacts justify congressional reform of ANILCA to reduce logging).
207. See City of Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1403-04 (9th Cir.
1985) (docket no. 84-3883, indicates case filed in 1984).
208. No. J86-024 CIV, 1987 WL 90272, at *4 (D. Alaska June 26, 1987). The
court declined to address the city's section 810 claims because individual subsis-
tence users with standing to raise those claims had not yet joined as plaintiffs. Id.
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In 1988, in Hanlon v. Barton, the district court reviewed section
810's "significance" threshold when subsistence hunters from the
nearby Native village of Hoonah challenged the new operating plan.
Hoonah's villagers faced competition from outsiders for deer stocks
depleted by Native corporations logging nearby. 2 9 New Forest
Service clearcuts would further reduce deer habitat by eight to
twenty-one percent, and the accompanying roads would increase
outsiders' access.21" The Hoonah villagers contended that the 1986
to 1990 Forest Service plan violated both NEPA and ANILCA.
In Hanlon, the Forest Service based its finding of no significant
restriction on an understanding that harm must be "likely" before it
could trigger tier-II. The district court rejected this interpretation,
following an adapted form of the Kunaknana "may" test to evaluate
the "significant possibility" of a restriction.' The district court
also followed Kunaknana in holding that the agency must evaluate
the cumulative impacts of future logging on subsistence. The
Hanlon court accepted, however, the agency's finding that the im-
pact of increased logging competition alone would be insignificant
because total game supply would continue to exceed forecast de-
mand throughout the 5-year period under evaluation.2"2 This hold-
at *1.
209. Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1450; SCHROEDER & KOOKESH, supra note 206,
at 135, 139, 231-34; Telephone Interview with Joseph Johnson, Counsel, Alaska
Legal Services, Anchorage (Aug. 11, 1994).
210. Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1449-50.
211. See id. at 1448-49. In addition to Kunaknana, the district court cited the
Ninth Circuit's decisions in Gambell v. Hodel, 774 F.2d 1414, 1422 (9th Cir.
1985), and Akutan 11, 792 F.2d at 1379. Although the district court purported to
follow the "may" test, it reinterpreted this standard as "a significant possibility"
of significant restriction. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1449.
212. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1451; cf. KRUSE, supra note 165, at 8-9, 16-
22, 26-29 (suggesting Forest Service use estimated-game-production-less-than-
forecast-demand as threshold for a "significant" restriction under ANILCA). The
court tempered this ruling by finding it substantially likely both that the Forest
Service would be required to evaluate the cumulative subsistence impact of in-
creased logging activity and hunting competition, and that there was substantial
likelihood that the increase would result in a decline in deer population below
anticipated demand by the year 2080. Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1453-55. The
court refused, however, to grant preliminary injunctive relief on the basis of these
distant cumulative effects. Id. at 1458-59.
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ing appeared counter to Congress' purpose because it excused the
Forest Service from providing the protections of tier-I.
2
'
3
Congress' purpose was to protect subsistence users by involving
them in planning and by setting limits for habitat-destroying pro-
jects. Kunaknana's "may" test required the Forest Service to pro-
vide these protections in Hanlon if its logging plans raised a threat
of significant restriction. The agency acknowledged that logging
would reduce deer habitat and numbers locally, and increase hunt-
ing pressure. Furthermore, the game redistribution threatened tradi-
tional clan allocations of hunting territory. 214 Even if enough deer
were available elsewhere, the forecast shortage at Hoonah threat-
ened to make hunting more difficult locally, creating a need for the
impact-minimizing standards of tier-II."5 These local impacts to
subsistence indicated a need for users to participate in planning.
The facts in Hanlon required the Forest Service to find a threat of
significant restriction, because its project created the kind of im-
pacts Congress sought to reduce in tier-II.
Nevertheless, the district court in Hanlon accepted the agency's
argument that the total game supply was adequate, and found no
irreparable harm to support a preliminary injunction. Rather than
appeal this denial, the villagers of Hoonah joined the plaintiffs from
Tenakee Springs in an interim settlement requiring the Forest Ser-
vice to supplement its EISs. 21 6 Late in 1989, the agency issued a
213. In theory, competition could restrict a user's traditional methods of taking
game, even if the total game supply remained sufficient. Cf. Hanlon, 740 F.
Supp. at 1452 (acknowledging FONSR might be invalid because it failed to con-
sider impacts on harvest methods, but refusing to hear claim because of lack of
development by plaintiff).
214. See SCHROEDER & KOOKESH, supra note 206, at 151-52, 155; Johnson
Telephone Interview, supra note 209.
215. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1450, 1452-53. The court in Hanlon excluded
subsistence users' evidence of impacts on their activities as a challenge to the
substantive validity of the Forest Service's FONSR, absent a showing that the
agency failed to consider this evidence when evaluating environmental impact.
See id. Because the purpose of the significance threshold was merely to pass
through projects that posed no threat, however, the users' bare allegation of a
threat should have been sufficient to meet the "may" test. See Greenpeace Action
v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342, 1351 (9th Cir. 1992) (to meet NEPA's threshold,
plaintiff need merely have "alleged facts which, if true, show that the proposed
project may significantly degrade" the environment).
216. See Clough III, 915 F.2d at 1310; see also Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. at 1410
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new EIS construing the fifty-year contract as requiring that the
agency offer a large amount of timber to APC and carry over that
offer to the next five-year planning period." 7 The resulting "avail-
ability constraint" forced the 1989 EIS to recommend clear-cutting
the disputed areas intensively, even though APC could not use all
of the timber previously offered. The Forest Service conceded that
its new plans might significantly restrict subsistence in some areas,
and it therefore included tier-II evaluations of these areas in its
1989 EIS. Subsistence users of both villages challenged the EIS,
contending it violated NEPA, NFMA, the Clean Water Act, and
section 810.
In 1990, the district court denied a preliminary injunction in City
of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, finding only "technical deficiencies"
under NEPA.21 Reviewing the Forest Service's section 810 evalu-
ation, the court rejected the agency's contention that tier-II imposed
no substantive limits on its discretion to approve development.
Instead, the district court held that section 810 required the agency
to select a project that permitted valid tier-II findings.219 The court
(listing dates of EISs). The Forest Service did ultimately acknowledge that its
projects threatened a significant restriction of wildlife resources. See ALASKA
PuLP 1989 SEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 125.
217. See Clough III, 915 F.2d at 1310, 1311 (finding it "not at all clear that the
contract requires the government to make available to APC hundreds of millions
more board feet than it could possibly cut during the five year period"); cf. Drais,
supra note 201, at 329 (Forest Service interpreted ANILCA's harvest goal as a
mandate, and overspent timber supply fund to meet it, even though "substantially
less" timber was actually sold). Notwithstanding public controversy and con-
gressional intervention subsequent to Clough, the Forest Service still attempts to
provide extra timber "as a buffer to market volatility" today. See NORTHWEST
BARANOF 1995 DEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 58 ("the Forest Service attempts
to provide an opportunity for the industry as a whole to accumulate a supply of
purchased but unharvested timber (i.e., volume under contract) equal to about
three years of timber consumption").
218. See Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. at 1429; cf. id. at 1409 n.2 ("[w]here counsel
indulge every marginally colorable claim or argument[,] their zealous advocacy
disserves the interests of justice by diluting debate on more important questions").
Three weeks later, the district court issued a second memorandum in Clough II,
reiterating its finding that a preliminary injunction should be denied because
deficiencies in the EIS were merely technical. See 750 F. Supp. at 1432.
219. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1427; Clough H1, 750 F. Supp. at 1432.
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omitted, however, to take the next logical step and require the
agency to design alternatives specifically to protect subsistence. The
absence of subsistence-protective alternatives undermined the pro-
ject decision in Clough because the agency lacked a baseline to
measure subsistence impacts.
The tier-I findings in Clough also were unsupported by any
analysis separate from NEPA's: they were wholly conclusory."'
Nevertheless, the district court upheld these findings because the
subsistence hunters could not prove from the agency's record that
they were irrational. The court's holding vitiated the tier-II evalu-
ation procedure by allowing the Forest Service to make subsistence
a secondary consideration in its land use planning."' Further, the
court reduced the effectiveness of Congress' subsistence protections
Technically, the Service is correct that ANILCA does not circum-
scribe its discretion to designate the project's purpose or to disregard
alternatives which do not promote that purpose. However, where an
agency fails to consider and select an alternative that can be certified
as both "necessary" and "consistent with sound management" .. the
agency proceeds at its peril, for the failure to satisfy this statutory
prerequisite bars the agency from proceeding with its proposed dispo-
sition of the public lands.
Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. at 1427.
220. The findings recited the language of tier-I, listed all of the titles of the
statutes with which the restriction was "consistent," suggested that logging alter-
natives all represented "a balance" between maintaining subsistence habitat and
contract commitments, and referred to "mitigation measures" specified for each
timber sale. They did not, however, cite any subsistence evaluation with more-
protective alternatives that could test the "necessity" of restriction, cite any meth-
od of determining compliance with the land management statutes, cite the method
of determining the land area "balance," or cite impact-minimizing steps the agen-
cy had evaluated and rejected as ineffective. In short, the Forest Service present-
ed its tier-II findings without drawing any rational connection between its envi-
ronmental studies and the range of alternatives it chose to consider. See ALASKA
PULP 1989 SEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 132-33. More recent Forest Service
practice reflects a greater attempt to provide rational support for tier-II findings,
but a continuing emphasis on accomplishing the primary purpose of a project at
the expense of subsistence. See NORTHWEST BARANOF 1995 DEIS, supra note
164, ch. 4, at 58-59.
221. Cf supra note 166 and accompanying text (all logging alternatives studied
had approximately the same impact, rather than a range of subsistence-protective
alternatives with variable logging).
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because it declined to enforce the tier-II findings as substantive
limits on agency discretion.
Later in 1990, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Clough decision,
ordering a preliminary injunction because the Forest Service had
not adequately reviewed its timber "carryover" and the cumulative
impacts of logging.22 The Court of Appeals equated ANILCA's
requirements with NEPA's, however, omitting to analyze the
agency's construction of tier-II. The same year, Congress enacted
the Tongass Timber Reform Act ("TTRA"), which removed
ANILCA's timber quota and timber supply fund.223 In 1991, the
district court decided City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, rejecting
all the villagers' claims on the merits. This time, the Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, under the new reasoning that Congress examined
the adequacy of agency plans when it enacted the TTRA.224 This
final decision in the eight-year challenge satisfied neither the villag-
ers nor the Forest Service.225 Because it never reached the tier-II
222. See Clough III, 915 F.2d at 1311-14; see also supra note 217 and accom-
panying text (Forest Service forced to use intensive logging by "availability con-
straint" resulting from its broad reading of its timber "carryover" responsibility
under APC contract). The Forest Service never did review these impacts. See
City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, 960 F.2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1992) (Norris, J.,
dissenting).
223. See Pub. L. No. 101-626 § 101, 104 Stat. 4426 (1990) (codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 539d, 539e, 472a, 1132 (1994)); see also Grode, supra note 201, at
882-83 (commenting on these provisions); Drais, supra note 201, at 329, 363-64
(same). The TTRA also modified the two 50-year timber sale contracts to make
them subject to the National Forest Management Act, NEPA, and the other envi-
ronmental requirements ordinarily applicable to the Forest Service. See Pub. L.
No. 101-626 § 301, 104 Stat. 4426, 4430-32 (1990).
224. The Ninth Circuit held that the Forest Service's inadequate EIS did not
warrant enjoining the timber sales because Congress had imposed new environ-
mental standards for future sales in the TTRA. See Franzel, 960 F.2d at 778-79;
but see id. at 779-80 (Norris, J., dissenting) (arguing Congress did nothing in the
TTRA to ameliorate the impacts of previously-authorized sales because the legis-
lation was prospective). Interestingly, the district court had rejected subsistence
users' argument that the agency must modify its previously-authorized sales to
meet TTRA standards, because the legislation was prospective. See City of
Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, No. J86-024 CIV, slip op. at 4-5 (D. Alaska May 24,
1991). Thus, the sales escaped environmental review because the district court
held they were not subject to TTRA, and the Ninth Circuit held they were re-
viewed by TTRA. Id.
225. See Telephone Interview with James Pierce, U.S. Forest Service Group
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findings, the Ninth Circuit left alive the controversy whether the
agency correctly interpreted ANILCA.
III. TIER-I EVALUATION AND THE SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTION
THRESHOLD
A. The Purposes of Tier-I
One of ANILCA's overarching objectives, expressed in sections
101, 801, and 802, was to protect subsistence resources from devel-
opment projects. Section 810 included subsistence broadly in pro-
jects that an agency planned "under any provision of law." In the
first sentence of section 810, Congress included subsistence in each
project by requiring an agency to evaluate three factors: (1) the ef-
fect on subsistence uses, (2) availability of substitute lands, and (3)
less-harmful project alternatives. The courts termed this evaluation
"tier-I." Although the district court in cases such as Hanlon only
required agencies to assess the threat of significant restriction, the
statute's language suggests Congress had three purposes in tier-I.
The first purpose was to inject subsistence into an agency's plan-
ning early, to make it pro-active in protecting resources. Congress
conveyed this purpose through its mandate to study "other lands,"
which could enable an agency to avoid subsistence impacts. 26
Similarly, the command to study "other alternatives" could help an
agency protect subsistence by eliminating or modifying a project
Leader for Evaluation of Timber Resources, Former Leader of Interdisciplinary
Team for Clough EISs, Tongass National Forest, Juneau (Mar. 18, 1994); Tele-
phone Interview with Bruce Rene, U.S. Forest Service Documents Coordinator
for Tongass Land Management Plan, Juneau (Apr. 12, 1994); Telephone Inter-
view with Robert Buck Lindekugel, Conservation Director, Southeast Alaska
Conservation Council, Juneau (Oct. 1, 1992); Telephone Interview with Joseph
Johnson, Counsel, Alaska Legal Services, Anchorage (Aug. 25, 1994); Johnson
Telephone Interview, supra note 209.
226. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a); see also supra note 28 (citing text of statute).
The agency must research "the availability of other lands for the purposes sought
to be achieved," suggesting Congress' purpose was to relocate a project where
possible, rather than relocating subsistence activities. See id.; see also FOREST
SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § 1.1 (2) (in deciding what "other lands" to
consider, agency must demonstrate that candidate sites are suitable, available, and
properly designated for proposed project); BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145,
§ IV(A)(2) (similar criteria).
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with adverse impacts. 27 Neither other lands nor other alternatives
would assist an agency striving to determine whether the impacts of
a proposed project were "significant." Nevertheless, in cases such
as Clough, the agencies focused their tier-I evaluation on the signif-
icance finding, perhaps interpreting it as the sole purpose of tier-I.
In Clough, the Forest Service declined to study subsistence-pro-
tective alternatives yielding less timber than it believed necessary to
fulfill its long-term logging contract. The agency based its tier-I
evaluation on NEPA law, which permitted an agency to include
only alternatives promoting its project purpose. In bypassing
more protective alternatives, the Forest Service overlooked the
express requirement of tier-I to study "other alternatives," as well
as the agency's own guidelines. 229 Based on the language included
in tier-I, Congress evidently expected an agency to consider a rede-
sign, broadening its project purpose to encompass subsistence pro-
tection.
227. The "other alternatives" study could encompass substituting a completely
different agency project with lesser impact on subsistence. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 3120(a); see also FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § 1.1(3) ("oth-
er alternatives" evaluation includes both other ways to implement a proposed
project and "other actions" that are "reasonable, physically and technically possi-
ble, and economically feasible"); BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § IV(A)(3)
(similar criteria).
228. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1421 ("ANILCA, like NEPA, does not
require affected agencies to consider project alternatives which do not achieve the
purpose contemplated for the proposed action"); see also City of Angoon v.
Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 197 (1987)
("[w]hen the purpose is to accomplish one thing, it makes no sense to consider
the alternative ways by which another thing might be achieved").
229. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a); see also FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra
note 145, § 1.1(3) (alternatives to be evaluated include both other ways to imple-
ment same action and other actions); cf. Lumber, Prod. & Indus. Workers Log
Scalers Local 2058 v. United States, 580 F. Supp. 279, 283 (D. Or. 1984) (stating
in dictum that different Forest Service Manual provision is "internal management
guideline" rather than "rule affecting important substantive rights," so not binding
on agency); Foundation For North Amer. Wild Sheep v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
681 F.2d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 1982) (codified Forest Service regulation is bind-
ing on agency); GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RE-
SOURCES LAW 284 (3d ed. 1993) (considering question: "[Is an agency bound by
its own manual?").
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Although tier-I requires an agency to consider subsistence protec-
tion, it contains no substantive language compelling the agency to
redesign its project. Even though tier-I does not limit agency discre-
tion, the Administrative Procedure Act does require an agency to
weigh tier-I factors against other, substantive requirements of
ANILCA 3 ° These include section 802's directive to cause "the
least adverse impact possible" and section 804's requirement to
discontinue taking fish and wildlife for other uses if there is a
shortage of those resources needed for subsistence. In Clough, the
logging plans threatened to cause a shortage of game by consuming
forest habitat, so sections 802 and 804 potentially applied to these
plans."' To meet the substantive requirements of those sections,
the Forest Service should have considered whether more subsis-
tence-protective locations and projects were feasible. The first pur-
pose of tier-I was to serve as the vehicle for that consideration, and
230. Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994),
provides that a reviewing court must set aside agency findings that are "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id.
§ 706(2)(A); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-
14 (1971). The Supreme Court has held that this APA provision requires a court
to make a narrow inquiry into whether an agency has considered "the relevant
factors" and whether it has made "a clear error of judgement." See id. at 416; cf
Zygmunt J.B. Plater & William L. Norine, Through the Looking Glass of Emi-
nent Domain: Exploring the "Arbitrary and Capricious" Test and Substantive
Rationality Review of Government Decisions, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 661,
715-25 (1989) (discussing courts' application of APA review standards to
agencies' choices among alternatives).
231. See, e.g., ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 28-32, 83-
86, 115-20, 125, 132; cf George C. Coggins & Michael E. Ward, The Law of
Wildlife Management on the Federal Public Lands, 60 OR. L. REv. 59, 71 n.51
(1981) (all land uses that impact wildlife are "consumptive," particularly uses that
directly kill a species); infra part V.B. (discussing analogy between habitat
protections under ANILCA and Endangered Species Act.) Section 802's policy of
"least adverse impact possible" and section 804's subsistence "preference" may
have also applied in Clough because new Forest Service logging roads threatened
to increase competition for game from non-subsistence hunters, thus harming
subsistence uses. See, e.g., Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1449-50.
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to report its results.232 The agency failed to fulfill the first purpose
when it declined to study more protective alternatives.
Congress' juxtaposition of tier-I with tier-II in subsection 810(a)
suggested it had a second purpose. The three tier-I evaluation fac-
tors-subsistence uses, other lands, and other alternatives-were
well calculated to support an agency's three tier-Il findings that (1)
a restriction was necessary, (2) the project used minimal land, and
(3) subsistence impacts were minimized. All three of these tier-II
findings could incorporate the first tier-I factor-subsistence uses
and needs-as the baseline for measuring alternative projects' im-
pacts. In addition, the tier-I study of the second factor-availability
of other lands-could help support an agency's tier-Il finding that it
used minimal land by eliminating the possibility of relocation.233
Finally, the third tier-I factor, other alternatives, could help justify
tier-II findings that a restriction was necessary and impacts were
minimized by demonstrating the absence of other options.3
These correlations with tier-Il indicated Congress' second purpose
for tier-I was to support an agency's tier-II evaluation.
232. But see Alaska v. United States, No. J87-012 CIV, slip op. at 14, 17 (D.
Alaska Sep. 17, 1991) (tier-I evaluation need not be timely prepared because tier-
I does not require any public input); Watt, No. A83-337 CIV, slip op. at 59-60
(agency need not ever make public its tier-I FONSR); cf. Alaska Wilderness v.
Morrison, 67 F.3d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 1995) (agency could not freely consider
alternatives while APC contract was in force).
233. This is not a perfect correspondence: the tier-I factor goes more to the
availability of other sites, while the tier-II finding goes to minimizing the area of
a particular site. Cf., e.g., BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § IV(A)(2) (evalu-
ation criteria for "other lands" in tier-I). Nevertheless, the tier-I evaluation would
help an agency make its tier-II finding by demonstrating that there was no other
site available that could reduce the area of subsistence land used by a given pro-
ject.
234. The tier-I study of "other ways to accommodate the proposed action"
would validate an agency's tier-II finding that there were no reasonable impact-
minimizing measures beyond those it adopted in its project. See id. § IV(A)(3)
(evaluation criteria for "other alternatives" in tier-I). The tier-I study of "other
actions" would help support an agency's tier-I finding that a restriction was
"necessary" if it showed the subsistence impacts of alternative projects were even
greater. See id. The tier-IT findings that a restriction is "necessary" and impacts
are "minimized" must be closely linked, because an impact cannot be "necessary"
if an agency can readily reduce it further.
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To support tier-II findings, a tier-I evaluation had to include an
adequate range of alternatives. Each tier-II finding required an
agency to make a comparison showing it could not replace its cho-
sen alternative with a more protective one.235 To make these com-
parisons, an agency had to examine the feasibility of alternatives
found to better protect subsistence in tier-I. In Clough, the district
court held that section 810 did not dictate anything about the alter-
natives an agency must study. This holding overlooked both
Congress' requirement for comparison standards in tier-Il and its
purpose to provide baseline data in tier-I. The district court's hold-
ing was also inconsistent with Congress' first tier-I purpose-early
planning-because an agency could do early subsistence planning
only if it included protective alternatives in tier-I.
The third purpose of tier-I was to enable an agency to determine
whether a project threatened a "significant" restriction, triggering
tier-II. Tier-I cases focused on this third purpose almost exclusive-
ly, perhaps because villagers found it easier to challenge an
agency's finding of no significant restriction as "arbitrary" than to
identify its failure to study better alternatives. Agency guidelines
also implied that the significance determination was the sole objec-
tive of tier-I.236 Congress did not even mention "significance"
235. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(3)(A) (finding that significant restriction of sub-
sistence is "necessary"-suggesting agency has compared alternatives with lesser
restriction and found them incapable of meeting project purpose); id. (significant
restriction is "consistent" with sound management-suggesting agency has com-
pared alternatives with lesser restriction and found them in no greater confor-
mance with mandate to maintain wildlife); id. § 3120(a)(3)(B) (project involves
"minimal amount" of public lands-suggesting agency has compared alternatives
with lesser land area and found them incapable of meeting project purpose); id.
§ 3120(a)(3)(C) (agency will take reasonable steps to "minimize" subsistence
impacts-suggesting agency has compared alternatives with additional protective
steps and found them ineffective in reducing subsistence impacts or incapable of
meeting project purpose).
236. See FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, §§ 1.1, 1.2, 3.2 (no
mention of Congress' other tier-I purposes); BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145,
§§ IV(A), IV(B), app. 5, app. 6, app. 7, app. 8 (same); INTERIOR DEPARTMENT
GUIDELINES, supra note 145, §§ Ill(A), IIl(B) (same); PARK SERVICE GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 145, §§ HI(A), Ill(B), ANILCA Section 810 Background,
ANILCA Section 810 Format (same); FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE GUIDELINES,
supra note 145, §§ IV(A), IV(B) (same); cf. PARK SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra
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among its tier-I study factors, and its "other lands" and "other alter-
natives" factors did not relate logically to the significance
threshold. On the other hand, the tier-I factor, requiring an agency
to examine "subsistence uses and needs," did provide a foundation
for its significance determination. More telling was Congress' inte-
gration of tier-I and tier-II in succeeding sentences of subsection
810(a). Their proximity justified the agencies' interpretation that
one purpose of tier-I was to enable an agency to make the threshold
significance finding.
The definition of a "significant" restriction is explored below
because it was the principal issue in Kunaknana and later tier-I
cases. It should be emphasized, however, that the significance find-
ing was not the only purpose of tier-I. The language of subsection
810(a) commanded an agency to study other lands and alternatives
before raising the significance issue at the threshold of tier-II. In
tier-I, Congress expected an agency to include subsistence in the
course of planning for the new land uses that ANILCA authorized.
As prerequisites to the significance finding, tier-I required an agen-
cy to plan early and develop alternatives consistent with Congress'
overall goal of protecting subsistence. An agency that made its
significance finding without these prerequisites could not fully com-
ply with section 810.
B. The "Significantly Restrict" Threshold
1. Hanlon and its Probability Threshold
In tier-II, Congress provided that an agency could make
"[n]o... disposition of [federal] lands which would significantly
restrict subsistence" until it held a hearing and made three find-
ings." Unless it eliminated all significant restrictions at the
threshold, this language required an agency to complete tier-II for
every land disposition. In Kunaknana, faced with the problem of
deciding whether its project met the threshold, the BLM concluded
that only a project that "may" significantly restrict subsistence trig-
note 145, ANILCA Section 810 Background (purpose of tier-Il is to "ensure
local public involvement and elimination of adverse impacts").
237. ANILCA § 810(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (1994).
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gers tier-I. 238 The Ninth Circuit deferred to the BLM's construc-
tion of the statute. In Akutan, the Court of Appeals retained the
"may" test, rejecting the Interior Department's contention that a
significant restriction must be "likely" to trigger tier-I. 239 None of
the land agencies revised its guidelines, however, and, apart from
the BLM, they retained the "likely" standard rejected by Akutan in
1986.
In Hanlon, the Forest Service applied its "likely" standard in
evaluating a proposal to log eight to twenty-one percent of the local
habitat of the main subsistence resource-deer.2" Based on a
computer model of deer populations, the agency found a significant
restriction unlikely and used that finding as its reason to bypass
tier-II.24" ' The district court rejected the "likely" standard and pur-
ported to follow the "may" test, but actually invented a new anal-
ysis. This new analysis in Hanlon divided section 810's "signifi-
cance" threshold into the probability of a subsistence restriction and
the extent of the restriction if it occurred.242 The district court held
that the probability must rise to a "significant possibility" of sig-
nificant restriction to reach the tier-II threshold.243 In dictum, the
court observed that a forty-nine percent probability was sufficient to
reach the threshold, while a one percent probability was "clearly
insignificant." 2" The district court's analysis departed from the
language of the statute, and from Ninth Circuit precedent, in several
ways.
First, the language of section 810 included no authority for a
court to erect a "probability" threshold in tandem with its "signifi-
cantly restrict" threshold. The court's new barrier was inconsistent
with Congress' purposes of expanding participation through the
238. See Kunaknana, 742 F.2d 1145.
239. See Akutan 11, 792 F.2d at 1378-79 (citing Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1151;
Hodel, 774 F.2d at 1422).
240. Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1448.
241. See id. at 1450-52; see also id. at 1453-55 (discussing cumulative impacts
on deer population); cf. ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS, supra note 164, III consoli-
dated appendix, at E-1 (presenting Sitka black-tailed deer "habitat capability
model" used to predict populations of game).
242. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1449 n.12.
243. Id. at 1449.
244. Id.
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hearing, and protecting resources through the standards, of tier-II.
Congress enacted section 810 to protect subsistence uses, not to
reduce the burden that planning imposed on agencies. To make its
probability analysis in Hanlon, the Forest Service had to divert ef-
fort from planning subsistence protections into avoiding such
protections.245 That diversion conflicted with Congress' purpose of
minimizing subsistence impacts of land management because it
diluted the agency's protective efforts.2" Instead of holding tier-II
hearings and designing protective plans, the agency produced an
elaborate rationalization of why the acknowledged game impacts
would not be significant.247
The language of section 810 also provided no foundation for the
"significant possibility" standard in the Hanlon court's "probability"
threshold. That language required an agency to complete tier-I for
every project that "would" significantly restrict subsistence. The
Ninth Circuit's "may" test was a practical means to comply because
it triggered tier-II for every project that threatened a significant
restriction. Hanlon's "significant possibility" test, in contrast, al-
lowed even a project that threatened a severe restriction to bypass
tier-II when an agency judged the probability low. If the agency's
245. See KRUSE, supra note 165, at 16-22, 26-30 (draft of elaborate procedure
based on computer models of game production to determine whether restriction
may be "significant" in tier-I). But see id. at 22-25 (procedure for producing
maps that may be useful in obtaining comments from local users and redesigning
projects to avoid subsistence impacts); cf. Kruse Telephone Interview, supra note
165 (Forest Service has actually changed alternatives based on response to such
maps at tier-II hearings); Telephone Interview with Dale Kanen, U.S. Forest
Service Subsistence Coordinator, Chatham Area, Tongass National Forest, Sitka,
Alaska (Oct. 21, 1993).
246. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1449-51 (Forest Service determines that
project will reduce game and increase non-subsistence competition, but argues
that it should not have to complete tier-II); id. at 1452-55 (Forest Service deter-
mines that cumulative impacts on game population will become substantial, but
argues that it should not have to consider future conditions or complete tier-IT);
cf ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 17-39 (elaborate evalua-
tion of impacts of logging alternatives on wildlife habitat without consideration of
alternatives that reinterpret, terminate, suspend, or amend logging contract);
Clough III, 915 F.2d at 1311-12 (questioning agency's interpretation and applica-
tion of contract).
247. Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1449-51.
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judgment erred, it would violate section 810 because a known re-
striction would result without tier-II protections."l
Finally, Hanlon's "significant possibility" standard was incon-
sistent with the Ninth Circuit's "may" test because it gave agencies
no useful guidance whether to complete tier-II. Contrary to the
district court's dictum, an event with "merely" one percent proba-
bility may occur.249 In the range above one percent, the court left
the Forest Service to specify what numerical probability a "signif-
icant possibility" required. A numerical probability would have
been meaningless, however, because the number computed by the
agency would have depended upon its qualitative definition of a
"significant" restriction.5 In Hanlon, the Forest Service's proba-
248. The consequence could be a project that destroyed subsistence resources
or their habitat, without design input from local users and without an effort by
the agency to determine whether the restriction was necessary, whether the pro-
ject could use less land, and whether it could take measures to reduce subsistence
impacts. Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(3) (1994) (Congress' finding that continuation of
subsistence lifestyle already is threatened by development).
249. The Forest Service disagreed: "[iut is inconceivable that Congress would
have required agencies to hold hearings and make findings when there is no sig-
nificant possibility of a restriction on subsistence." Appellees' Joint Brief at 44,
City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, 960 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1992) (Nos. 91-
35520, 91-35522). While the agency's position was superficially reasonable, it
was contradicted by Congress' language: "No ... disposition of such lands which
would significantly restrict subsistence uses shall be effected . . . ." 16 U.S.C.
§ 3120(a) (1994) (emphasis added). Further, the Forest Service's application of
the "significant possibility" standard illustrated how malleable a criterion it was.
The agency immediately proposed to clearcut eight to twenty-one percent of the
habitat of the principal subsistence game. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1450.
While the Forest Service was confident there would be enough game left to satis-
fy demand, see id., it appears evident that such a massive project could have
some significant impact. The agency erected the "significant possibility" standard
as an additional barrier to tier-II, beyond Congress' requirement that any threat-
ened restriction be "significant." See id. at 1449. The Ninth Circuit's "may" test
better expressed the meaning of Congress' language: if there is a threat of signifi-
cant restriction, ensure that no project proceeds without the protections of tier-II.
250. In other words, an agency that considered ten starving villagers a "signifi-
cant" restriction would compute a lower probability of that event for the same
project than another agency that defined a "significant" restriction as five starving
villagers. Compare, e.g., BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, app. 8, at 9-3 (sug-
gesting restriction is not "significant" unless number of users barred from sub-
sistence is "a major proportion of active subsistence harvesters") with PARK SER-
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bility computation also depended on its computer model, which was
based on gross estimates of deer reproduction and future growth in
subsistence uses. 5 In short, the district court's "significant pos-
sibility" test provided no useable standard for when an agency must
complete tier-II. The court neglected the purpose of section 810
because it left an agency with complete discretion whether to pro-
vide the protections Congress included in tier-LI.
Agencies should use the Ninth Circuit's "may" test because it
effectuates the language of section 810 without requiring a proba-
bility analysis like that in Hanlon. Had it followed the "may" test
initially, the Forest Service could have completed tier-II without the
Hanlon litigation, because the agency ultimately conceded that its
project threatened a significant restriction. Under section 810, an
agency that foresees a possibility of significant restriction should
move on to tier-II, so no such impact evades the protections Con-
gress provided. 52  Had Congress intended to hedge those
VICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145 (no such criterion for number of affected us-
ers). The district court's compounding of Congress' discretion-filled "significantly
restrict" standard with another discretion-filled "significant possibility" standard
made findings of no significant restriction essentially non-reviewable. See
Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1449. While the Ninth Circuit's "may" test hardly car-
ries scientific precision, it better conveys an agency's duty to complete tier-II if a
project threatens subsistence. See Akutan 11, 792 F.2d at 1378-79 (rejecting Forest
Service's "likely" standard).
251. See KRUSE, supra note 165, at 8-10, 16-18, 22 (assuming loss of under
ten percent of community's nutrition is insignificant, assuming forest cover data
produce accurate deer population statistics from habitat capability model, assum-
ing ten percent of deer population can be harvested annually, assuming reported
deer harvest statistics are accurate, assuming deer demand tracks user population,
assuming low estimate of user population growth is accurate, assuming there will
be no significant restriction if total game demand is less than total predicted sup-
ply, and assuming that usage of other resources can be approximated by areas of
land harvested); see also id. at 9, 17 (actual number of deer present in analysis
area at any time could be significantly different from model predictions; present
harvest demand statistics may reflect invalid survey data); cf Kruse Telephone
Interview, supra note 165 (forest cover data are reasonably good, habitat capabili-
ty model is fairly simple and may be good because users have not attacked it,
major impacts on subsistence are not from individual timber sales but from cu-
mulative effects of Tongass Land Management Plan); ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS,
supra note 164, III Consolidated Appendix, at app. E-1 (providing further details
of deer habitat capability model in use by Forest Service at the time of Hanlon).
252. Cf. INTERIOR DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § III(B)(1)
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protections with a "significant possibility" requirement, it would not
have mandated tier-II for every project significantly restricting
subsistence. The sole barrier to tier-II should be the "significantly
restrict" finding-what the Hanlon court called the "extent" of
restriction-because that was the only threshold Congress specified
in section 810.
2. The "Extent-of-Restriction" Threshold
The different agencies' definitions of the kind of restriction that
meets the "significance" threshold in section 810 are inconsistent.
In Kunaknana, for example, the Ninth Circuit accepted a BLM
definition that required a "substantial" reduction in subsistence, and
the Fish and Wildlife Service and Forest Service guidelines now in-
clude this "substantial" extent requirement. 3 In contrast, the Park
Service and Interior guidelines require only a reduction or limita-
tion of subsistence, without demanding that it be "substantial." 54
All of the guidelines expand the extent-of-restriction threshold into
alternative tests for (1) reduced game abundance, (2) game redistri-
bution, (3) reduced subsistence user access, or (4) competition from
non-subsistence users. 55 Only the BLM, Fish and Wildlife
(combining "reasonably foreseeable" with rejected "likely" standard); PARK SER-
VICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § III(B)(1) (same); BLM GUIDELINES, supra
note 145, app. 8, at 9-1 ("first a restriction must be foreseen, then the magnitude
of the restriction must be evaluated"). A restriction may result from a project that
forces a change in subsistence methods, even if total subsistence resources remain
adequate. In the Hanlon project, for example, game redistributions may have
worked a foreseeable restriction because the Natives observed a cultural prohibi-
tion against using other families' traditional hunting grounds. Johnson Telephone
Interview, supra note 209.
253. See Watt, No. A83-337 CIV, slip op. at 42; BLM GUIDELINES, supra note
145, § IV(B)(2) app. 8; FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note
145, § IV(B); FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § 05(B).
254. See PARK SERVICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § III(A)(1), ANILCA
Section 810 Background, ANILCA Section 810 Format V; INTERIOR DEPART-
MENT GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § III(A)(1).
255. See Forest Service Guidelines, supra note 145, §§ 05(B), 3.2; BLM
GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § IV(B)(2), app. 8; FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE
GUIDELINES, supra note 145, §§ IV(A), IV(B); see also PARK SERVICE GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 145, § IIl(A)(1), ANILCA Section 810 Background, ANILCA
Section 810 Format (adding "habitat loss" as an alternative element of the test for
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Service, and Forest Service guidelines, however, require "major"
redistribution, "substantial" reduction of access, or "major" compe-
tition to have a significant restriction. These semantic differences
may have little practical effect on whether the agencies will com-
plete tier-II. On the other hand, the guidelines potentially direct the
BLM, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Forest Service to avoid tier-IL
for some projects, because they require a greater restriction than the
Park Service does to support the "substantial" or "major"
finding.256 These agencies should use the same guidelines as the
Park Service because Congress did not distinguish among agencies
in allocating its tier-II protections.
There are other inconsistencies, such as the absence of a test for
non-subsistence competition in the Interior guidelines. This defi-
ciency could raise Interior's threshold, avoiding tier-II in a case like
Hanlon where an agency expected competition to increase. The
Park Service guidelines add a test for habitat loss, lowering that
agency's threshold and potentially leading it to do more tier-II eval-
uations. The BLM guidelines refer to "a major proportion" of sub-
sistence users, suggesting that impacts on an individual or small
group cannot rise to a significant restriction. The Park Service and
Interior guidelines lack this language-a further inconsistency
among the extent-of-restriction thresholds." 7
reduced game abundance); cf. INTERIOR DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note
145, § III(A)(1) (omitting test for competition from non-subsistence users).
256. See, e.g., Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1449-50, 1452 (Forest Service recog-
nized its project would increase hunting competition, redistribute game, and re-
duce game abundance, but made FONSR because game would still be "adequate"
and subsistence users' travel would not be "greatly increased"); cf. Tulkisarmute
Native Community Council, Int. Bd. Land App. 85-487, at 5-6, 21-22, 88 IBLA
210, at 212, 219 (1985) (section 810 imposed no duty on BLM to review gold
miners' plan to relocate fish stream into channel 120 feet wide and 6300 feet
long and dredge streambed, because environmental assessment concluded that the
agency had mitigated impacts enough to avoid "significant" restriction).
257. See BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, app. 8, p. 9-3; cf. PARK SERVICE
GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § III(A)(1), ANILCA Section 810 Background,
ANILCA Section 810 Format; INTERIOR DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, supra note
145, § III(A)-(B). The Forest Service and Fish and Wildlife Service take a mid-
dle ground, cautioning the official making the significance determination to "be
sensitive to localized, individual restrictions created by any action". FOREST SER-
VICE GUIDELINES, supra note 145, § 05(B); FISH AND WILDLIFE GUIDELINES,
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Despite the discrepancies among agency guidelines, the Ninth
Circuit has not revisited the BLM "substantial" restriction threshold
it affirmed in Kunaknana. In Hanlon, the district court did review a
new Forest Service requirement that a restriction had to lower the
supply of game below subsistence users' demand in order to be
"significant."' The agency's new requirement raised the tier-I
significance threshold by adding the "unmet demand" criterion to
each of the guidelines' four tests. In Hanlon, this higher signifi-
cance threshold proved determinative. Although its project substan-
tially reduced deer and displaced users from traditional hunting
grounds, the Forest Service found the restriction insignificant, ab-
sent proof of unmet demand. The district court upheld that finding
based on its deference to the agency's construction of "signifi-
cance." This holding is surprising because elsewhere in the same
decision, the court was concerned by inconsistency among interpre-
tations of section 810. Specifically, the court rejected the Forest
Service's tier-I evaluation, which omitted cumulative impacts, in
part because the BLM had included such impacts in
Kunaknana.29 Under the same reasoning, the district court should
have rejected the Forest Service's "unmet demand" requirement
because the BLM had no such barrier in its threshold in
Kunaknana. Had the court demanded such consistency in Hanlon, it
would have helped ensure that agencies drafted uniform definitions
of the "significance" threshold.
Section 810 does not, by its terms, apply differently to different
federal agencies. Inconsistent threshold tests may harm subsistence
users' livelihoods by making tier-II protections less available on
some public lands. Although an agency may perceive advantage in
tailoring a threshold to its own resources, Congress intended section
810 to benefit subsistence users, not to justify disparate treatment
of similar uses for administrative convenience."6 The feasibility
supra note 145, § IV(B).
258. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1450; cf. FOREST SERVICE GUIDELINES, su-
pra note 145, §§ 05(B), 3.2 (no requirement that total resource demand be greater
than supply to have a "significant" restriction); KRUSE, supra note 165, at 18, 21-
22, (suggesting Forest Service base "significance" on demand-greater-than-supply
criterion).
259. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1453 n.40, 1455 n.50.
260. See 16 U.S.C. § 3112(1) (purpose of ANILCA Title VIII is to preserve
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of standardizing procedures is demonstrated by NEPA regulations,
which require all agencies to conduct standard environmental stud-
ies. For section 810 evaluations, the planning horizon, sampling
methods, confidence limits of statistical studies, and basic concepts
like whether an individual can suffer a "significant" restriction,
should be uniform for all agencies. In order to reduce inconsistency
in determining when tier-II studies are required, all agencies should
operate under the same rules.
All the federal land agencies should adopt a low significance
threshold to give effect to the language and purpose of section 810.
A low threshold will not increase an agency's procedural burden,
beyond requiring a hearing, as an agency should gather the data to
support its tier-II findings in tier-I. A low threshold will more fre-
quently require tier-II findings, adding the substantive burden of
designing only projects with necessary and consistent restrictions,
minimal land, and minimal subsistence impacts. This burden will
not be onerous with a low threshold because a low threshold brings
projects with smaller impacts into tier-I. With smaller subsistence
impacts to start with, the burden of minimizing these impacts will
also be small, taking less effort than an elaborate analysis of wheth-
er the threshold is met.26" ' Furthermore, the burden of a low
threshold is balanced by the benefits of requiring an agency to
focus on planning its projects to protect subsistence, consistent with
opportunity for subsistence users). But see Telephone Interview with James
Kurth, Deputy Assistant Regional Director for Subsistence, U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service, Anchorage, Alaska (May 7, 1993) (state of Alaska is so vast it is
hard to generalize subsistence evaluations; different agencies also have different
management mandates); Telephone Interview with Helen Clough, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Dillingham, Alaska (Apr. 21, 1994) (uniform regulations are
good in theory but agency activities vary greatly; for example, subsistence evalu-
ations of a logging project and a river recreation project would be quite differ-
ent).
261. Cf. supra notes 240, 241, 245 and accompanying text (describing the
Forest Service's use of elaborate computer model and analysis to avoid complet-
ing tier-II hearing and findings in Hanlon). Smaller subsistence impacts should be
easier to justify as "necessary," and "consistent" with sound wildlife manage-
ment, and "minimal" in area because fewer subsistence users will be displaced
and more subsistence lands will remain to support them. Smaller impacts should
also be easier to justify as "minimized" because fewer steps will be available for
an agency to test as "reasonable."
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the purpose of section 810. Through tier-II hearings, subsistence
users will gain the participatory role in land management that Con-
gress intended. To make the tier-II findings, agencies will plan
projects for the "least adverse impact" that Congress intended. The
burdens of uniformly applying a low threshold are not excessive;
they merely effect the subsistence protections that Congress provid-
ed in tier-I. 262
To implement a low threshold, agencies should standardize both
tier-I procedures and their definitions of "significant." In 1984, the
Alaska Land Use Council proposed protocols for using survey data
in subsistence evaluations.263 These protocols should form the ba-
sis of standard tier-I procedures specifying how all agencies assess
available lands and alternatives, survey biological and social condi-
tions, and set statistical limits to predict subsistence impacts. Stan-
dard tier-I procedures will limit the broad discretion agencies cur-
rently have under their sketchy and inconsistent guidelines. Using
standard tier-I procedures to assess subsistence impacts, and a stan-
dard definition of the threshold, agencies will fulfill Congress'
intent to make accessible the protections of tier-Il.
C. Contrasts: The Thresholds in ANILCA and NEPA
1. The Purposes of ANILCA and NEPA
Agencies should use different thresholds for ANILCA and NEPA
because "significance" serves a different purpose in each statute. In
Amoco, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of ANILCA sec-
tion 810 is to protect subsistence resources from "unnecessary de-
struction." '264 A finding of significant restriction triggers tier-II,
which serves this purpose in two ways. First, tier-I requires a local
hearing, which places a minor procedural burden on an agency, but
allows subsistence users to participate in designing a project with
262. Cf. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 836-38 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that NEPA threshold should be low, and the agency's
significance determination informal to avoid expending elaborate procedures in
the "grey area" where a project may be significant; and to further ensure that the
agency gets full tier-II information needed to make considered choice among
project alternatives).
263. See supra note 158.
264. Amoco, 480 U.S. at 544.
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minimal impacts.265 Second, tier-IL requires an agency to make
three findings that impose substantive limits on its land use plan-
ning.2' Under these substantive limits, an agency may significant-
ly restrict subsistence only so far as is "necessary" to install another
use approved by Congress.267 The tier-II findings require an agen-
cy to make land use decisions that are "wise" in the sense that they
minimize subsistence impacts.
The Supreme Court has held that NEPA has two purposes: re-
quiring an agency to consider significant environmental effects in
approving a project, and disclosing its environmental analysis to the
public. 6 ' A project that meets the NEPA threshold by "signifi-
cantly affecting the ... environment" triggers the major procedural
burden of making an EIS.269 An EIS promotes NEPA's two pur-
poses by ensuring that an agency is fully informed of environmen-
tal concerns and by distributing agency deliberations for public
comment. In contrast to ANILCA, however, the Supreme Court has
held that the requirement to make an EIS imposes no substantive
limits on an agency's project. ° NEPA thus requires an agency to
do informed, but not wise, planning. 71 An agency can avoid the
EIS requirement if it makes an environmental assessment ("EA")
leading to a "finding of no significant impact" ("FONSI") 2  Un-
like the ANILCA threshold, the NEPA threshold and the procedures
for completing an EAIFONSI or EIS have been formalized in regu-
lations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ"). 273
265. Id. at 536 n.2.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 544.
268. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
269. Id. at 90 n.1.
270. See id. at 97-98, 100-01, 108.
271. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51
(1989).
272. See 40 C.F.R. § 1504.3; Seattle Community Council Fed'n v. Federal
Aviation Administration, 961 F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1992). A third alternative is
for the agency to determine that its action is of a type that normally does not
implicate environmental concerns-that is, does not require either an EIS or an
EA, but is subject to a "categorical exclusion" from NEPA evaluation. See 40
C.F.R. § 1508.4; Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1986).
273. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1995); see also Exec. Order No. 11,514
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Courts have resorted to the CEQ regulations and NEPA case law
to define the significance threshold under ANILCA. For example,
in Kunaknana, its first ANILCA case, the Ninth Circuit cited with
approval the BLM's cumulative impact analysis-an analysis de-
rived from NEPA cases and regulations. 74 In its 1986 Akutan de-
cision, the district court referred to NEPA case law as a "guideline"
for defining ANILCA's threshold.27 In Penfold, decided the fol-
lowing year, the same court imported cumulative impacts analysis
from NEPA into its ANILCA threshold.276 In Hanlon, in 1988, the
district court required the Forest Service to follow NEPA cumula-
tive impact regulations in its ANILCA tier-I evaluation.277 Al-
though cumulative impacts may create a significant restriction, this
similarity does not authorize an agency to graft NEPA's entire
threshold onto section 810, because the two statutes have different
purposes. The courts' confusion of the two thresholds is unfortunate
because it contradicts the language and purpose of ANILCA.
Congress enacted the language of ANILCA section 810, a decade
after NEPA, to increase subsistence protection. The tier-II hearing
provision expands NEPA's public participation requirement, serving
Congress' purpose of involving subsistence users in planning. The
tier-II findings have no NEPA analog, but promote Congress' pur-
pose of minimizing subsistence impacts of federal management.
These purposes would be poorly served if ANILCA used the NEPA
significance threshold, because that threshold serves as a screen to
prevent agencies from having to write EISs for all categories of
§ 3(h), 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,991 § 3(h),
42 Fed. Reg. 26,967 (1977), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994) (citing execu-
tive authority for issuance of CEQ regulations).
274. See Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1151; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(7) (in-
cluding cumulative impacts in NEPA regulation defining significance); id.
§ 1508.7 (defining cumulative impact); id. § 1508.25(c) (including cumulative
impacts in EIS); cf Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 413-14 (1976) (cumula-
tive impacts require comprehensive EIS, but geographic scope of EIS is at discre-
tion of agency).
275. See Akutan 1, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,245 n.1 (in adopting
"may" test, "the Ninth Circuit no doubt intended courts to draw on NEPA case
law as a guideline for determining significance").
276. Penfold II, 857 F.2d 1307.
277. Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. 1446.
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federal actions.278 The ANILCA threshold, in contrast, only serves
to screen from tier-II study actions that pose no threat of restricting
the livelihoods of subsistence users. To protect these users from
agencies' varying development policies, Congress must have intend-
ed ANILCA's threshold to be lower than NEPA's.
A low ANILCA threshold need not disrupt an agency's planning
because ANILCA's tier-II imposes a smaller burden than NEPA's
EIS requirement. Holding a local subsistence hearing adds minimal
effort, and supplies data to support an agency's tier-II findings.279
The remaining data should be provided by the subsistence alterna-
tives that an agency is required to study in tier-I. If an agency seeks
to minimize subsistence impacts starting in tier-I, it will merely
have to document its selection of alternatives in tier-II-a much
smaller effort than undertaking an EIS. Because tier-II imposes a
lower burden and promotes Congress' protective purposes, agencies
should use a lower "significance" threshold for ANILCA. Congress
must have intended agencies to define this threshold through order-
ly rule-making to ensure consistent protection on all federal lands.
The application of NEPA law to this ANILCA rule-making process
is discussed below.
278. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (applying ANILCA threshold to any disposition
of public lands which would significantly restrict subsistence uses); see also 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (applying NEPA threshold to "proposals for legislation and
other major [f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment"); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (in NEPA, "major federal action" means the
same as "significantly affecting the ... environment"); cf. Penfold 11, 857 F.2d at
1314 (holding that BLM approval of "notice" mines is not a major federal action,
so neither the NEPA nor the ANILCA threshold is met).
279. Cf Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1425-26 (rejecting subsistence users' claim
of inadequate notice and opportunity for participation in tier-II hearings); Kanen
Telephone Interview, supra note 245 (Forest Service now makes major changes
in locations of logging units based on tier-II hearings); Rene Telephone Inter-
view, supra note 225 (same; timing of hearings is always difficult for subsistence
users; hearing comments contain less substance than meetings with community
leaders); Kruse Telephone Interview, supra note 165 (tier-II hearings generate
good will; subsistence maps enable users to make valuable comments on local
timber sales; hearings on individual sales do not allow users to comment on real
issue: the forest-wide timber harvest level); Clough Telephone Interview, supra
note 260 (Forest Service NEPA filings, written to avoid legal challenge, lack
information comprehensible to subsistence users).
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2. Inapplicability of NEPA to ANILCA's Threshold
CEQ regulations establish NEPA's threshold by defining the
word "significantly" through factors that assess the social, econom-
ic, and geographic "context," and "intensity" of a project's ef-
fects.8 In the Ninth and D.C. Circuits, the context has not been
at issue in NEPA findings, and it has even less relevance to the
ANILCA threshold because ANILCA defines the context. Three
CEQ "intensity" factors-(1) highly controversial effects, (2) un-
known risks, and (3) cumulative impacts-have been important in
Ninth and D.C. Circuit NEPA cases. The usefulness of these three
NEPA intensity factors as models for defining the ANILCA thresh-
old is discussed in the next section of this Article. Other CEQ in-
tensity factors have played small parts in the NEPA decisions and
have little relevance to the ANILCA threshold.281
Beyond the intensity factors, other CEQ regulations delineate the
NEPA threshold by permitting mitigation measures, tiered review,
categorical exclusions, and a single purpose for an agency's range
of project alternatives. CEQ regulations define "mitigation" and
provide that an agency must describe its measures to reduce envi-
280. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(a), (b) (1995).
281. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(1) (impacts that may be both beneficial and
adverse); id. § 1508.27(b)(2) (impacts on public health or safety); id.
§ 1508.27(b)(3) (impacts on culturally unique or ecologically critical areas); id.
§ 1508.27(b)(6) (decisions that establish a precedent); id. § 1508.27(b)(8) (im-
pacts on historic sites); id. § 1508.27(b)(9) (impacts on protected or endangered
species); id. § 1508.27(b)(10) (threatened violations of environmental law); see
also Marsh v. Oregon Nat'l Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 n.20 (1989)
(listing factors); cf. Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th
Cir. 1988) (violation of water quality standards); Los Angeles v. National High-
way Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (violation of
Clean Air Act plan); Public Citizen v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
848 F.2d 256, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (no Clean Air Act violation; no precedent);
Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 979-80, 983, 986-87
(9th Cir. 1985) (no zoning violations; beneficial impacts, protected species);
Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1992) (protected
species); Jones v. Gordon. 792 F.2d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 1986) (protected species);
Committee For Auto Responsibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 1001 n.35 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (beneficial impacts); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756
F.2d 143, 148-49, 153-55 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (public health).
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ronmental impacts in any required EIS. 282 Both the Ninth Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit interpret these regulations to allow an EA
containing enforceable mitigating conditions to support a
FONSI.283 To avoid an EIS, the D.C. Circuit has held, mitigation
must completely compensate for all significant impacts.2 4 The
Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has not required complete mitigation.285
The Supreme Court, in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Coun-
cil, held that an EIS need not have a complete mitigation plan be-
cause NEPA imposes no substantive mitigation requirement.2 6
The Court's ruling, that an EIS does not require full mitigation,
may support the Ninth Circuit's relaxed view of the measures re-
quired to support an EA.
282. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20; see Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332, 351 n.15 (1989) (reciting definition); see also 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h), 1508.25(b)(3) (inclusion in EIS).
283. See LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389, 399 (9th Cir. 1988); The
Steamboaters v. FERC, 759 F.2d 1382, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985); Cabinet Mountains
Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
284. The complete compensation requirement was based on the D.C. Circuit's
view that a mitigated FONSI remained a finding of no significant impacts. See
Cabinet Mountains Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 682; see also Sierra Club v. Peterson,
717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (if "any 'significant' environmental im-
pacts might result," agency must prepare EIS).
285. "[S]o long as significant measures are undertaken to 'mitigate the
project's effects,' they need not completely compensate for adverse environmental
impacts." Greenpeace, 982 F.2d at 1353; see Jantzen, 760 F.2d at 987 (rejecting
"strict standard" of mitigation in D.C. Circuit). But cf Conner v. Burford, 848
F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1988) (although NEPA does not require complete com-
pensation, "an EIS must be prepared as long as 'substantial questions' remain as
to whether the measures will completely preclude significant environmental ef-
fects").
286. See 490 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1989). But see George C. Coggins & Jane E.
Van Dyke, NEPA and Private Rights in Public Mineral Resources: The Fee
Complex Relative?, 20 ENVTL. L. 649, 650 n.5 (1990) (arguing that Congress
intended NEPA to have substantive effect in protecting environment). The federal
agency in Methow Valley Citizens had complete mitigation plans for its own, on-
site actions. See 490 U.S. at 357-58. The additional plan that the Court deemed
unnecessary was for off-site actions of non-federal agencies. See id. at 331-45,
352-53, 353 n.16. The Court has extended the Methow Valley Citizens limit on
EIS mitigation to include an agency's planning for its own, on-site actions. See
Marsh v. Oregon Nat'l Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 369-70 (1989).
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In Kunaknana, the Ninth Circuit accepted the BLM's mitigation
measures as support for its finding of non-significance under
ANILCA. The NEPA rule allowing an agency to avoid "signifi-
cance" through mitigation is inappropriate to ANILCA, however,
because tier-II's third finding expressly requires an agency to mini-
mize any restriction that is significant. Congress' inclusion of this
"minimize" requirement in tier-II suggests it did not intend agencies
to avoid tier-II by mitigating significant restrictions in tier-I. 87
Agencies certainly should investigate a range of protective alterna-
tives in tier-I, but if any alternative threatens subsistence, they
should proceed to tier-II. That interpretation is consistent with
Congress' policy to involve users in subsistence management, be-
cause tier-II hearings provide such involvement.
Other CEQ regulations permit "tiered" NEPA review of a project
that will occur in distinct stages. 88 This "tiered" review allows an
agency to defer detailed study of the environmental impacts of a
later stage until it is ready to approve that stage. In an oil project,
for example, an agency may wish to satisfy NEPA with an EA at
the leasing stage, and avoid an EIS for the greater impacts of ex-
ploration, development, and production stages unless oil actually is
discovered. The danger is that the agency will make uninformed
decisions at the early stage that become commitments to later ac-
287. An important purpose of tier-I is to require agencies to include subsistence
protections early in their land use planning. But if an agency's range of alterna-
tives includes one that may significantly restrict subsistence, it must proceed to
tier-II, because Congress intended it to minimize the threat. In completing tier-II,
an agency will provide greater protection because tier-II requires positive steps to
minimize subsistence impacts. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(3)(C). Agencies have
sought to avoid tier-II. See Telephone Interview with Clarence Summers, Subsis-
tence Specialist, National Park Service, Anchorage, Alaska (Apr. 5, 1994) (when
Park Service finds during public review that one alternative threatens significant
restriction, it alters project to avoid having to make finding of significant restric-
tion); cf. Telephone Interview with Leslie Kerr, Chief, Planning Section, U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, Anchorage, Alaska (Jan. 14, 1994) (if Fish and Wild-
life Service ever discovered threat of significant restriction, it would delete that
project from its refuge); King Telephone Interview, supra note 154 (only "rea-
sonably important" BLM evaluations should receive public comment because
agency conducts many, has developed expertise, and would be hampered in deal-
ing with extensive input).
288. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(i), 1501.7(a)(3), 1502.4(d), 1502.20, 1508.28.
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tion, for example, through the investment of large resources in an
oil strike.289 The Ninth Circuit has held an agency must do an EIS
for an on-shore oil lease, unless it retains power to prevent harm to
sensitive areas until they are studied.' 9 For offshore leasing,
NEPA permits an agency to defer its EIS because the government
retains greater control over the later stages of these projects.2 9'
In Amoco, the Supreme Court declined to enjoin Interior's
"tiered" subsistence evaluation of off-shore leases, but this holding
should not signal the extension of "tiered" review from NEPA to
ANILCA. The Court's analysis was directed to the remedy, not
whether the agency complied with ANILCA. 9g Tier-II of section
810 specifically applied to a "lease, permit, or other use," showing
Congress intended an agency to grapple at the lease stage with
restrictions that could result at a later stage. A "tiered" ANILCA
review would violate Kunaknana's threshold by allowing an agency
to defer tier-II if a later stage (such as oil development) is "unlike-
ly," even though it clearly may cause significant restrictions if it
occurs.293 "Tiered" review also would devalue subsistence users'
participation by deferring tier-II hearings on a project until its de-
sign is substantially complete 4 To comply with Congress' lan-
289. Cf. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 503-04 (lst Cir. 1989) (agency
may develop institutional commitment to project it approves at early stage with-
out adequate study, but substantive standards of ANILCA enable court to fashion
a remedy).
290. See Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied sub nom. Kohlman v. Bob Marshall Alliance, 489 U.S. 1066
(1989); Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1443-51 (9th Cir. 1988); cf Cabinet
Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 682-84 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (miti-
gation measures sufficient to avoid threat of significant impact at lease-explora-
tion stage; not requiring agency to exclude lessor from occupying lease in order
to escape EIS at early stage); Park County Resource Council v. United States
Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 621-24 (10th Cir. 1987) (same).
291. See Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 608-09, 614-17 (9th Cir.
1984) (citing Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984)).
292. Amoco also addressed leases off-shore, where the Court concluded section
810 did not apply. See 480 U.S. at 544-46; see also id. at 534 n.1 (not reaching
question whether discrete stages of oil project on OCS have implications for
ANILCA review of leases on OCS).
293. Cf. Akutan H, 792 F.2d at 1378-79 (rejecting "likely" threshold for signifi-
cant restriction as inconsistent with Kunaknana's "may" test).
294. See Kruse Telephone Interview, supra note 165 (subsistence evaluation of
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guage and purpose in ANILCA, an agency must complete its sec-
tion 810 evaluation at the outset, even if a project will occur in
stages over time.
. In addition to the tiered review of a project's evolving stages, the
CEQ regulation permits an agency to split its NEPA evaluation into
a general EIS for a whole program, and smaller EAs or EISs for
specific sites.295 In Alaska v. National Parks and Conservation As-
sociation, the Alaska district court suggested that ANILCA might
permit an agency to split its subsistence evaluation into program-
matic and site-specific studies.296 Such a split evaluation is, how-
ever, barred by ANILCA because every tier-I evaluation must have
both a programmatic study of other lands and alternatives and a
site-specific study of subsistence uses. Although Congress encour-
aged early subsistence planning, an agency should do a tier-I evalu-
ation late enough that the impacts of each alternative are predict-
able. A project must go beyond its conceptual stage for an agency
to assess its impact on subsistence uses and needs, adaptability to
other lands, comparison with other alternatives, or threat of signifi-
cant restriction. This practical requirement of tier-I prevents an
agency from splitting off programmatic evaluation of projects under
ANILCA.
NEPA law permits an agency to use mitigation or tiering to avoid
an EIS, but with a "categorical exclusion" it can avoid even the
lesser burden of making an EA. For a categorical exclusion from
NEPA, CEQ regulations require an agency to find that its project
falls into a predetermined category of activities that normally re-
quire neither an EIS nor an EA.297 Although the courts have not
timber sale, while useful in avoiding local hunting grounds, fails to address
forest's overall harvest level, which drives extent of restriction).
295. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(i), 1502.4, 1502.20, 1508.28(a).
296. See No. J87-012 CIV, slip op. at 18 (D. Alaska Sept. 11, 1991) (rejecting
agency's argument that ANILCA requires subsistence evaluation only for indi-
vidual permit application); see also BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, app. 1
(recommending programmatic subsistence evaluations for mining plans in areas
of low subsistence use or new mineral entry).
297. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.5(k), 1501.4(a)(2), 1508.4. An agency also must
find that there are no extraordinary circumstances that may cause the normally-in-
significant action to have significant impacts. See Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821,
827-29 (9th Cir. 1986).
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yet considered whether NEPA's categorical exclusion law extends
to ANILCA, the BLM's section 810 guidelines do make categorical
exclusions from section 810 for fire suppression planning and issu-
ing subsistence permits that merely preserve the status quo.29 The
National Park Service's guidelines create de facto exclusions for
issuing individual subsistence permits, recreation permits, or emer-
gency closures, because these are "minor or routine," or preserve
the status quo. The Forest Service's NEPA guidelines appear to
permit it to categorically exclude actions from ANILCA, in con-
junction with exclusions from NEPA. The Interior and Fish and
Wildlife Service guidelines make no mention of categorical exclu-
sions from section 810.
The language of section 810 contains no authority to make cate-
gorical exclusions, and sweeps broadly over agencies permitting
"the use, occupancy, or disposition of public lands under any provi-
sion of law." Subsection 810(c) contains Congress' only exclusions:
state and Native corporation land selections. In Chevron, U.S.A,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court held
that an agency has no discretion if Congress has unambiguously
expressed its intent.299 Given the clear intent of subsection 810(c)
to define section 810's categorical exclusions, there is no discretion
for agencies to create others. A "minor" exclusion for issuing sub-
sistence permits is unjustified because, as section 804 demonstrates,
some subsistence uses restrict others. The burden of evaluating a
"minor" action should be light if its subsistence impacts are mini-
mal. Because the language of subsection 810(c) is unambiguous and
the burden of section 810 is light, agencies may not create categori-
cal exclusions from its evaluation requirements.
Beyond categorically excluding an action from NEPA, an agency
can limit NEPA review to a narrow range of alternatives by defin-
ing the purpose of its project narrowly. CEQ regulations require an
EIS to cover all reasonable alternatives to a proposal, including
alternatives that mitigate project impacts. The Supreme Court has
held, however, that an agency can eliminate alternatives that are
"remote and speculative." 3" In City of Angoon v. Hodel, the
298. See BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, app. 2, app. 3; cf. id. § II(B)(3),
app. 4 ("[T]here are no categorical exclusions for 810 at this time").
299. See 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
300. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 551
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Ninth Circuit expanded the Court's analysis, reasoning that an
agency must only study NEPA alternatives that promote a project's
purpose as the agency defines it.3 'O In City of Tenakee Springs v.
Clough, the district court applied Angoon's NEPA analysis to a
project where the Forest Service defined its purpose as logging
enough timber to satisfy its Alaska Pulp contract. This purpose con-
strained the agency to plan only the most concentrated logging
alternatives. The court held that NEPA allowed the agency to by-
pass alternatives like modifying the contract because they did not
serve the project purpose.3 2
In Clough, the district court held that ANILCA, like NEPA, al-
lowed an agency to ignore any alternative outside its project pur-
pose. The court reasoned that ANILCA did not affect what alterna-
tives an agency prepared, although tier-I placed substantive limits
on an agency's choice among its alternatives.3 3 Considering those
substantive limits, the district court reasoned that to be "necessary"
under ANILCA, a subsistence restriction merely had to promote
any one permissible land use. The court's reasoning, however, was
flawed because ANILCA requires an agency to include another
use-subsistence-with the new use, in every project's purpose.
Rationally, an agency should find it "necessary" to restrict subsis-
tence to promote a new use only if it examines how much the new
use would have to be restricted to protect subsistence.
In Amoco, the Supreme Court ruled that subsistence is "a public
interest" that an agency must reconcile, if possible, with competing
land uses.30 4 Following the Court's logic, there must be at least
(1978) (quoting NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
301. 803 F.2d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987),
cf. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(g), 1501.7(a)(2), (3), 1502.2(e), 1502.4(a), 1508.25(b)(2)
(allowing agency to determine "scope" of EIS, but not authorizing it to restrict
scope by defining purpose of project).
302. See Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. at 1420. The Ninth Circuit did not agree. See
Clough III, 915 F.2d at 1312 (even if Alaska Pulp contract required Forest Ser-
vice to make available full harvest, agency should have explored alternative of
amending contract); cf. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a), (c) (EIS must evaluate "all rea-
sonable alternatives," including alternatives not within jurisdiction of lead agen-
cy).
303. See Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. at 1421, 1427.
304. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 546 (referring to agency's desired uses as public
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two uses in the purpose of every project, and subsistence must be
one of them. The Forest Service did not have to protect subsistence
completely in Clough, because Congress did not make subsistence
uses paramount, but neither did Congress make the logging contract
paramount. The agency rationally had to go beyond "full satisfac-
tion of the logging contract" and consider the other part of its pur-
pose: protecting subsistence. ANILCA required it to develop a
range of alternatives that balanced these competing uses, compro-
mising the logging contract as well as subsistence. ANILCA de-
manded these subsistence-protective alternatives because, unlike
NEPA, ANILCA contained the substantive requirements of tier-II.
Tier-II requires an agency selecting its preferred alternative to
find that (1) any significant restriction is necessary, (2) the alter-
native uses minimal land, and (3) the agency will minimize sub-
sistence impacts. A restriction can be "necessary" only if there is
no feasible alternative that avoids it; land use is "minimal" only if
there is no available alternative that uses less; and impacts are
"minimized" only if there are no reasonable alternatives that reduce
them °.3 5 Tier-II thus defines its requirements for the preferred al-
ternative relative to the subsistence impacts of other alternatives.
An agency can rank the relative impacts rationally only if it designs
some alternatives to protect subsistence. In Amoco's reconciling
interests).
305. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1510
(Philip B. Gove ed., 1971) (defining "necessary" as "unavoidable," or without
further alternative); id. at 1438 (defining "minimal" as "least possible," i.e., with-
out further alternative); id. (defining "minimize" as "reduce to the smallest possi-
ble ... extent," or without further alternative); id. at 63 (defining "alternative" as
"situation offering a choice"); see also Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1151 (when inter-
preted in conjunction with the statute requiring leasing program, section 810
required BLM to rank the subsistence impacts from leasing different tracts' and
compare their relative desirability for the program); cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978) ("the concept of alternatives
must be bounded by some notion of feasibility").
306. Unless it designs some alternatives with additional subsistence protections,
an agency cannot determine whether it has effectively minimized subsistence
impacts in its other alternatives. The Forest Service did not provide such a range
of alternatives in Clough. See ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at
20, 28 (amount of habitat for main subsistence species remaining after project
would be similar for all alternatives examined); Kruse Telephone Interview, supra
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process, an agency has discretion to decide which is the most pro-
tective alternative that remains feasible, but it must study each
alternative to have a basis for that judgment. NEPA's range of
alternatives is not adequate because NEPA does not, like ANILCA,
mandate that an agency discover the most protective alternative. Of
the two statutes, only ANILCA contains substantive standards that
cabin an agency's range of permissible choices.
3. NEPA: Useful Models for ANILCA
The NEPA threshold, while it does not apply directly, contains
two useful models for ANILCA: the burden of showing that im-
pacts are "significant" and the intensity of impacts required to reach
the threshold. In NEPA cases, the courts have allocated the burden
of showing significant impacts between an agency and the public.
In the Ninth Circuit, an agency must do an EIS if there are "sub-
stantial questions" whether impacts may rise to the NEPA thresh-
old.3 7 It is an agency's burden initially to assess impacts.311 If it
issues a FONSI, an opponent has the burden of raising "substantial
questions" by alleging facts that, if true, would show a project may
significantly harm the environment. Although the D.C. Circuit has
not expressly adopted this Ninth Circuit "substantial questions"
inquiry, it places a similar burden on opponents of a FONSI.
Both the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit review a FONSI
under the deferential "arbitrary or capricious" standard of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act ("APA").3 9 In the Ninth Circuit, if an
note 165 (Forest Service approach of including same timber volume in all alter-
natives neutralizes effectiveness of section 810); cf. ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS,
supra note 164, ch. 4, at 84-85 (preferred alternative number 3, is projected to
cause the greatest drop in subsistence game).
307. See, e.g., Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d 1342, 1351 (9th Cir.
1992) (quoting LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389, 397 (9th Cir. 1988) (an agen-
cy must prepare an EIS if "substantial questions are raised as to whether a pro-
ject... may cause significant degradation of some human environmental fac-
tor")).
308. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1995); see also City of Davis v. Coleman, 521
F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that it is the responsibility of the federal
agency, not environmental action groups or local government to investigate en-
vironmental effects).
309. See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D) (1994). The Ninth Circuit, which
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opponent raises "substantial questions," an agency must give a
"convincing statement of reasons" why there will be no significant
impact."' The D.C. Circuit reviews a FONSI by examining
whether the agency (1) took a hard look at the project, (2) iden-
tified the relevant environmental concerns, (3) made a "convincing
case" for its FONSI, and (4) minimized all significant impacts
through mitigation measures."' In practice, the D.C. Circuit has
deferred more to a "convincing case" than the Ninth Circuit has to
a "statement of reasons," but both courts have enjoined projects
until agencies completed satisfactory EA!FONSIs.1 2
formerly reviewed a FONSI under the slightly less deferential "reasonableness"
standard, recently adopted the APA standard. See Greenpeace Action, 982 F.2d at
1349-50 (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360
(1989)). The APA standard requires a court to ensure an agency has taken a
"hard look" at impacts and made a decision based on a reasoned evaluation of
the "relevant factors," while deferring to the agency's discretion on matters of
fact. See id. at 1350. The D.C. Circuit has long employed the APA standard in
reviewing a FONSI. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 490 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
310. See Seattle Community Council Fed'n v. FAA, 961 F.2d 829, 832 (apply-
ing "reasonableness" standard).
311. See Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d at 499-500 (Wald, C.J., dissenting);
NRDC v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1430 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The "hard look"
part of the four-part test was derived from prior circuit court created law. See
NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citing WAIT Radion v.
FCC, 135 U.S. App. D.C. 317 (1964)). The "relevant areas" part was apparently
derived from the Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). The "convincing case" part was the court's
own innovation. See Maryland-Nat'l, 487 F.2d at 1040 n.10. The "sufficiently
minimized" part was derived directly from NEPA's inclusion of a significance
threshold, and reflects the D.C. Circuit's "complete" mitigation perspective. See
id. at 1040.
312. The "convincing case" element of the D.C. Circuit's four-part test resem-
bles the Ninth Circuit's "convincing statement of reasons" for why a FONSI is
justified. Compare Maryland-Nat'l, 487 F.2d at 1040 with Seattle Community
Council, 961 F.2d at 832. The D.C. Circuit, however, has deferred to an agency's
"primary responsibility" to determine whether an action significantly effects the
environment. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 151
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The D.C. Circuit has ordered a few projects enjoined as a result
of defective underlying FONSIs. See id., 756 F.2d at 157-58; Sierra v. Peterson,
717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983); cf. Maryland-Nat'l, 487 F.2d at 1041-43
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Courts reviewing ANILCA cases also have used the "arbitrary or
capricious" standard, but seem to have placed a greater burden on
plaintiffs to show significant impacts on subsistence. In Kunaknana,
for example, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BLM's finding of no
significant restriction ("FONSR") for oil leases under a standard
that approximated the four-part test used by the D.C. Circuit in
NEPA cases.313 Unlike its own NEPA cases, however, the Ninth
Circuit did not inquire whether the ANILCA plaintiffs raised sub-
stantial questions that shifted the burden of making a "convincing
statement" to the agency. In Hanlon, the district court rejected
users' claims that logging would restrict subsistence because they
offered their evidence after the agency completed its FONSR. Un-
der NEPA law, even without their evidence, the plaintiffs could
have used the agency's record to raise "substantial questions." A
"substantial questions" inquiry might have led the court to enjoin
the project, because the Forest Service later found sufficient evi-
dence of restrictions to trigger tier-II. 4
Reducing users' burden would improve their ability to participate
in development decisions and give them greater access to tier-II
hearings. The burden shift also would help prevent an agency from
overlooking a threat of restriction, and ensure it made the substan-
(remanding for reconsideration whether injunction should issue). The Ninth Cir-
cuit will defer to an agency's analysis of the record only if it is "fully informed
and well considered." See Seattle Community Council, 961 F.2d at 832; Friends
of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985); cf.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (em-
ploying same phrase). The Ninth Circuit has ordered injunctions for several pro-
jects supported by defective FONSIs. See LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389, 403
(9th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Service, 843 F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (9th
Cir. 1988); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 759, 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1985).
313. See Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1151 (agency "conducted an extended analy-
sis" of restrictions, "examined the relevant factors," articulated a "rational con-
nection" between the facts it found and its FONSR, and included protective lease
conditions "to preclude future restrictions on subsistence") (emphasis deleted).
314. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1449-52 (Forest Service acknowledged in-
creased competition, reduced game population, decreased habitat, and changed
game distribution, but did not proceed to tier-II evaluation); see also Clough I,
750 F. Supp. at 1425 (following Hanlon, agency retained FONSR for only one
analysis area of project); cf. Clough 11, 915 F.2d at 1310 (project had a total of
four areas).
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tive findings of tier-II when required. Subsistence users lack the
legal and technical expertise to build a tier-I record, while an agen-
cy has both the personnel and the duty to analyze subsistence im-
pacts .3 " The burden shift is even more appropriate to ANILCA
than to NEPA because it is less difficult for an agency to complete
a tier-II evaluation than an EIS. NEPA's "substantial questions"
model that allocates the burden of proving significant impacts is
thus appropriate to meet Congress' purpose of minimizing restric-
tions in ANILCA.
In addition to its allocation of burdens, NEPA's impact "inten-
sity" factors are useful in defining ANILCA's significant restriction
threshold. Three intensity factors in the CEQ definition of "signifi-
cance" have been important in Ninth Circuit NEPA cases:
(1)"highly controversial" effects, (2) "unknown risks," and (3) "cu-
mulative impacts." Under the CEQ regulations, if project impacts
are likely to be "highly controversial," they may exceed the NEPA
threshold."6 While the Ninth Circuit recently held that, absent
widespread opposition, two FONSIs were not highly controversial,
in two other cases the court overturned FONSIs because they were
highly controversial." 7 The D.C. Circuit has not applied this
315. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (duty to evaluate impacts); id. § 3112(1)
(Congress' policy to minimize subsistence impacts); 36 C.F.R. §§ 242.5,
242.10(a) (Interior and Agriculture Departments must accord preference to subsis-
tence uses on public lands); 50 C.F.R. §§ 100.5, 100.10(a) (same); see also
BERGER, supra note 3, at 47A-47X, 55-59 (depicting limited cash resources and
subsistence economy of contemporary, rural Native villages).
316. "The following should be considered in evaluating intensity .... (4) The
degree to which the [proposed project's] effects on the quality of the human
environment are likely to be highly controversial." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4).
"Controversial" refers'to "cases where a substantial dispute exists as to the size,
nature, or effect of the major federal action rather than to the existence of opposi-
tion to a use." Foundation For North Amer. Wild Sheep v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
681 F.2d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162
(4th Cir. 1973)); LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389, 400-01 (9th Cir. 1988);
Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988). The "sub-
stantial dispute" must exist at the time the agency is deciding whether effects are
significant. See Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 982 F.2d .1342, 1353-54 (9th Cir.
1992).
317. In two recent cases, the Ninth Circuit held effects were not controversial
because plaintiffs' experts failed to object before the FONSI, see Greenpeace
Action, 982 F.2d at 1352-53, or were opposed by all other parties after extensive
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NEPA intensity factor. A project is more likely to meet ANILCA's
threshold if its effects are highly controversial because some users
have judged it will create a significant restriction. An agency
should afford these users the opportunity to review the project
through a tier-II hearing because Congress identified such participa-
tion as one of its purposes in ANILCA.
Another intensity factor that defines NEPA significance is wheth-
er project impacts are "highly uncertain or involve unique or un-
known risks." The Ninth Circuit overturned FONSIs for projects
with "unknown risks" in three NEPA cases, and the D.C. Circuit
applied this factor in one case.31 Under ANILCA, a project is
more likely to meet the significance threshold if it contains un-
known risks because the extent of the restriction may be greater
than an agency anticipates. Although NEPA's "highly controver-
sial" and "unknown risks" factors are difficult to quantify, both can
biological study. See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d
976, 979-87. Congress had also endorsed the agency's proposed mitigation mea-
sures. See id. at 982-83. In four other cases, public controversy was one factor
leading the Ninth Circuit to require agencies to complete EISs. See LaFlamme,
852 F.2d at 400-01; Sierra Club, 843 F.2d at 1193-94; Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d
821, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1986); Wild Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1182. In two of these four
cases, agencies had not prepared any EA. See LaFlamme, 852 F.2d at 399; Jones,
792 F.2d at 828. In the other two cases, the Ninth Circuit reversed "highly con-
troversial" EAs, which agencies had concluded with FONSIs. See Sierra Club,
843 F.2d at 1193-95; Wild Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1182-83. In Cabinet Mountains
Wilderness v. Peterson, the D.C. Circuit dealt with public controversy without
explicitly invoking the CEQ's intensity factor. 685 F.2d 678, 683-84 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
318. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5). The Ninth Circuit overturned FONSIs in
three cases that addressed both the "unknown risks" factor and the "highly con-
troversial" factor. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 843 F.2d at 1194;.Jones,
792 F.2d at 829; Wild Sheep, 681 F.2d at 1182 n.47. In other cases, the court
upheld FONSIs against challenges that involved unknown risks, without expressly
invoking this CEQ factor. Cf Greenpeace Action, 982 F.2d at 1351-54 (agency
need not prove EA used best scientific method, resolved disagreement over ef-
fects, or showed effectiveness of mitigation measures); Jantzen, 760 F.2d at 983,
985-86 (agency may base FONSI on biological study with known limitations if
plaintiffs provide no better data). The D.C. Circuit relied upon the "unknown
risks" factor in one case where it rejected an agency's FONSI. See Foundation on
Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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assist agencies in defining when a project's impacts reach the
ANILCA significance threshold.
The final intensity factor that courts have reviewed in NEPA
threshold cases is "cumulative impacts." In Kleppe v. Sierra Club,
the Supreme Court reasoned that an agency must include the "cu-
mulative or synergistic" impacts of related projects in an EIS.319
The CEQ regulations now include an intensity factor for projects
related to others that have foreseeable, "individually insignificant
but cumulatively significant" impacts. The Ninth Circuit relied on
cumulative impacts in holding that one project exceeded the NEPA
threshold, and it was a contributor in two other cases requiring
agencies to issue EISs.3 20 The D.C. Circuit has reviewed cumu-
lative impacts in one NEPA case, affirming a FONSI.32'
In reviewing ANILCA threshold findings, courts have applied
only the "cumulative impacts" factor, among all the NEPA intensity
factors. The Ninth Circuit approved a FONSR based partly on a
cumulative impacts study in Kunaknana, and affirmed that
ANILCA required an agency to study cumulative subsistence im-
pacts in Penfold and Clough.3 22 The district court required cumu-
lative impacts studies under ANILCA in Penfold, and extended this
requirement to include "reasonably foreseeable future" subsistence
impacts in Hanlon. Although there is no express requirement to
study cumulative impacts in ANILCA, the courts' adoption of this
NEPA factor is logical because such impacts increase the extent of
subsistence restrictions. Thus, NEPA's "cumulative impacts" factor
319. See Kleppe, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7)
(CEQ intensity factor); id. § 1508.7 (defining "cumulative impact"); cf. id.
§§ 1508.25(a)(1), 1508.25(a)(2) (including "connected actions" and "cumulative
actions" within scope of project that must be covered in a single EIS).
320. In Thomas v. Peterson, the Ninth Circuit used EIS scope regulations to
require a cumulative EIS. See 753 F.2d 754, 758-61 (9th Cir. 1985). In two other
cases that used the "highly controversial" intensity factor, the Ninth Circuit cited
the CEQ definition of a cumulative impact and applied it in practice as an inten-
sity factor. See LaFlamme, 852 F.2d at 401-02; Sierra Club, 843 F.2d at 1194-95.
The court also followed Thomas in relying on the CEQ definitions of "connected
actions" and "cumulative impacts" to overturn a Forest Service EA/FONSI in
Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 719-21 (9th Cir. 1988).
321. See Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 487-88 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
322. See Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1151; Penfold II, 857 F.2d at 1319-23;
Clough III, 915 F.2d at 1312-13.
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also serves as a useful model for agencies defining the ANILCA
significance threshold.
The three intensity factors important for NEPA do not exhaust
those an agency could use for ANILCA, because the two thresholds
serve different purposes. The CEQ factors fail to address important
facets of ANILCA, including its focus on subsistence uses and its
requirement to study alternative projects that protect subsistence.
Agencies defining the ANILCA threshold should specify subsis-
tence-specific evaluation factors such as the relative resource de-
pendence of different communities, availability of substitute re-
sources, cultural and social aspects of resource sharing, and feasi-
bility of other sites or alternative projects."3 To ensure uniformi-
ty, all federal land agencies should join in rule-making to define the
ANILCA "significance" threshold.
IV. TIER-II EVALUATION
A. The Tier-Il Findings: Substance or Procedure
The principal issue raised by tier-II is whether the three find-
ings-(1) a restriction is "necessary" and "consistent" with sound
management, (2) a project will use "minimal" land, and (3) an
agency will "minimize" subsistence impacts-impose substantive
limits on agency discretion.24 Although some commentators ques-
tion its practical value, the substance-procedure distinction has
loomed large in NEPA cases, and the Supreme Court has concluded
NEPA contains no substantive limits.325 If tier-II is substantive,
323. Cf. supra note 134 (referring to Alaska Land Use Council Work Group I
proposal for definitions of "significance" under ANILCA); supra notes 158 and
accompanying text (referring to ALUC Work Group II proposal for standard
methods of data collection and analysis to support subsistence evaluations).
324. See Kerr Telephone Interview, supra note 287; Rene Telephone Interview,
supra note 225; Pierce Telephone Interview, supra note 225. A separate issue
concerns the effort an agency should expend to comply with the hearing proce-
dure of tier-II. Cf. Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1425-26 (rejecting subsistence users'
claims that notices and hearings were inadequate); ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS,
supra note 164, 1 Consolidated Appendix, app. B-1 Angoon, at 12, 16 (criticizing
Forest Service for holding hearing when subsistence users were away); id., app.
B-3 Hoonah, at 11, 30, 37, 53, 67 (same); id. app. B-10 Tenakee Springs, at 6-7
(same). An agency must design its notice and hearing procedures to take full
advantage of the expertise of local subsistence users.
325. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51
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ANILCA will require an agency to design subsistence-protective
alternatives, and to select the most protective alternative that is
practicable.
The plain language of the three findings appears to impose sub-
stantive standards on any agency that approves a project. The words
in subsection 810(a)(3) do not give an agency numerical limits, but
they do require it to rank its alternatives according to their subsis-
tence impacts. The tier-II language also gives an agency project
design criteria: each alternative must avoid unnecessary restrictions,
be consistent with sound management, use minimal land, and in-
clude steps to minimize impacts. On the other hand, the language
of subsection 810(d) refers to the evaluation requirements of sub-
section 810(a) as "procedural." One agency, the Forest Service, has
argued that tier-Il is purely procedural, and therefore places no
limit on its discretion to design and select alternatives.326
The Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Amoco focused on
whether, given a violation, ANILCA mandated an injunction. The
Court's analysis, developed in the prior case of Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, found no inescapable inference that Congress
intended to mandate injunctions for ANILCA violations.327 The
Court held that the "underlying substantive policy" of ANILCA was
to protect subsistence resources from unnecessary destruction.
328
(1989) (finding that although other statutes may impose substantive obligations on
federal agencies, NEPA merely prohibits uninformed agency action); see also
David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Expla-
nations for a 12-0 Record, 20 ENvTL. L. 551, 564-66 (1990) (noting that the
Supreme Court has refused to engage in substantive review in NEPA cases; there
is no way to translate NEPA's environmental goals into judicially manageable
standards); Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA's Promise--Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L.
533, 534, 539-49 (1990) (Supreme Court has prevented agencies from implement-
ing substantive protections Congress intended); cf Coggins & Van Dyke, supra
note 286, at 650-51 (noting that "procedure is not easily severed from substance,
and even strictly procedural requirements inevitably have substantive consequenc-
es").
326. See Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. at 1427.
327. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 541-44 (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 311-15 (1982)) (courts retain equitable discretion to grant or deny
injunction unless Congress withdraws it expressly or by "necessary and inescap-
able inference").
328. Id. at 544. The Amoco Court agreed with the district court that no injunc-
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The holding did not resolve the nature of tier-II because the Court
did not address whether this policy imposed any substantive duty
on an agency. Because its discussion in Amoco assumed the Interior
Department did violate ANILCA, the Court did not explore how far
an agency could restrict subsistence without a violation.
Two years after the Court decided Amoco, the First Circuit dis-
cussed the requirements of ANILCA to distinguish it from NEPA.
In Sierra Club v. Marsh, the court suggested an injunction was the
proper remedy for an agency's inadequate EIS.329 The First Cir-
cuit reasoned that a NEPA violation was less likely to be reparable
because NEPA lacked substantive standards like those a court could
use to repair a project violating ANILCA.330 The court's interpre-
tation that tier-II findings "curtail[ ] the range" of agency choices
seems to accord with the language of ANILCA.33' The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, has never commented on the First Circuit's dictum
that tier-II is substantive.
The Ninth Circuit has had the opportunity to review actual tier-II
findings only in Clough, where it failed to discuss whether it inter-
preted tier-II as substantive.332 The Forest Service findings in
Clough's EIS each contained one short paragraph reciting the tier-II
language and referring generally to other EIS chapters. The district
court reasoned that the agency had a substantive duty to make these
findings true in selecting among its project alternatives. According
to the court, however, the agency had no predicate duty to include
subsistence in the initial design of its alternatives. Based on the
tion was needed because oil exploration would not undermine section 810's pro-
tective policy. The exploration itself would not restrict subsistence, the Interior
Department retained power to control later stages of oil development, and the
agency could "meaningfully comply" with section 810 at a later stage. See id. at
544-46.
329. 872 F.2d 497, 502-04 (1st Cir. 1989).
330. Id. at 502-03.
331. Id. at 502.
332. See Clough III, 915 F.2d at 1310-13; see also id. at 1313 (apparently
misinterpreting section 810(b) to refer to tier-I factors, and failing to discuss tier-
II findings); City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, 960 F.2d 776, 778-79 (assuming
arguendo Forest Service violated section 810 and finding no irreparable harm to
support injunction); id. at 780 (Norris, J., dissenting) (suggesting EIS failed to
comply with NEPA and ANILCA, but not addressing specific requirements of
tier-II).
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Forest Service's narrow range of alternatives, and on deference to
the conclusions that resulted, the court upheld all of the tier-II find-
ings.33 The district court's analysis was flawed because an agen-
cy must design alternatives that protect subsistence before it can
select one that conforms with tier-II.
Tier-II does not expressly limit an agency's discretion to design
alternatives, but finding (A) requires that any restriction flowing
from the one it chooses be "necessary" to make the new use feasi-
ble. To be rational, then, the agency must show that the new use
would fail, whether for economic, engineering, or ecological rea-
sons, if it selected another alternative that better protected subsis-
tence. Findings (B) and (C) require that the agency's chosen alter-
native take the minimal area of land and cause minimal impacts,
consistent with the feasibility of the new use. Again, a rational
choice must show that the new use would not be feasible under an
alternative that further reduced land area and subsistence impacts.
To support such a choice, an agency must design alternatives that
reduce the subsistence restriction, land area, and impacts, and then
determine whether these alternatives will compromise the feasibility
of its new use. The agency must rank the alternatives that are com-
patible with the new use to determine which causes the least re-
striction, as required in the tier-II findings. In Clough, for example,
the Forest Service should have defined the limit of subsistence
protection by reducing logging to protect varying levels of subsis-
tence, and determining the greatest protection that allowed logging
to remain feasible.334 The district court's deference to the
333. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1426-29; Clough H, 750 F. Supp. at 1432;
City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, No. J86-024 CIV, slip op. at 23-28 (D. Alas-
ka May 24, 1991).
334. Even if the Forest Service had complied with NEPA's requirement to
study a "no action" alternative, that would not have satisfied tier-II of ANILCA.
Tier-II requires an agency to choose an alternative that maximizes subsistence
protection, consistent with completing its project; not merely to study a theoreti-
cal alternative that eliminates the project. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 546 (Congress
established section 810 as "a framework for reconciliation, where possible, of
competing public interests"). But cf, e.g., 2 U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE FOREST
SERVICE, TONGASS LAND MANAGEMENT PLAN REVISION-SUPPLEMENT TO THE
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, ch. 3, at 764 (Aug. 1991) (rept.
RIO-MB-149) (finding restriction "necessary" to meet forecast demand for tim-
ber, without studying any alternative free of impact on subsistence).
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agency's definition of its project was misplaced. The Forest Service
had no discretion to ignore protective alternatives because tier-II
imposed a substantive requirement to minimize subsistence impacts.
The interpretation that tier-II imposes substantive requirements is
not inconsistent with subsection 810(d)'s reference to "procedural"
ones. Congress drafted section 810 to reflect the holding of Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,335 in which the Supreme Court
applied the substantive standard "no feasible and prudent alterna-
tive" restricting federal highways through parks.336 In Overton
Park, the Court halted a highway because an agency did not con-
sider all of the "relevant factors." Like the highway statute in
Overton Park, but unlike NEPA, section 810 requires an agency to
select the alternative that causes the least harm to certain resources.
To fulfill this requirement, the agency must consider a relevant
factor: whether some feasible alternative can better protect subsis-
tence. Like the highway statute, tier-II includes its "necessary,"
"minimal," and "minimize" requirements in an agency's project
review procedure. Although the agency must satisfy that procedure
in tier-II, Congress designed the process to achieve the substantive
outcome of minimizing a project's impact on subsistence. The sub-
stantive requirements of tier-II, and Clough's interpretation of each
finding, are discussed below.
B. Finding (A): Restriction is Necessary and Consistent
The first tier-II finding is that the subsistence restriction caused
by a project is "necessary, consistent with sound management prin-
ciples for the utilization of the public lands." Although both "neces-
sity" and "consistency" with sound management are elements of
finding (A), these two elements impose separate duties on an agen-
cy.
335. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
336. See Mitchell Telephone Interview, supra note 128 (Congress drafted sec-
tion 810 to require agencies to include subsistence among the "relevant factors"
studied prior to the making of a decision); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 404-05 (cit-
ing Department of Transportation Act of 1966, as amended, section 4(f), 49
U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1964 & Supp. V 1969), and Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968,
section 18(a), 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964 & Supp. V 1969)).
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1. The Finding of Necessity
In Clough, subsistence users argued it was not "necessary" for
the Forest Service to restrict subsistence merely to meet a contract,
and that a project must promote more of Congress' land use objec-
tives than a single timber contract to be necessary. The district
court reasoned that no project could promote the objectives of
every statute, thus an agency need only find a restriction necessary
to promote one of the uses Congress designated for a reserva-
tion.337 The court was partially correct in its interpretation of find-
ing (A), but it did not go far enough in reviewing the agency's
"necessity" analysis to effectuate Congress' scheme.
To manage the public lands, agencies had to have some discre-
tion to select the best use for each tract. Congress recognized this
need for flexibility through the "necessary" requirement in finding
(A), which stopped short of making subsistence the paramount
use. 3 1 Instead, this language commanded agencies to balance
existing subsistence uses in each reservation against other uses
Congress designated as permissible. Congress provided a pro-
cess-the tier-I evaluation and the tier-II hearing-so that each
agency would involve subsistence users and obtain information to
minimize new restrictions. At the end of this process, the tier-II
findings imposed substantive standards on an agency balancing
other uses against subsistence.
In Clough, tier-II did not bar the agency making that balance
from satisfying private interests at the same time it served the pub-
lic interest. The Forest Service made a lawful policy choice to pro-
mote timber harvesting because that was a use Congress intended in
the Tongass National Forest.339 Tier-II imposed duties on the For-
337. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1427-28.
338. See City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, No. J86-024 CIV, slip op. at 24
(D. Alaska May 24, 1991) ("Congress refrained from using the word
'unavoidable' which would impose an absolute duty on federal agencies, and
opted for the word 'necessary"'); cf Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411-13 (stating
that statutes excluding highway unless there was no "feasible" and "prudent"
alternative raised park protection to paramount importance, but still permitted
highway in case of "truly unusual factors," costs reaching "extraordinary magni-
tudes," or "unique problems"); supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text (trac-
ing Congress' adoption of the word "necessary").
339. See ANILCA §§ 703, 705, 706, 16 U.S.C. §§ 539d, 1132, 539c (mandat-
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est Service to minimize the use of subsistence lands and take rea-
sonable steps to minimize subsistence impacts. Provided it met
those duties, the agency could find a subsistence restriction "neces-
sary" to satisfy a private timber contract.3" As far as it went, the
court's analysis accepting that agency purpose did no violence to
Congress' scheme, but the court omitted a second, essential step.
Finding (A) demands that a restriction, not just a project, be
"necessary." A restriction is the product of both the project purpose
and the means that an agency chooses to effect it. The means are
determined, in part, by section 810, because tier-I requires an agen-
cy to look at all its land to locate subsistence uses and alternate
project sites. Further, tier-II requires an agency to rank the subsis-
tence value of each site, to support its findings."' If some lands
are more highly valued for subsistence, it is irrational to select
those sites for a new project that is feasible elsewhere. Only if the
lands most valued for subsistence are the ones needed to make a
project feasible is it "necessary" to take valuable subsistence land.
ANILCA's protection is thus similar to the highway act in Overton
ing timber harvest level, establishing timber supply fund, exempting harvest from
land suitability review, and setting harvest reporting requirements).
340. Notwithstanding the public interest in preserving the independence of rural
villages, see 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1), (4), (5), subsistence itself confers private bene-
fits in that users and their families reap the immediate rewards. See id. § 3113;
cf. BERGER, supra note 3, at 56-57 (describing complex subsistence economy that
distributes benefits to elderly and disabled villagers who cannot participate in
hunting or fishing).
341. The tier-I findings that a restriction is "necessary" and impacts will be
"minimized," and arguably, the finding that use of subsistence lands will be
"minimal," require an agency to rank the value of each site and design alterna-
tives that avoid the most valuable subsistence sites. See ALASKA PULP 1989
SEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 132-33 (arguing in "minimal lands" finding that
highest-ranked logging lands also are highest-ranked subsistence habitat, so pro-
ject must use more than minimal amount of land); cf id., ch. 3, at 109-16, ch. 4,
at 6-13, 17-32, 80-85, 111, 115-20, 132 (ranking subsistence use in different
areas qualitatively on maps and charts, and analyzing impacts, but making "nec-
essary" finding for preferred alternative even though it causes greatest impact);
Kunaknana, 742 F.2d at 1151 (requiring agency "to compare the relative desir-
ability of leasing other tracts" from subsistence standpoint, in course of its tier-I
evaluation); cf. NORTHWEST BARANOF 1995 DEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 59
("[e]ffort was taken" to protect highest valued subsistence areas; not possible to
redirect logging without impacting another community's subsistence).
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Park, which allows an agency to take park land only if there is no
feasible and prudent alternative. If there is a feasible alternative,
ANILCA requires an agency to find it unnecessary to use valuable
subsistence land.
In Clough, the Forest Service's choice of means is troubling
because it suggests the subsistence restriction was not "necessary."
The agency justified logging prime subsistence lands based on its
interpretation that the contract required it to sell timber-more than
the buyer could cut.342 Under section 810, the agency had a duty
to minimize subsistence restrictions from its land management by
taking a hard look at the constraints it placed on project planning. It
had amended its logging contract before. If there was an alternative
to using highly-valued subsistence land, such as reinterpreting the
contract or amending it again, the restriction was not necessary. In
that event, the court should have held that the agency's "necessary"
finding violated section 810.
2. The Finding of Consistency with Sound Management
In addition to the "necessary" finding, an agency must find a
restriction "consistent with sound management principles for the
utilization of the public lands." This consistency requirement must
be interpreted in light of Congress' directives throughout ANILCA
for agencies to conserve healthy populations of subsistence species
by applying scientific game management methods. In enacting these
directives, Congress recognized that conserving subsistence species
required agencies to protect their habitats, in addition to managing
the game.343 Accordingly, in making tier-II's consistency finding,
342. See Clough III, 915 F.2d at 1311 ("not at all clear that the contract re-
quires the government to make available to APC hundreds of millions more
board feet than it could possibly cut during the five-year period").
343. See S. REP. No. 413, supra note 32, at 233, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5177 (committee intends conservation of healthy populations to
mean "the maintenance of fish and wildlife resources and their habitats" (empha-
sis added)); see also id. (including four references to protection of "ecosystems");
supra note 139 (citing committee report); cf. Alaska National Interest
Lands-Part 1: Hearings on H.R. 39, H.R. 2219 Before the Subcomm. on Fisher-
ies and Wildlife Conservation and the Env't of the Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 694 (Feb. 14-Mar. 6, 1979) (House Serial
No. 96-4) (remark of Rep. Oberstar) ("we cannot have a two-headed monster,
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an agency must determine that its land use planning for habitat
supports existing, scientific game management prescriptions.
The principal game management prescriptions are invoked by
section 804, which accords subsistence uses "priority over the tak-
ing on [public] lands of fish and wildlife for other purposes." Under
section 804, game managers have imposed prescriptions-hunting
seasons and bag limits-to prevent subsistence shortages by regu-
lating non-subsistence hunters.3' Federal land agencies, however,
have never specified that a project must be consistent with these
game management regulations in their section 810 guidelines. This
omission may have arisen from the original separation between
game management by the state and public land management by
federal agencies, but it ignores Congress' intent to integrate habitat
protection with sound game management. Further, the absence of
game management prescriptions from section 810 consistency find-
ings is now particularly egregious because the section 804 priority
is administered by a federal subsistence board.345 To provide
Congress' full protections, tier-II evaluations must specify how a
one regulating fish and wildlife, and the other the habitat"); id. at 413-14, 418-19
(statements of Ronald Skoog, Commissioner, Department of Fish and Game,
State of Alaska) (state should retain subsistence management to avoid fragment-
ing habitats that span state and federal lands).
344. See 16 U.S.C. § 3114; U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, OFFICE OF
SUBSISTENCE MANAGEMENT, SUBSISTENCE MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS FOR
FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS IN ALASKA (effective July 1, 1992-June 30, 1993)
(booklet summarizing regulations for general distribution to hunters); Subsistence
Management Regulations for Public Lands in Alaska; Final Rule, 57 Fed. Reg.
22,940-64 (May 29, 1992) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 242 for Agriculture Dept. and
50 C.F.R. § 100 for Interior Dept.). Managers also must regulate subsistence
users in times of severe shortage, abating some subsistence uses according to a
further priority established by section 804. See 16 U.S.C. § 3114(1), (2), (3);
Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 317 (9th Cir. 1988); Bobby v.
Alaska, 718 F. Supp. 764, 776-78 (D. Alaska 1989); see also Smith, supra note
17, at 25-27 (describing state's operation of this second-tier preference system).
345. See 36 C.F.R. § 242.10(a), (c)(3); 50 C.F.R. § 100.10(a), (c)(3); see also
infra part V (discussing role of Federal Subsistence Board and opportunity to
integrate habitat and game management by regulation); cf., e.g., NORTHWEST
BARANOF 1995 DEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 23, 45-46, 51-53, 55-59 (referring
to deer shortage and need to manage non-subsistence hunting, but making "con-
sistency" finding without specifying measures to accommodate game management
to habitat loss induced by project).
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project's subsistence restriction is consistent with existing game
management prescriptions, or how the agency will amend those
prescriptions to prevent a shortage as required by section 804. If a
project creates a subsistence shortage, the consistency finding must
specify how the agency will implement the abatement priority
among subsistence users that section 804 also requires.
In Clough, the only consistency finding litigated to date fell short
of Congress' standards. The Forest Service finding provided a list
of statutes and a pro forma statement that the preferred alternative
was consistent with them. The agency's record, however, showed
existing problems with game management prescriptions, and antici-
pated that its project would necessitate amended regulations for
both non-subsistence and subsistence hunters.3" The Forest Ser-
vice also acknowledged it had not ensured that state law manage-
ment prescriptions would be amended. Given the failure to integrate
land management with game management, the district court should
have remanded the tier-II consistency finding rather than deferring
to the agency. Further, given Congress' emphasis on protecting
subsistence, the court should have required the Forest Service to
investigate alternatives with lesser habitat destruction before finding
its project consistent under ANILCA.347
C. Finding (B): Project Takes the Minimal Area of Public Lands
The second tier-II finding is that an agency will use "the minimal
amount of public lands necessary to accomplish the purposes" of its
project. In Clough, the Forest Service determined that its lands
most highly valued for subsistence were also most valuable for its
346. See ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 20-32, 80-85,
115-120, 123-125; see also Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1453 (Forest Service project-
ed that cumulative impacts of logging would drop deer population "substantially
below the level necessary to meet expected harvest demand" by the year 2080).
The Forest Service recommended that the state amend its management regulations
to compensate for federal development of habitat, but acknowledged that it did
not know whether the state would respond. See Clough 11, 750 F. Supp. at 1432.
347. See 16 U.S.C. § 3112(1). But cf. Kenaitze, 860 F.2d at 317 ("Congress
passes laws, not purposes"); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for
a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2426 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
"the vice of 'simplistically ... assum[ing] that whatever furthers the statute's
primary objective must be the law"') (citations omitted).
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logging project. The agency interpreted finding (B) to require the
sacrifice of these subsistence lands, to minimize its overall use of
public land. 3' The district court recognized that minimizing the
use of subsistence lands would be more consistent with the purpose
of section 810, but held that it was bound by ANILCA's definition
of "public lands" which included all federal lands in Alaska.349
The court's decision permitting the agency to log the best subsis-
tence lands to save non-subsistence lands was contrary to the lan-
guage, purpose, and legislative history of section 810.
The purpose of section 810 is to preserve subsistence resources
by protecting their habitat from unnecessary destruction, and Con-
gress designed the language and structure of subsection 810(a) to
promote this purpose. Tier-I requires an agency to evaluate "public
lands" with reference to any public lands it considers for disposi-
tion, but tier-II requires it to evaluate "such lands" with apparent
reference to the immediately preceding clause: "public lands needed
for subsistence purposes."35 Consistent with this statutory struc-
348. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1428; see also ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS,
supra note 164, ch. 4, at 28-32, 84-85, 119-120 (preferred alternative number 3,
causes greatest habitat loss for principal subsistence species). Subsistence users
construed finding (B) to require an agency to minimize its use of subsistence land
rather than its overall use of public land. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1428.
Thus, unlike findings (A) and (C), the dispute in finding (B) concerned a pure
question of law. See id.; cf Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1455 n.50 (judicial deference
to Forest Service inappropriate where its construction conflicted with clear intent
of Congress). The agency's interpretation of finding (B) may have evolved subse-
quent to Clough. See 1 U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE, CENTRAL
PRINCE OF WALES FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT-KETCHIKAN
PULP COMPANY LONG-TERM TIMBER SALE CONTRACT ch. 3, at 316 (July 1993)
(report R1O-MP-229a) (statement in tier-I finding (B) that agency made effort
"to protect the highest value subsistence areas"); see also NORTHWEST BARANOF
1995 DEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 41, 45 (preferred alternative number 1, had
least impact on game of four action alternatives, and also lowest total acreage of
public lands used).
349. See Clough, 750 F. Supp. at 1428; see also id. at 1429 (minimizing use of
subsistence lands is more consistent with the purpose of section 810); cf. 16
U.S.C. § 3102(3) (defining public lands as federal lands in Alaska); Amoco, 480
U.S. at 547-49 (construing definition of public lands narrowly).
350. Compare tier-I (applying section to "disposition of public lands under any
provision of law") with tier-II (following tier-I search for alternatives to reduce
"disposition of public lands needed for subsistence," agency must complete tier-II
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ture, finding (A) requires that restrictions flowing from a use of
subsistence land be necessary, finding (B) that a use of subsistence
land be minimal in area, and finding (C) that a use of subsistence
land be conditioned to minimize its impacts. The district court in
Clough overlooked this natural reading of subsection 810(a) when it
referred to the definition section of ANILCA to ascertain the mean-
ing of "public lands."
The court's interpretation of finding (B) also undermined Title
VIII's protective purpose by affirming the sacrifice of highly valued
subsistence lands. Congress could not have intended that result
when it cautioned agencies to "cause the least adverse impact possi-
ble" on subsistence users.351 It is highly unlikely that Congress
envisioned a situation where minimizing the development of public
lands would aggravate the loss of subsistence land. Finding (B)
simply does not seem artful in its use of the defined term "public
lands" because the structure and purpose of the section show Con-
gress sought to protect subsistence lands, not public lands in gener-
al.
If there is any ambiguity in finding (B), reference to its legisla-
tive history is appropriate.352 The House bills with the first ver-
sions of section 810 applied it only within subsistence zones, so
findings for any "disposition of such lands which would significantly restrict
subsistence uses"). 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (emphasis added). Under the Forest
Service's proposed construction, it would have made no sense for Congress to
refer, in tier-II to "such lands," because it could have simiply said "public lands."
See id.; cf. Clough, 750 F. Supp. at 1428 ("public lands" is always term of art).
351. See 16 U.S.C. § 3112(1); see also id. § 3101(c) (purpose of ANILCA to
provide opportunity to continue subsistence lifestyle, consistent with wildlife
conservation and other reservation purposes).
352. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (if
Congress' intent is clear, there is no reason to resort to agency interpretation or
legislative history). The district court found no reason to apply the canon of con-
struction that interprets ambiguities in favor of Natives, in laws enacted to benefit
them. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1428; cf. Amoco, 480 U.S. at 555 (finding
no ambiguity in definition of public lands, under same canon). If there was ambi-
guity in finding (B), the purpose of title VIII as Native legislation, the inclusion
of Native villagers in Clough, and the status of the agency as one of several ad-
ministering section 810 should have offset the court's deference to a Forest Ser-
vice interpretation. See Village of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572, 581-82 (9th
Cir. 1984) (canon of construction applied to Title VIII).
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minimizing non-subsistence lands was not an issue.31' New bills
deleted the subsistence zones, making section 810 applicable to all
federal lands, and added tier-II's finding (B).354 It could be argued
that these amendments fundamentally changed section 810 to pro-
tect subsistence by protecting all public lands, but the actual chang-
es in wording were minor. Tier-I still requires an agency to evalu-
ate "other lands," referring to lands with fewer "subsistence uses
and needs." Tier-II still requires an agency to develop only those
subsistence lands that are "necessary," and to "minimize" subsis-
tence impacts. Tier-I and findings (A) and (C) thus remain consis-
tent with Congress' original scheme in the subsistence zone
era-they protect subsistence lands. This history suggests that find-
ing (B) has the same purpose: to minimize development of subsis-
tence lands. In Clough, the district court thwarted this purpose
when it held finding (B) to protect overall public land at the ex-
pense of subsistence land.
D. Finding (C): Agency Will Minimize Impacts
Section 810 requires that "reasonable steps will be taken to mini-
mize" a project's subsistence impacts. In Clough, the district court
upheld the steps-thinning trees, closing minor roads, training log-
gers to avoid bears, and asking the state to change hunting regula-
tions-that the Forest Service proposed to minimize impacts. In
approving these steps, the court rejected subsistence users' claims
that the word "reasonable" required the agency to take all reason-
353. See H.R. 10888, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 601(b), (j) (Feb. 9, 1978) (review
applies in "subsistence management zones" in new reservations); see also H.R.
39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 703(3), 704(a), 714 (Oct. 17, 1977) (review applies
in "regional subsistence zones" that include all subsistence lands in Alaska along
boundaries of the 12 Native regional corporations); H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 703(3), 704(a), 714 (Oct. 28, 1977) (same). In these early versions, one tier-I
review factor was the availability for the project of "lands outside a subsistence
management zone." See H.R. 10888, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6010) (Feb. 9,
1978); see also H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 714 (Oct. 17, 1977) (review
factor is availability to project of "non-subsistence lands"); H.R. 39, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 714 (Oct. 28, 1977) (same).
354. H.R. 39, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 704, 705, 707 (Feb. 15, 1978); S. 2944,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 703, 707 (Apr. 19, 1978); ANILCA §§ 804, 805(a),
810(a), 16 U.S.C. §§ 3114, 3115(a), 3120(a) (1994).
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able impact-minimizing steps, and that these steps must be adequate
to protect subsistence. The court also rejected the users' contention
that the word "minimize" required the agency to reduce subsistence
impacts to their smallest value.355 The court summarily deferred to
the agency, accepting its legal interpretation of finding (C), but this
interpretation recognized only part of Congress' design in section
810.
A land manager must have discretion to trade off factors in a
planning decision, and the adjective "reasonable" allows an agency
to decide what steps will minimize subsistence restrictions. The
word "reasonable" in finding (C) neither requires an agency to take
all available steps nor cabins an agency's choice of protective steps
with a substantive standard.356 The word "minimize," however,
does supply a substantive standard for the level of subsistence pro-
tection an agency must provide. "Minimize" goes beyond the famil-
iar environmental standard--"mitigate"-and requires an agency to
do more than just reduce a project's impacts.357 It must reduce the
355. See Clough I, 750 F. Supp. at 1429; see also City of Tenakee Springs v.
Franzel, No. J86-024 CIV, slip op. at 27-28 (D. Alaska May 24, 1991) (rejecting
subsistence users' argument that "minimizing" steps must reduce impacts to their
smallest degree, in contrast to "mitigation" measures which reduced impacts'
severity); Appellants' Joint Brief at 33, City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, 960
F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1992) (Nos. 91-35520, 91-35522) (subsistence users' argument
that "minimize" is more substantive standard than "mitigate"); Appellants' Reply
Brief at 19, City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel (Nos. 91-35520, 91-35522)
(same). The subsistence users' principal contentions were that the Forest Service
failed to consider cutting less timber, closing its logging roads to reduce competi-
tion from non-subsistence hunters, or using timber harvest techniques developed
by its biologists under its "New Perspectives" program. See id. at 19-21;
Appellants' Joint Brief at 33-35, Franzel, supra.
356. Cf. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 503 (1st Cir. 1989) (suggesting
that tier-I requires an agency to modify project if it "unreasonably harms" sub-
sistence). Early bills used the word "adequate" in finding (C), but Congress sub-
stituted ,the more familiar legal standard of reasonableness. See supra note 141
(Senate report suggests "reasonable" and "adequate" are functionally equivalent).
357. See supra note 305; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20(b) (1995) (NEPA regu-
lation treating "minimizing impacts" as a specific type of "mitigation," separate
from avoiding, rectifying, reducing over time, or compensating for, impacts).
Although "minimize" and "mitigate" clearly have different meanings, there has
been much confusion of the two terms, even in the courts. See Akutan 1H, 792
F.2d at 1377-78 (using terms interchangeably in describing tier-II); Clough 11,
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impacts to a definite end point: the smallest subsistence restriction
the new use can cause and still remain feasible.358 An agency
need not employ heroic measures, but when it has chosen how to
minimize subsistence impacts, it must continue to add steps to fur-
ther reduce a restriction as long as they remain reasonable. The
difficulty for an agency arises from Congress' use of the flexible
word "reasonable" to implement the substantive "minimize" Stan-
dard.
An agency's inquiry into what is "reasonable" raises two ques-
tions. First, an agency must determine which of the potential steps
it knows of are "reasonable., 359 In this context, the "minimize"
standard suggests it must take all known steps that reduce a restric-
tion.3' An agency may, after study, reject a step that will not ef-
750 F. Supp. at 1432 (Forest Service "mitigation measures" that comply with
finding (C)); cf. BLM GUIDELINES, supra note 145, app. 10 (suggesting tier-Il
format as: "the following mitigation measures ... will be[ ] used to minimize ad-
verse impacts").
358. ANILCA's use of this "minimize" standard is not unique. The highway
statutes in Overton Park required an agency to use "all possible planning to mini-
mize harm." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 404
n.2, 405 n.3 (1971). Regulations implementing section 404 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), require an agency permitting discharge of dredged or
fill material into navigable waters to ensure "appropriate and practicable steps
have been taken which will minimize" the impacts. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d)
(1995); see also id. § 230.12(a) (1995) (agency may impose permit conditions to
minimize impacts). These examples illustrate that "minimize" can be an enforce-
able, substantive standard. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332, 351-53 (1989) (highway statute in Overton Park "may impose
substantive environmental obligations on federal agencies").
359. That is, an agency that has designed a project and evaluated its subsis-
tence impacts must further study the effectiveness of all measures it knows may
reduce those impacts. An agency need not use all available measures because
some may be redundant, detrimental in combination with others, or destructive to
the feasibility of a project. Rather, it must evaluate the effectiveness of all protec-
tive measures it knows of. The district court evidently overlooked this distinction
when it held "[t]he Forest Service is not required to consider 'all' reasonable
alternatives." City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, No. J86-024 CIV, slip op. at 28
(D. Alaska May 24, 1991). An agency is required to consider all measures it
knows of, and to decide what combination it can use most effectively, before it
can conclude rationally that it has minimized subsistence impacts.
360. This duty must be bounded by feasibility of the subsistence-protective
step, feasibility of the project after the agency implements the step, and the re-
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fectively reduce subsistence impacts as an unreasonable waste of
effort. If a step reduces impacts, however, an agency cannot avoid
that effort by implementing a cost-benefit analysis because Con-
gress recognized non-economic values in protecting subsistence. An
agency can only avoid an effective step if that step would render its
new use infeasible, because Congress made subsistence co-equal
with the other uses it designated for the federal lands.
The second question facing an agency is how hard it must look
to find unknown impact-minimizing steps. Clearly, an agency must
consider steps disclosed by public comment under tier-II and
NEPA, and must investigate whether each will be effective. If an
agency rejects a suggestion, it has the burden of showing the step
would be ineffective, because finding (C) requires it to minimize
project impacts.36' Congress could not have expected users to
prove the efficacy of proposed steps because the limited income
produced by their subsistence economy cannot support research. An
agency must also search for unknown impact-minimizing steps,
beyond those suggested in public comments, because Title VIII
expresses Congress' mandate to protect subsistence. Judicial over-
quirements of other laws. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(d) (agency must comply with
other applicable laws); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978) (under NEPA, "the concept of alternatives must be
bounded by some notion of feasibility"); cf. Methow Valley Citizens, 490 U.S. at
352-53 (unlike NEPA, a substantive statute may demand that an agency fully
develop a plan to mitigate harm before it acts).
361. The district court took the opposite view: "plaintiffs have failed to carry
their burden of proving the existence of viable, preferable, ascertainable mitiga-
tion alternatives, or of showing why the [Forest] Service's proposal is 'arbitrary
and capricious."' Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. at 1429. A party challenging an agency
does have the burden of showing its finding irrational, but the court overlooked
the agency's predicate burden: to "examine the relevant data and articulate a ...
'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made."' Motor Vehi-
cle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (citations omitted). If an agency makes its choice of impact-mini-
mizing steps without evaluating a suggested measure, its finding is not "'based on
a consideration of the relevant factors"' and cannot stand. Id. (quoting Bowman
Transp. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974)); cf. City
of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975) (compliance with NEPA
should not depend on proof, by plaintiffs with limited resources, that project will
have particular effects, because it is federal agency's duty to evaluate project's
effects).
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sight of that open-ended search should be circumspect, but an agen-
cy must respond to Congress' command to "minimize" impacts on
subsistence.
In Clough, there were sharp factual disputes between the Forest
Service and subsistence users over three impact-minimizing steps,
but the foregoing framework suggests the appropriate analysis if the
details were available.362 The first dispute concerned the number
of logging roads the agency would close to reduce competition
from non-subsistence hunters. The agency reasoned that it should
leave major roads open to aid hunters. Subsistence users contested
this choice, however, arguing that non-subsistence hunters were
motorized, while they hunted from boats. The court should have
analyzed the dispute as an agency's avoidance of a known impact-
minimizing step. The Forest Service could have readily learned the
efficacy of closures because it had subsistence use surveys and
models of deer availability.363 The agency had the burden of
showing that any closure it rejected would not have protected sub-
sistence. Had it demanded that showing, the court could have re-
viewed whether additional road closures were a "reasonable" step.
Only if additional closures were unreasonable was the agency's
finding (C) valid.364
362. Compare Appellants' Joint Brief at 33-35, City of Tenakee Springs v.
Franzel, 960 F2d 776 (9th Cir. 1992) (Nos. 91-35520, 91-35522), and Brief for
Hanlon Appellants at 38-41, Clough III, 915 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1990) (Nos. 90-
35516, 90-35527) with Consolidated Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for Sum-
mary Judgment and Reply to Opposition to Federal Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 19-27, City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel (D. Alaska May 24,
1991) (No. J86-024 CIV). In addition to the factual disputes, there was a funda-
mental disagreement whether the Forest Service must consider amending its long-
term contract to permit less logging and lower impacts. See Appellants' Joint
Brief at 33, City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, supra; Memorandum of Federal
Defendants in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Amended Complaint
of Hanlon Plaintiffs and Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction Sought
by Hanlon Plaintiffs at 7-11, Clough I, 750 F. Supp. 1406 (No. J86-024 CIV);
Clough III, 915 F.2d at 1311-13.
363. The Forest Service did decide to close spur logging roads, but not main
roads. See Clough 1, 750 F. Supp. at 1429. Although the agency considered the
merits of road closures, it did not use its available data to quantify the subsis-
tence impacts. See ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS, supra note 164, ch. 2, at 28-29, 38,
45, ch. 4, at 80, 123-25, 131-32, 134, 136, 137-38.
364. The issue of road closures was related to another disputed issue-whether
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The second factual dispute was over the method of logging the
Forest Service employed. The agency contended that it made an
appropriate tradeoff among known methods to harvest timber and
protect wildlife, while subsistence users argued that techniques of
"new forestry" would reduce impacts further.365 If new forestry
had unknown effectiveness, the court should have employed the
reasonableness inquiry for steps unknown to an agency. Under that
inquiry, the court should have determined whether the agency con-
ducted an evaluation within the time and budget limits of its pro-
ject.3 The court had to accept the agency's account of those lim-
its if there was support in the record, but common sense suggests
the agency should have tested techniques that might be useful later
in a fifty-year contract.367 Only if new forestry had proved
the Forest Service could delegate its impact-minimizing steps to the
state-because the agency proposed state game regulation as the solution to non-
subsistence hunting competition created by road access. See ALASKA PULP 1989
SEIS, supra note 164, ch. 4, at 123-24. If road closure and game regulation could
each accomplish the same protection, the agency had discretion to choose which
step it preferred. If both steps together would further protect subsistence, howev-
er, the agency was required to use both, because the "minimize" standard re-
quired it to employ all effective steps. See supra note 369 and accompanying
text; see also infra note 356 and accompanying text (discussing agency's duty to
implement its suggestions for game management).
365. "New forestry" describes a program of silvicultural methods designed to
permit some timber harvest while preserving ecological values present in multi-
age, multi-story forest stands. See Jerry F. Franklin, An Ecologist's Perspective
on Northwestern Forests in 2010, FOREST WATCH, Aug. 1989, at 6-9; Jerry F.
Franklin, Thoughts on Applications of Silvicultural Systems Under New Forestry,
FOREST WATCH, Jan./Feb. 1990, at 8-11; cf. William Atkinson, Another View of
New Forestry, FOREST WATCH, Aug. 1990, at 12-15 (criticizing methods). New
forestry was developed, in part, by biologists of the Forest Service.
366. The agency argued that it had incorporated new forestry into timber sale
planning under its "New Perspectives" program. See Consolidated Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motions at 25-27, City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel (D. Alaska May
24, 1991) (No. J86-024 CIV). Subsistence users argued that the agency had in-
corporated more effective steps recommended by its own experts into another
timber sale, but not into the Clough sale. See Appellants' Reply Brief at 19-20,
City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel, 960 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1992) (Nos. 91-
35520, 91-35522).
367. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 385
(1989) (if the agency took a hard look, it was permitted to conclude that new
scientific evidence did not merit supplemental EIS); cf. O'TOOLE, supra note 201,
338 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
ineffective at reducing impacts or had foreclosed the logging con-
tract, should the court have validated the agency's finding (C).
The third factual dispute was over a Forest Service suggestion
that the state might need to impose management regulations to
control competition from nonsubsistence hunters. The Forest Ser-
vice reasoned that it had no jurisdiction to control hunting because
the state, at that time, had the power and duty to enforce the subsis-
tence preference.368 The Forest Service also argued that it had tak-
en other measures to "mitigate" habitat damage from logging, even
if the state failed to issue the regulations. In opposition, subsistence
users contended that the Forest Service's suggestions to the state
were too vague, and finding (C) required an agency itself to take
steps, rather than delegating these steps to the state.369 The court
reasoned that the Forest Service could properly delegate its impact-
minimizing steps, unless the users showed that reliance on the
delegation was irrational. The court held that, irrespective of any
delegation, the Forest Service had properly asserted that its own ac-
at 22-25 (some 60 percent of Tongass Forest's budget was spent on timber sale
preparation); DAVID KATZ, TONGASS AT THE CROSSROADS: FOREST SERVICE
MISMANAGEMENT IN THE WAKE OF THE TONGASS TIMBER REFORM ACT 11-16,
30-32 (1992) (Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics
White Paper to the Clinton Administration) (arguing Forest Service shortchanged
wildlife and spent most of its budget on timber program).
368. See Memorandum of Federal Defendants in Support of Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment on Amended Complaint of Hanlon Plaintiffs and Opposition to
Motion for Preliminary Injunction Sought by Hanlon Plaintiffs at 28-29, Clough
1, 750 F. Supp. 1406 (No. J86-024 CIV) (deer harvest exceeds pre-logging capac-
ity of area and key to reducing competition is not road closures but state game
bag limits). Following the federal takeover of subsistence management in 1990,
the Forest Service continued to argue it could not control hunting because it had
only one of five seats on the Federal Subsistence Board. See Consolidated Oppo-
sition to Plaintiffs' Motion at 22-23, City of Tenakee Springs v. Franzel (D.
Alaska May 24, 1991) (No. J86-024 CIV).
369. See Brief for Hanlon Appellants at 39-41, Clough III, 915 F.2d 1308 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Nos. 90-35516, 90-35527); see also ALASKA PULP 1989 SEIS, supra
note 164, ch. 4, at 123-24 ("[a]t some point, the Alaska Board of Game may
have to use its authority to further regulate non-subsistence harvest of deer due to
the competition .... They may also have to prioritize the harvest of deer among
[subsistence users]"); id. at 136 ("[sjtate regulatory opportunities for establishing
seasons, bag limits, access permits, and licensing were evaluated as good for...
subsistence concerns, but are outside the Forest Service authority").
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tions minimized subsistence impacts.37° The holding suggests that
the court made an unduly narrow interpretation of finding (C).
The court should have analyzed this third dispute as a challenge
to an agency's avoidance of a known impact-minimizing step. The
court's legal conclusion, that an agency could delegate steps to a
reliable actor, was supportable."7 ' The Clough case, however, con-
tained factual questions that undermined the propriety of the Forest
Service delegation. Users questioned the specificity of its proposals,
and the Forest Service was uncertain whether the state would fol-
low them, negating its claim of proper delegation. The fact that it
had no power over state regulation did not excuse the Forest Ser-
vice from its duty because it had independent authority to regulate
hunting directly, or could have obtained a commitment from the
state. 72 Any Forest Service delegation to the state had to be en-
forceable, because finding (C) required that impact-minimizing
steps "will be taken." If hunter regulation was an effective impact-
minimizing step, the court should have held that the agency's fail-
ure to ensure regulation invalidated its finding (C).
In summary, Congress' purpose-protecting subsistence resources
from unnecessary harm-requires an agency to give tier-II a more
expansive interpretation than the Forest Service afforded it in
Clough. Finding (A) requires an agency to determine there is no
other feasible means to install a new use before finding a restriction
"necessary." Finding (A) also requires an agency to determine a
370. See Clough 11, 750 F. Supp. at 1432.
371. The agency would remain responsible for defining how it would enforce
the delegation because finding (C) gave it the duty to minimize project impacts.
See 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(3)(C); cf. The Steamboaters v. FERC, 759 F.2d 1382,
1394 (9th Cir. 1985) (under NEPA, if an agency relies on mitigating measures to
support a FONSR, it must specify how it will enforce those measures);
LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389, 399-400 (9th Cir. 1988) (same); CASE, supra
note 9, at 291 (citing Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423, 428 (D. D.C.
1979)) (suggesting federal agencies also have a trust responsibility to maintain
subsistence).
372. See 16 U.S.C. § 3125(3) (agency may restrict non-subsistence fishing and
hunting only to protect fish and wildlife or subsistence); id. § 3126(b) (agency
may close lands to fishing and hunting for game conservation); see also id.
§ 3116 (Interior Department has duty to monitor regulation and report exercise of
federal "closure or other administrative authority to protect subsistence"); cf. id.
§ 551 (Forest Service may regulate occupancy and use of national forests).
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restriction's consistency with other laws, including game manage-
ment prescriptions that effect the subsistence preference of section
804. Finding (B) requires an agency to minimize its use of valuable
subsistence land, even if it must employ a greater area of other
federal land. Finding (C) requires it to take all known steps that
increase subsistence protection, to justify rejecting other steps sug-
gested by the public, and to develop new impact-minimizing steps.
A reviewing court must scrutinize the factual basis for an agency's
tier-II findings, and ensure its legal interpretations remain consistent
with Congress' scheme to protect subsistence.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Section 810: Agency Implementation
The first recommendation is that federal land agencies develop
new procedures that conform subsistence planning to Congress'
protective purpose. Congress clearly sought to remedy deficiencies
in public land management under ANCSA when it enacted Title
VIII of ANILCA. Although subsistence users have rarely had the
data to prove need for an injunction, they have shown that agency
planning under section 810 is inadequate. The agencies must act to
protect subsistence now because existing section 810 guidelines are
not consistent, binding, or effective in making subsistence co-equal
with other uses. In Hanlon, for example, the district court held a
Forest Service tier-I study deficient, and in Clough, the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected a tier-II evaluation.373 To comply with ANILCA,
agencies should implement new procedures for the tier-I evaluation,
threshold "significance" determination, and tier-II findings.
New tier-I procedures should evaluate a range of protective alter-
natives because an important purpose of tier-I is to avoid subsis-
tence impacts early in project planning. To define these alternatives,
an agency should research subsistence use and needs, other
available sites, and project alternatives. The procedures should draw
standard methods for surveying and data analyses from the recom-
373. See Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1448-49, 1452-55; Clough III, 915 F.2d at
1311-14; cf. Daugherty, supra note 153, at 1597-98 (as a result of Forest Service
projects, many areas of the Tongass will be unable to meet demand for the prin-
cipal subsistence species within five decades).
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mendations made by the Alaska Land Use Council.374 The re-
search should rely on those most knowledgeable about the re-
sources to be protected: the subsistence users. New tier-I procedures
should also require an agency to document its study fully, to sup-
port its "significance" determination and any required tier-II evalua-
tion.
New significance threshold procedures should incorporate the
"may" test and present factors that define the extent of restriction.
The factors should relate to subsistence, rather than the generic
concerns of the NEPA regulations. The threshold finding should be
a practical assessment of the threat to users' livelihoods, not an
effort to protect a project schedule from tier-II requirements
through complex analysis. The procedures should establish
ANILCA's significance threshold lower than NEPA's because Con-
gress sought to make the user participation and substantive provi-
sions of tier-II readily available. Whether or not it finds a threat of
significant restriction, an agency should disclose its threshold find-
ing to enable timely comment by subsistence users.
New tier-Il procedures should implement the substantive lan-
guage of the tier-II findings, providing more detailed instructions
than the statute or the existing guidelines that parrot it. Agencies
should interpret strictly the requirement that resource destruction be
"necessary" because Congress' purpose was to minimize significant
restrictions of subsistence. New procedures should affirm that an
agency can rationally find a restriction "necessary" only if it has
studied a range of more protective alternatives that proved infeasi-
ble. Agencies must also document a project's consistency with
section 804's wildlife management prescriptions before making the
"consistent with sound management" finding. In addition, tier-II
procedures should ensure that projects take minimal subsistence
land by requiring an agency to rank the subsistence values of the
lands studied in each alternative. Agencies must also investigate
374. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (ALUC Working Group II
recommendations for subsistence evaluation methods, never adopted); cf. supra
notes 134, 156 (Working Group I recommendations for subsistence definitions
with little restraint on agency discretion, adopted as guidelines by Fish and Wild-
life Service); SCHROEDER & KOOKESH, supra note 206, at 319-26 (suggesting
approach for subsistence evaluation of logging programs in Tongass).
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what measures are available to minimize subsistence impacts, im-
plement all those steps that are effective, and monitor their contin-
ued effectiveness. Putting together all of these requirements, new
procedures must effect Congress' fundamental purpose: selecting
the most subsistence-protective alternative that allows a new use to
remain feasible.
A related recommendation is that agencies use the discretion that
inevitably remains in their new procedures to zealously protect sub-
sistence. Although project schedules and budgets may invite agen-
cies to treat subsistence as an afterthought, section 810 exists to
promote forethought. The highest Alaska administrator in each
agency should monitor planning, integrate section 810 into agency
culture, and ensure that each project includes protective alternatives.
While this protection weighs heaviest on multiple use agencies-the
Forest Service and BLM-they should rise to the task because their
lands are critical for subsistence. Further, subsistence is compatible
with other desired uses: watershed, wildlife, recreation, and wilder-
ness. Beyond making new procedures to achieve minimal compli-
ance with section 810, agencies should strive to promote Congress'
purpose of preserving the lands that give cultural, religious, and
social necessities, and a livelihood to subsistence users.
B. Sweet Home: Land Use Planning and Game Management
A further recommendation is that agencies integrate land use with
resource management on the public lands. Congress recognized that
in order to maintain a game population, an agency must protect
habitat at the same time it controls hunting and fishing.375 In
Clough, however, tier-II findings revealed the Forest Service had
divorced its land use planning from game management. One model
for integrating the two aspects of game conservation may be found
in the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").376
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, the Supreme Court upheld an ESA regulation that sought
to protect endangered species habitat at the same time it protected
375. See 16 U.S.C. § 3120; see also S. REP. No. 413, supra note 32, at 233,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5179 (conservation of healthy resource popula-
tions requires maintenance of fish and wildlife resources "and their habitats").
376. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994).
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animals from direct harm. 377 ESA barred any person from taking a
protected animal, and defined "taking" broadly to encompass sever-
al actions that would injure or kill, including "harm. 378 In Sweet
Home, the disputed regulation defined "harm" to include "signifi-
cant habitat modification.., that actually kills or injures wild-
life. 3 79 The Court upheld this definition as a reasonable construc-
tion of the "taking" prohibition, consistent with Congress' purpose.
The decision offered agencies a means to better protect subsistence
because Congress' definition of "taking" in ANILCA was quite
similar to its definition in ESA, and included the term "harm."38
Both ESA and ANILCA protect wildlife populations, but for
different purposes. ESA seeks to save declining species from ex-
tinction, so it bars their taking entirely. ANILCA seeks to conserve
surpluses of game species for subsistence users to harvest, and also
for sport hunters and fishers, and commercial fishers, if the num-
bers permit.3 1 Accordingly, ANILCA allows taking game, but
377. 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2412-14, 2418 (1995); see also id. at 2418-21
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting facial challenge to regulation under assump-
tion that "taking" prohibition includes implied requirement of proximate cause);
cf. id. at 2421-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that expansion of taking prohi-
bition to include modification of privately-owned habitat exceeds authority of
Fish and Wildlife Service).
378. See ESA § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (unlawful to take any
endangered species). ESA defines a taking as follows: "[t]he term 'take' means to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt
to engage in any such conduct." Id. § 1532(19).
379. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) (defining "harm" to include "significant habi-
tat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by sig-
nificantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or
sheltering").
380. See ANILCA § 102(18), 16 U.S.C. § 3102(18) (defining "take" or "tak-
ing" to include "pursue, hunt, shoot, trap, net, capture, collect, kill, harm, or
attempt to engage in any such conduct"); cf. supra note 378 (ESA definition
contains same terms in different order, except ANILCA deletes "harass," and
adds "net").
381. That is, ANILCA seeks to maintain a "healthy population" of each game
species, so there will be a harvestable surplus above the base population required
for the species to continue to exist. See 16 U.S.C. § 3112(1), (2); see also supra
note 139 (quoting Senate report defining requirements for healthy populations);
cf. Madison v. Alaska Dep't of Fish & Game, 696 P.2d 168, 174 (Ala. 1985)
(discussing former state law establishing priority system to assure taking fish on a
19961 343
344 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
section 804 gives subsistence "priority over the taking... of fish
and wildlife for other purposes.""3 2 To provide section 804's sub-
sistence priority, when necessary in times of shortage, agencies
have restricted only sport/commercial users. 383  The Supreme
Court's holding in Sweet Home suggests that agencies should also
restrict land use projects that "take" game by significantly modi-
fying habitat.
New ANILCA regulations should include significant habitat mod-
ification in section 804's "taking" priority, so that agencies will
combine land use planning with game management. Under such
regulations, if the game surplus exceeds subsistence needs, a federal
land agency will allocate it between sport/commercial taking and
any new project taking game by modifying habitat. This allocation
must involve the state, which ordinarily regulates sport/commercial
uses. If a project takes the available game surplus, the agency must
curtail sport/commercial uses to protect subsistence under section
804's priority. Some projects will be cancelled because of strong
public support for sport and commercial uses in Alaska. Public
involvement will also assist an agency in designing new projects to
protect both sport/commercial uses and subsistence. Allocating the
available game will focus an agency's efforts on Amoco's process
of reconciling competing public interests in subsistence,
sport/commercial uses, and development projects.384
"sustained-yield" basis); Bobby v. Alaska, 718 F. Supp. 764, 776-77 (D. Alaska
1989) (discussing state's interpretation of its "sustained yield" requirement).
382. 16 U.S.C. § 3114.
383. See id. See also, e.g., Kenaitze v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 313-14 (9th Cir.
1989) (describing section 804 priority without reference to evaluation of land
use); cf. Hanlon, 740 F. Supp. at 1449-51, 1453-55 (describing section 810 evalu-
ation of land use without reference to section 804 priority). The administration of
the subsistence priority is complicated by the fact that the state now sets only
sport/commercial seasons on public lands. The Federal Subsistence Board has
taken over setting subsistence seasons and administering the priority for subsis-
tence users in times of shortage. See infra note 387 and accompanying text.
384. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 546 (Congress declared subsistence a public inter-
est and established section 810 as framework for agencies to reconcile competing
interests); cf Daugherty, supra note 153, at 1598 n. 134 (reporting claim that
Forest Service is already restricting non-subsistence hunters to accommodate
resource taking by projects, and to "conceal adverse effects of clear-cutting on
subsistence").
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Even if there is no game surplus to allocate, section 804 will not
bar a project because Amoco holds new uses co-equal with subsis-
tence.385 A project taking game needed for subsistence will force
an agency to apply section 804's second tier of priority favoring
certain classes of subsistence users over other classes. Again, the
requirement to allocate the game in advance will focus an agency's
project design on minimizing subsistence impacts.
Regulations including habitat modification in section 804 prior-
ities also will clarify an agency's duties under section 810. An
agency making the tier-I finding that a project is "consistent with
sound management" will have to amend its game management to
account for the project's game taking.3 6 An agency making the
finding that it will "minimize" subsistence impacts will also have to
review game management, if total game takings cause adverse im-
pacts. The taking definition will thus lead an agency to integrate
project design with game management in completing its section 810
evaluation. The integrated planning will minimize the destruction of
subsistence resources-the overarching purpose of section 810. To
accomplish this purpose, the taking definition should be incorporat-
ed in joint regulations that apply to all federal land managers in
Alaska.
C. Joint Regulations: Executive Action
A final recommendation is that the Executive Branch improve
land agencies' conformance with section 810 by placing them under
uniform regulations. Currently, subsistence evaluations are governed
by internal guidelines of each agency that are not consistent, cur-
rent, readily available to the public, or uniformly followed. The
385. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 548. If an agency simply defined significant habi-
tat modification as a "taking" for purposes of ANILCA, section 804 potentially
could bar a project that reduced habitat where there was no game surplus to sup-
port subsistence. To avoid making subsistence the paramount use in contravention
of Amoco, an agency could draft its definition of harm (taking) to include signif-
icant habitat modification "except where necessary to effect another use designat-
ed by Congress for the lands in question." Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a)(3)(A) (requir-
ing that subsistence restriction be "necessary" to purpose of project, for agency to
complete tier-II evaluation).
386. See Amoco, 480 U.S. at 534 n.2.
1996] 345
346 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
Department of the Interior cannot remedy this situation unilaterally
because one important agency, the Forest Service, is part of the
Department of Agriculture. The President, however, can issue an
executive order requiring all agencies to follow uniform regulations,
and there is precedent for this approach under NEPA. To address
the shortcomings in agency guidelines, the President should direct
the agencies to develop and implement joint regulations for subsis-
tence evaluations.
The President should designate the Federal Subsistence Board to
prepare these joint regulations. The Board is comprised of the Alas-
ka regional heads of the major federal land agencies, and thus in-
cludes viewpoints encompassing preservation, recreation, subsis-
tence, and resource development."' Following judicial invalida-
tion of the state's subsistence preference in 1990, agencies created
the Board by regulation to assume management of subsistence hunt-
ing on federal lands.3"' This management of subsistence resources
will benefit if integrated with management of their habitats under
section 810. The Board receives staff support from the Fish and
Wildlife Service, which provides expertise in game manage-
ment.3"9 If the President assigns the Board to be the leading body,
387. The Federal Subsistence Board consists of the Alaska Directors of the
Fish and Wildlife Service, Park Service, Forest Service, Bureau of Land Man-
agement, and Bureau of Indian Affairs, and is supported by a staff committee
from all five agencies. See 36 C.F.R. § 242.10(b)(1), (c)(5) (1995); 50 C.F.R.
§ 100.10(b)(1), (c)(5) (1995); Subsistence Management Regulations for Public
Lands in Alaska, Final Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,940, 22,954 (1992); cf. id. at
22,944, 22,945 (rejecting comments that Board or staff committee should include
subsistence users, but offering to consider users' suggestions and to utilize re-
gional councils "to the maximum extent possible").
388. See Temporary Subsistence Management Regulations for Public Lands in
Alaska, Final Temporary Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 27,114-170 (1990); see also supra
note 120 (discussing federal takeover); cf supra notes 198-200 and accompany-
ing text (Board will also have jurisdiction over subsistence fishing in navigable
rivers with federal reserved water rights).
389. See 36 C.F.R. § 242.10(c)(7) (1995); 50 C.F.R. § 100.10(c)(7) (1995).
Reportedly, the Board is responsive to villagers' subsistence needs. Johnson Tele-
phone Interview, supra note 225. The Fish and Wildlife Service has expertise
from its mission to conserve game on some 75,000,000 acres in Alaska-eighty-
five percent of its National Refuge System. Arguably, its culture may once have
been too sport or preservation-oriented to meet subsistence harvest needs, but it
now staffs the Board and has assumed the duty of providing a subsistence prefer-
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the section 810 regulations it prepares will be accorded deference in
the courts.
When the Federal Subsistence Board drafts joint regulations, the
state should participate, as should Native organizations and the
public at large. The state will bring broad experience gained from
its years of managing subsistence on federal, state, and private
lands. Further, the state should continue to manage subsistence on
state and private lands, and non-subsistence hunting and fishing on
all lands. The state produced the baseline subsistence use surveys
and has a continuing stake in the welfare of all its rural resi-
dents. 3' Native organizations represent the interests of a large
fraction of villagers and the accumulated knowledge from centuries
of subsistence. The public should also be involved in drafting the
joint regulations because of the public interest in the lands. The
Board should seek advice from subsistence users, Native corpora-
tions, other private landowners, development interests, commercial
fishers, sport fishers and hunters, and conservation groups. The
drafters should provide the notice and comment required for infor-
mal rule making under the APA. To increase participation, the
Board should conduct hearings on federal land use planning for
subsistence throughout Alaska.
The regulations that result from this process should incorporate
the foregoing recommendations. They should be flexible enough to
impose minimal burdens on small projects, while ensuring full pro-
ence on public lands. See Clough Telephone Interview, supra note 260 (also
noting Fish and Wildlife Service is not as well funded as other agencies). But see
Kurth Telephone Interview, supra note 260 (state is too vast and agency man-
dates too diverse for uniform section 810 regulations); Telephone Interview with
Susan Detwiler, Chief of Staff Committee Coordination and Legal Issues Branch,
Fish and Wildlife Service, Anchorage, Alaska (Jan. 3, 1994) (uniform section 810
regulations are "politically unfeasible" and would devolve into agencies' battle
over habitat management); cf. Telephone Interview with Tina Cunning, State of
Alaska Subsistence Division (Sept. 29, 1992) (subsistence evaluations have been
ineffective in protecting small communities and motorized access).
390. Some 60 percent of rural residents now are non-Native and there is con-
siderable public pressure for the state to reassume subsistence management on
public lands. Telephone Interview with Susan Detwiler, Chief of Staff Committee
Coordination and Legal Issues Branch, Fish and Wildlife Service, Anchorage,
Alaska (Jan. 14, 1993); see also supra note 9 (about 55 percent of those legally
qualified to use subsistence are non-Natives).
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tection for those that affect substantial areas of habitat."' Further,
they should specify who in each agency will do subsistence evalua-
tions and how those responsible will assess a project's impacts.
Responsibility should rest at a high enough level so that subsistence
gets a priority equal to new uses, as Congress intended. The evalua-
tions, however, should be conducted by project personnel from
various disciplines who have direct involvement in the design of a
project.392 To ensure projects minimize subsistence impacts, the
regulations should provide for plenary review of every evaluation
by the Federal Subsistence Board.393 Joint regulations and supervi-
sory review will reduce inconsistencies in policy among federal
land agencies. The new regulations will also remove ambiguities
that have sparked conflicts between the agencies and the subsis-
tence users Congress sought to protect in section 810.
CONCLUSION
Subsistence on the public lands is essential to villagers in Alaska.
Congress enacted ANILCA Title VIII to remedy agencies' failure
to protect subsistence, and included section 810 because projects
were destroying habitat that supported game. In tier-I, Congress
sought to inject subsistence into land use planning early. Beyond
391. The majority of subsistence evaluations involve small amounts of land or
insignificant threats, while a few clearly demand extensive planning to minimize
conflicts between new projects and existing subsistence uses. See Letter from
Terry L. Haynes, Statewide Coordinator, Division of Subsistence, Alaska Depart-
ment of Fish and Game, to Joris Naiman (Feb. 23, 1996) (on file with the
Fordham Environmental Law Journal).
392. Cf William Funk, NEPA at Energy: An Exercise in Legal Narrative, 20
ENVTL. L. 759, 763-65 (1990) (portraying ineffective implementation of NEPA in
agency where high level office preparing environmental statements had no in-
volvement with project design).
393. Although subsistence evaluations might be more consistent if they were
all prepared by the Board, that would disassociate the reviewers from project
management, and would be considered intrusive by land management agencies.
See Detwiler Telephone Interview, supra note 390. Instead, the Board should
provide detailed methods for subsistence evaluations, and act as a consultant
when requested. All agencies' subsistence evaluations should conclude with a
review by the Board. Following this review, the Board should halt any project
that does not include the full subsistence protections Congress provided in section
810.
ANILCA SECTION 810
requiring an agency to study a project's impacts, tier-I also requires
it to evaluate other sites and alternatives, to reduce those impacts.
In tier-II, Congress went further, requiring an agency to provide a
hearing and substantive findings before significantly restricting
subsistence use. Congress' intention was to make sure an agency
devised and selected the alternative that best protected subsistence
without foreclosing the project.
Unfortunately for the villagers, agencies did not rise to Congress'
challenge. Rather than protective alternatives, their tier-I studies
focused on justifying findings of no significant restriction in order
to avoid completing tier-II. Agencies also provided weak and incon-
sistent guidance to project designers on how to evaluate subsistence
impacts. Despite the different goals of the statutes, agencies import-
ed the higher "significance" threshold of NEPA, and erected the
"significant possibility" test as barriers to ANILCA's tier-II
protections. In the sole case reviewing tier-II findings, the agency
construed each finding to give itself the most discretion, rather than
giving subsistence the most protection. Fifteen years of implementa-
tion suggest that agencies have sought to minimize the burden of
complying with section 810, rather than using it to make better land
use decisions. To fulfill Congress' original intention, agencies must
change their methods of subsistence evaluation.
First, agencies must develop complete, consistent procedures to
guide project designers in an evaluation. Procedures should also re-
quire an agency to consider a range of protective alternatives early,
rather than justifying a pre-made choice with a standard finding. At
the same time, tier-I should use standard techniques to fairly assess
subsistence impacts. The procedures also must define the tier-II
threshold, combining the Ninth Circuit's "may" test with a practical
assessment of the extent of a restriction. Section 810 requires an
agency to err on the side of caution, providing Congress' tier-II
participation and findings if an alternative threatens to harm subsis-
tence.
New tier-II procedures must instruct an agency to select the least
harmful alternative that remains feasible. An agency's record must
also show that its choice takes the least valuable subsistence land,
discloses the protective steps available, and implements all steps
that effectively reduce subsistence impacts. To meet Congress'
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intent fully, an agency must develop game management prescrip-
tions and integrate them with its land use planning in tier-LI.
Beyond the agencies' separate jurisdictions, the President should
order the Federal Subsistence Board to create section 810 regula-
tions binding all federal agencies. These joint regulations should
collect the wisdom of subsistence users, the procedures developed
by the agencies, and the interests of the public in land use and
game management. They should lead an agency to choose the pro-
ject alternative that best protects subsistence. With consistent regu-
lations, and willing enforcement by land management agencies,
section 810 will help protect the subsistence way of life for future
generations in rural Alaska.
